Sarker, Ashutosh, and Helen Ross. 2006. "Managing the Ecosystem Services Linked to Water Resources Commons in South East Queensland, Australia." Presented at "Building the European Commons: From Open Fields to Open Source," European Regional Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) , Brescia, Italy, March 23-25.

Abstract

"This paper analyses how non-market-based instruments and market-based instruments could together address soil erosion and nutrients problems that prevail in the water resources commons in South East Queensland, Australia. Land owners' individual actions, such as historical land clearing in their private land and use of inorganic fertilizers, have contributed to soil erosion and nutrients problems respectively in the Brisbane River and Moreton Bay downstream. These problems have common property implications since private actions of land owners in their land management and water usage affect the common property access of others to water quality for consumption and recreational uses. Both humans and other species depend on the water quality of the Brisbane River and of Moreton Bay, which is recognised under the Ramsar Convention for its biodiversity values.

"A range of proposals have been made to encourage improved land management practices in the interests of water quality. The non-market- based instruments include education, moral persuasion, institutions-based design principles learned through international experience, and government command and control regulation for environment management. MBIs include price-based instruments and quantity-based instruments, which have in turn sub-classifications.

"Government regulation through the command and control mechanism has shown poor performance, and neither social nor formal rules for managing environment are well-crafted. The concepts of market-based instruments are relatively new and have shown some promising results in managing the environment, but these instruments are not substitutes for non- market based instruments. We argue that non-market and market-based instruments could be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Choosing the right combination is a challenge; yet could solve the problems of ecosystem commons in South East Queensland. Our paper attempts to explore suitable combinations of market and non-market based instruments in the context of the environmental management situation in South East Queensland. The design principles that Ostrom and their colleagues at the Indiana University have developed principally concern the commons of customary societies. Some of these design principles such as 'Congruence between Appropriation and Provision Rules,' and 'Monitoring Collective-Choice Arrangements' are applicable in Australian commons, which are non-customary, while the command and control mechanism is expected to remain necessary to some extent. In addition, market-based instruments would be a commendable complement to non-market-based instruments. Some of the price-based instruments are incentive payments and tendering, while quantity-based instruments include environmental offsets."