Dahal, Ganga Ram. 2006. "Forest Governance and Institutional Structure: An Ignored Dimension of Devolution Policy Process in Collective Action: The Case of Community Based Forest Management in the Philippines." Presented at "Survival of the Commons: Mounting Challenges and New Realities," the Eleventh Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Bali, Indonesia, June 19-23, 2006.

Abstract

"This paper identifies strategic weaknesses in the devolution policy process in forest management and analyses the reasons behind them. Further, it establishes the relationship of devolution policy outcomes under collective action with governance and institutional structures. The field research was undertaken in the Philippines, taking six cases of community based forest management (CBFM) sites in the province of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino and employing a qualitative technique for data collection and interpretation.

"The study demonstrates that the devolution policy process has two major interrelated strategic weaknesses: one is inadequate policy articulation and the other is a set of differences between policy and the complex reality of implementation. Guided by the legacy of the historical and colonial system of state control over forest resources, formal policy making in forestry in the Philippines is unilateral as two other actors, civil society and the market, are excluded. As a result, policy articulation is inadequate as manifested in three major policies (Local Government Code 1991, Executive Order 263 of 1995 and the Indigenous People's Right Acts 1997) with limited devolution of authority and power to manage forests by local communities. The research reveals that the centralised control mechanism in the policy has created an upward accountability structure in the devolved forest management approach, as any decisions about managing forests at the local level need prior approval from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

"Such inadequate policy provisions have ignored existing complex institutional structures. It is generally the case that the institutions involved in the implementation of devolution policy are poorly resourced; the delivery mechanism is apathetic and incompetent when not associated with externally funded projects. In contrast, the external projects have unleashed new institutions like 'remuneration for participation' for collective action at the community level and allowances for field visits among delivery agencies replacing the traditionally functional local networks and norms of volunteerism. The present policy process clearly fails to properly heed the strength and weakness of existing institutional structures. Further, this process has given rise to the elite capture of the devolved power and resources as it encourages the practice of taking undue benefits by the local elites after satisfying the requirements of DENR officials rather than the needs of members of CBFM.

"Similarly, the governance issue has been ignored in the implementation of policy. As is evident from this study, corruption permeates the process of CBFM implementation at all levels. The actors involved in CBFM implementation indulge in unethical practices, such as: misuse of CBFM funds, illegal logging, illegal collection of non-timber forest products, bribes and red tape in timber harvesting and sale. Also, the local elites are getting more benefits, which has led to the practice of inequitable benefits sharing among the members of CBFM POs.

"Drawing upon this analysis of strategic weaknesses in the devolution policy process in the Philippines the paper argues that the level of success of policy outcomes under collective action is dependent on the interrelation between the levels of devolution with clear policy articulation on the one hand and quality of governance and institutional structures on the other. "