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## A REVIEW OF FIVE STUDENT PAPERS

1.

Dulcey L. Simpkins

### **Land Trusts: Common Pool Resources Face A Capitalist Context**

Common pool resource (CPR) studies do not accommodate the pressures of capitalism particularly well; most cases pressures for conversion or external marketing of a common resource destroy the common organization. Privatization and the modern state, hallmarks of capitalism, tend to erode alternatives in resource management. Yet local land trusts represent a translation of commons regimes into a private property context. The similarities between trust activities and CPR institutions are obfuscated by their dependence on private property and state/federal law for enforcement of rules. Yet the intergenerational nature of the trust's activities, as well as the "institutions" other than enforcement, are determined through collective cooperation for conservation.

Land trusts are charities according to US IRS tax code 501(c)(3). As such, they are eligible to receive charitable donations of land or of easements controlling the use of land in perpetuity. Groups of local individuals organizing to prevent random development, or land conversion in their communities can incorporate as a trust. Doing so they offer tax benefits to land/easement contributors, and simultaneously preserve resources from degradation. These "common resources" (some are rival, some are almost non-rival that is more collective, but all are difficult to exclude others from) range from tangible endangered habitats and species to community character, views, and open space. But what they all have in common is their rival nature with development conversion, and the intergenerational concerns about them on the part of trust members. What each local trust does, which values or "resources" will be the goal of the trust protection efforts, result from negotiation. Local level land trusts form through collective action and are managed through negotiations of the "stakeholders in the resource." Beneficiaries of a trust's activities are indeed larger than the trust members, but there is still collective action toward enduring use of resources beyond a single generation, and the course of protecting and managing the resources is still negotiated by the trust in a manner akin to a CPR. Larger trusts, such as the Nature Conservancy, do not fall into the CPR analysis due to their bureaucratic nature, but they can contribute resources to the activities of local trusts and are therefore a significant actor in their environment, as is the state.

Larger trusts, such as the Nature Conservancy, do not fall into this CPR analysis due to their bureaucratic nature, but they can contribute resources to the activities of local trusts and are therefore a significant actor in their environment, as is the state. A significant difference between trusts and CPR lies in their dependence on external formal laws for enforcement of exclusion on trust lands. But therein lies hope for private property conservation efforts as well. Private property, vital to industry and capital accumulation, is relatively inviolable: the trust is thus ensured a reliable enforcement mechanism and continued legitimacy with state jurisdictions. CPRs, due to their informal customary tenure, are often undermined by developmental states and cannot prevent trespass by those not in the CPR. If a trust can solicit neighbors to monitor their plots, and can muster staff or volunteer energy to occasionally scope lands, they can rely on the state for enforcing exclusion once it is detected.

The state actually aids trust conservation efforts, rather than undermining them. Although nested in private property law, reliant on private property, and subject to differential class access due to the need for fundraising, land trusts represent a way of integrating feedback about environmental degradation and dwindling natural or community values back into an industrial economy--they exclude capital accumulation through privatization, and manage "undevelopedness" for the future.

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Melinda L. Graham

**The Farmers Market Of Ann Arbor, Michigan: A Contemporary Urban Common Property Regime.**

The case study presented, that of the Ann Arbor, Michigan, Farmers Market, applies and expands upon previous Common Pool Resource (CPR) research as it relates to contemporary urban settings. The Farmers Market represents a unique CPR regime in which the appropriators have devised a complex resource system, the Market system, to create and benefit from the resulting consumer interest. The system includes physical and temporal characteristics, as well as less tangible attributes such as reputation. In addition, the Market is nested within a larger city government structure, allowing for exploration of nested enterprises and external arrangements.

Established CPR principles directly applied to the Farmers Market include issues of scale, resource assessment, group size, and homogeneity of the appropriators, as well as decision-making processes such as the formation of operational and constitutional rules. Additional issues relevant to contemporary CPR regimes are also addressed. These issues include: 1) Redefining "natural resource"; 2) Dealing with rapid change; 3) Nesting CPRs within other systems; 4) The role of leadership; 5) The role of shared values; 6) Redefining success.

This case study concludes with recommendations for strengthening the Market's CPR regime. The Market must address issues of perceived inequity, establish more effective conflict resolution and work to clarify the appropriators' rights of ownership. The establishment of a common vision with regard to the Market's long-term success would also contribute to the sustainability of this contemporary urban CPR. This case study also points to four avenues for future CPR research: 1) Inclusion of contemporary urban CPR within continuing research efforts; 2) Creation of larger governance frameworks which nurture the formation of CPR strategies within them; 3) Exploration of the potential role of leadership within CPR and 4) Examining the role of shared values and their potential for overcoming appropriator heterogeneity.

3

Christopher E. Morrow and Rebecca Watts Hull

**Cofyal: The Rise And Fall Of An Indigenous Forestry Cooperative**

Recently, several authors have drawn on case studies of successful, and less successful, common pool resource (CPR) institutions to develop principles for predicting when a CPR regime will form and the likelihood of its success once created. Most of the case studies used by Ostrom to develop CPR principles are small-scale, isolated, self-organized institutions. However, many modern attempts to manage CPR involve multiple stakeholders with differing interests, dependence on external markets, and threats from outsiders. In developing countries, three critical issues often complicate the context in which institutions for collective action are developed: 1) dependence on outside organizations for financial and technical assistance; 2) dependence on markets for resource utilization; and 3) vulnerability to the larger political economy in which they operate.

This paper examines the development and dissolution of the Yanasha Forestry Cooperative (COFYAL) in the Palcazu Valley of Central Peru to test the relevance of Ostrom's CPR institution design principles to indigenous forest management regimes involving multi-institutional project assistance and a complex set of external influences. For several of these principles we suggest ways in which they can be expanded to make them more relevant to the variables affecting this particular case. We then use this expanded CPR framework to suggest ways in which external agencies can assist more effectively in the development of durable common pool resource institutions.

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Mary Mitsos

**The Breakdown Of The Commons And The Loss Of Saami Culture**

For the Saami there exists a close connection between their resource management system, reindeer herding, and their culture. For the past thirty years, the Saami people in Scandinavia have been under almost continuous pressure from rapid, mostly exogenous change. Many aspects of their cultural life and the resource management system are beginning to break down. Additionally, for at least the past decade, they have been under pressure from the government and environmentalists with the accusation that there is severe overgrazing on the tundra due to the herding practices of the Saami. The historical context of the case is described within a common property framework. Discussions of the dismantling of their common property regime (CPR) show that both the accusation of overgrazing and the breakdown of their culture can be attributed to the dissolution of their CPR.

Globally, the breakdown of many enduring CPR's has been provoked by four primary reasons: 1) increasing population pressure; 2) the introduction of more efficient technology; 3) immersion in a capitalistic market system; and 4) exogenous government intrusion. In this case, government policies appear to be the single, most important reason for the breakdown. By implementing rules that do not mesh with the local environment and by limiting the flexibility of the herding system, governmental policies have been detrimental. If, in fact, these policies are the fundamental reason, there is hope that the commons can be restored, thereby averting the "tragedy" (i.e., overgrazing) and hopefully saving Saami culture and their knowledge of reindeer and reindeer herding. Possible improvements explored are a) comanagement where both indigenous users and scientific "experts" are involved in the management of the reindeer and milk production, which allows the Saami to restore one of the most immediate feedback loops on the status of the pastures. Future research is recommended.

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William D. Leach

**Applying Common Property Theory To Suburban Resource Systems**

Common property research has focused primarily on subtractible, renewable resources and on informal or isolated appropriator organizations. Although this focus has facilitated the development of theory, the field may now be sufficiently mature that extending research to other settings will prove fruitful. This paper critically reviews the traditional bounds of the research, followed by an exploratory test of common property hypotheses using nontraditional resources in suburban settings. Specifically, it is suggested that (1) autonomous local governments can properly be considered common-property regimes, that (2) common-property regimes routinely manage not only subtractible, but also nonsubtractible resources, and that (3) common-property regimes must not only ensure sustainable use of renewable resources, but must also choose the mix of renewable resource systems that will be maintained. These three expanded applications of common property theory are explored through a post-hoc analysis of growth management regulations from 386 municipalities and 57 counties in California through 1989. Logistic regression is used to relate the incidence of growth management rules in each jurisdiction to local socioeconomic factors. The work expands the original analysis of the data by Glickfeld and Levine (1992) primarily by adding two independent variables: community stability and homogeneity. For municipalities, significant relationships are found for measures of homogeneity of educational attainment, homogeneity of language spoken at home, and community stability. However, the effect is opposite the direction predicted by common property theory: heterogeneous and unstable communities are more likely to regulate appropriation of shared resources.