

RESEARCH ARTICLE

A spatially explicit ontology for the institutional analysis of social-ecological systems

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Abstract: Dynamics within complex social-ecological systems (SES) are the product of a diverse array of socio-economic and biophysical processes. The spatial structure of these systems often influences the management of resources (e.g. forests, water, fish) including the institutional rules that are developed governing how these systems can be used. Prior work has developed frameworks to describe SESs to address what institutional contexts make SESs resilient or sustainable, but without articulating the spatial relationships inherent in these systems. The objective of this paper is to develop an ontology designed to describe the actors, resources and relationships within an SES, with an emphasis on the spatial relationships inherent in human-environment interactions. This ontology can be used to explore what spatial structures contribute to the resilience or sustainability of SESs. Many elements of SESs have explicitly spatial characteristics that in part affect the dynamics within those systems such as the proximity of actors to a resource, or the size of land holdings. The ontology presented here emphasizes the actors and resources in a system as well as the spatial characteristics and relationships that relate to the institutional factors affecting system dynamics. A series of three distinct case studies are used to demonstrate how this ontological framework can be applied to specific SESs. While the presentation here focuses on community level dynamics, the general framework presented here is broadly applicable to a wider array of analytical scales from local to regional level dynamics.

Keywords: Ontology; Social-ecological systems; Institutions

1. Introduction

Common-pool resources (CPR) such as trees in a community forest, water in irrigation systems, and fish or scallops in fisheries are embedded in social-ecological systems and their importance for natural resources management is well established in the literature (Dietz, Dolsak et al. 2002). CPRs have many spatially explicit characteristics, as do the households, communities and societies that manage them. Accordingly, the institutions (i.e. resource management regimes) that people develop in an effort to manage CPRs effectively vary with social and ecological spatial properties. For example, the institutions that affect the management of a 1 ha community forest develop in a dramatically different context than that for a trans-national park that is 100,000 ha in size. Some resources are relatively immobile (timber in community forests) while others are highly mobile (e.g. water in irrigation systems, wildlife in forests) (Schlager, Blomquist et al. 1994; Altrichter and Basurto 2008). Some park boundaries are well defined and recognized while others are imprecise and vague. A large, heterogeneous community may develop a different institutional solution for pasture management than a small cluster of households that have tight familial linkages (Varughese and Ostrom 2001). These diverse

52 relationships have important implications for the management of CPRs and the resource
53 management regimes that develop in different social-ecological conditions. Given the complexity
54 of social-ecological systems in which CPRs are embedded, it is difficult to conduct synthetic or
55 cross-site analysis without a framework to characterize these systems. Thus a major challenge in
56 developing such a framework is the identification of components to describe the spatial
57 relationships inherent in these social-ecological systems.

58 There are a number of case studies that have addressed the influence of spatial
59 characteristics in the institutional analysis of CPRs management (Schlager, Blomquist et al. 1994;
60 Levin and Harvey 1999; Wilson 2002; Turner, Matson et al. 2003; Lansing 2006; Ostrom 2007).
61 But there has not yet been an attempt to organize this type of analysis, and success at drawing
62 conclusions spanning case studies has been elusive. A series of coding efforts of numerous case
63 studies have provided an initial understanding of important conditions that can increase the
64 likelihood of communities managing their CPRs sustainably (Ostrom 1990; Tang 1992; Schlager,
65 Blomquist et al. 1994; Lam 1998; Cox, Arnold et al. in review). However, the emphasis has been
66 on identifying specific institutional arrangements without articulating their spatial context.
67 Spatial structure provides one common language that can facilitate cross-site analysis of SESs
68 and help further explain the functions and performance of these institutional arrangements.

69 The objective of this research is to develop a spatially explicit ontology that can enable the
70 cross-site analysis of social-ecological systems (SES), including the influence of institutional
71 forces on those systems. We present a spatial framework to describe the intersection between
72 institutions, people and common-pool resources and demonstrate how this framework can be
73 applied to three diverse case studies. While the paper draws examples from a set of three specific
74 CPRs, the framework is broadly applicable to a wide range of social-ecological contexts.

76 **2. Background and foundations**

78 This section provides a brief review of conceptual research on social-ecological systems
79 (SES) and the development of ontologies in spatial contexts. There is a distinct bridge between
80 these two science domains that we address in the development of an ontology for social-
81 ecological systems described later in this paper.

83 *2.1 Social-ecological systems and natural resource management*

85 Research on the dynamics in social-ecological systems (SESs) is quite diverse, although it is
86 characterized by several organizing concepts. These include resilience and robustness,
87 disturbance and perturbation, and complexity. A closely related, and somewhat overlapping,
88 literature has focused on the resolution of collective-action problems in common-pool resource
89 (CPR) settings, by some mix of institutional arrangements, biophysical conditions, and user group
90 properties (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2005). In this literature, institutions as rules function to provide
91 incentives that help groups of resource users overcome the divergence between individual and
92 collective interests they face, and collectively manage a natural resource. Berkes et al. (2003)
93 represents an integration of these two approaches, viewing a SES as a combination of institutional
94 arrangements and ecologies, each nested across several scales.

95 Overcoming collective-action problems is difficult because participants are uncertain about
96 the future actions of others, and have reasons to expect some degree of self-serving behavior on
97 their part (Hardin 1968). Many scholars studying community-based CPR management have
98 focused on the role institutions play in overcoming these difficulties. North (1990) states that
99 institutions arise in order to reduce the uncertainty in social situations by ordering participants'
100 relationships. By reducing uncertainty, trust and norms of reciprocity may be built and sustained,
101 and collective action may become possible. Thus, institutions are an important set of independent
102 variables that affect outcomes in collective-action situations. Institutions are defined by Ostrom

103 (1986) as “potentially linguistic entities . . . that refer to prescriptions commonly known and used
 104 by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships” where “prescriptions
 105 refer to which actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted.” In SESs an
 106 institution may involve the rules that restrict lobster harvesting when populations fall below a
 107 certain threshold, or the actors who are allowed to harvest timber in a community forest based on
 108 how long they have lived in the community.

109 Several frameworks have been proposed for studying SESs, including Gunderson and
 110 Holling’s (2002) Panarchy concept, Ostrom’s (2007) hierarchical framework, Anderies et al.
 111 (2004), Janssen et al.’s network approach (2006), and the robust control framework presented by
 112 Anderies et al. (2007). Anderies et al. (2004) defines an SES as four components: (1) A resource,
 113 (2) Resource users, (3) Public Infrastructure, and (4) Public infrastructure providers, as well as
 114 the possible inputs and outputs for each component. Janssen et al. (2006) define a SES as a
 115 network of nodes and links, and focus on analyzing SESs via the statistical properties of their
 116 networks, as is common in network analyses. A related body of work has focused on the
 117 properties of the social networks of individuals who manage natural resources (Bodin, Crona et
 118 al. 2006; Bodin and Crona 2008).

119 Gunderson and Holling’s work emphasizes the nonlinear temporal dynamics of SESs over
 120 time as they proceed through an adaptive cycle. In this adaptive cycle, any complex social or
 121 ecological system transitions from a period of growth and accumulating connectedness between
 122 its components, through a collapse to a period of renewal and reorganization that leads to further
 123 growth, restarting the cycle. The framework recognizes that multiple adaptive cycles may be
 124 nested one within another. This necessitates the incorporation of multiple nested spatial scales as
 125 slower moving adaptive cycles are associated with larger spatial scales.

126 Ostrom’s (2007) framework likewise attempts to recognize the hierarchical qualities of
 127 complex social-ecological systems, although the focus is analytical rather than spatial or
 128 temporal. A tiered framework where components of a SES are in turn decomposable into
 129 multiple subcomponents or properties results in an explicitly hierarchical structure. There are six
 130 primary components of an SES in this design: (1) A resource system, (2) Resource units, (3)
 131 Users, (4) A governance system, (5) Related ecosystems, and (6) External social, economic, and
 132 political settings. This framework includes some explicitly spatial properties such as the mobility
 133 and spatial/temporal distribution of the resource units, as well as the location of the users and the
 134 resource system, but does not articulate the role of spatial relationships in the system.

135 Finally, Anderies et al. (2007) present a framework defined by the robustness of social-
 136 ecological systems. This framework reflects the engineering origins of robustness as “the
 137 maintenance of some desired system characteristics despite fluctuations in the behavior of its
 138 components parts or its environment” (Carlson and Doyle 2002). This framework represents an
 139 SES as a decision-making component and a biophysical component that iteratively send signals to
 140 one another, constituting a feedback loop. The signal the decision-maker has is the output from
 141 the biophysical component, and the goal is to adopt a decision-making rule that maintains this
 142 output at a certain level or within a certain range given the behavior of the biophysical
 143 component, along with signal noise and external perturbations. These various frameworks have
 144 helped describe the structure of SESs, but have not focused on the spatial relationships that affect
 145 the dynamics within these systems.

146 147 *2.2. Ontologies and applications to social-ecological systems*

148
149 Ontologies have been suggested as tools to facilitate the accessibility and interoperability of
 150 spatial data (Smith and Mark 1998; Kuhn 2001; Agarwal 2005). Ontologies have also been
 151 developed to allow information systems to better manage and translate spatial data (Fonseca,
 152 Egenhofer et al. 2002; Timpf 2002; Agarwal 2005). Perhaps most importantly, the structure
 153 provided by ontologies can be used to create order from complex systems (Agarwal 2005). These

154 attributes are of particular utility given the challenges of characterizing complex systems and the
155 desire to produce effective cross-site analyses of social-ecological systems with generalizable
156 findings (McConnell and Keys 2005). Cross-site analyses require some standardization of data
157 which in part is provided by ontological frameworks that facilitate the translation of data across
158 different sources (Chandrasekaran, Josephson et al. 1999; Fonseca, Egenhofer et al. 2002).

159 While there have been previous attempts to develop data management systems for ecological
160 data (Baker, Benson et al. 2000; Bowers and Ludascher 2003), there has been less attention given
161 to systems of coupled social-ecological dynamics. Part of the challenge with these efforts is the
162 inherent complexity in social-ecological systems (Anderies, Janssen et al. 2004) and the task of
163 applying theoretical developments in ontologies to specific domains. Domain specific ontologies
164 have been developed to define the categories and relationships in what can be considered
165 complex systems. For example, Kuhn (2001) proposed a framework for modeling by organizing
166 the information in the German Traffic code. Ontologies have also been developed for remote
167 sensing data (Bähr 1998, Fonseca et al. 2002 and Comber et al. 2004, Ahlqvist 2005), land
168 development (Kaza and Hopkins 2007) and environmental planning (Boothby 2004; Pastorello,
169 Medeiros et al. 2005). Such efforts to organize data related to land cover, especially those that
170 incorporate human dynamics, are particularly relevant to applications to SESs given the
171 importance of these two domains to the system dynamics.

172 Semantic issues related to the vagueness and ambiguity of spatial features have been
173 highlighted as an obstacle in geographic representation (Agarwal 2005) which has implications
174 for the characterization of SESs. One study may find that lakes “near” agricultural areas are at
175 risk of eutrophication without defining the specific value of this distance relationship. Thus it is
176 difficult to disentangle the challenge of producing an ontology for the study of complex systems
177 from the issues related to semantics (Bishr 1998).

178 A core challenge in the study of social-ecological system is the definition of the dynamics
179 that are responsible for the resilience and stability of the system. A substantial number of domain
180 theories focus specifically on object classes and categorization without addressing dynamics such
181 as events, actions and processes (Kuhn 2001). But it is these types of system dynamics that are of
182 particular importance to the study of complex systems. Activity based ontologies (Câmara,
183 Monteiro et al. 2000; Kuhn 2001) offer a useful model for the development of frameworks
184 designed for dynamic systems, including complex social-ecological systems.

185 What characteristics should an ontology of SESs have? Agarwal (2005) defines four
186 considerations in the design of geographic ontologies: 1) spatial and temporal concepts, 2)
187 resolution of spatio-temporal integration and the object-field dichotomy, 3) resolution of
188 vagueness and ambiguity in geographic information and 4) resolution of issues in applying
189 higher-order ontology to vague concepts. Each of these considerations is relevant to the
190 development of ontologies for social-ecological systems. Spatial and temporal context have clear
191 implications for the definition of system dynamics, and spatial structure affects the resilience of
192 many social-ecological systems (Nyström and Folke 2001). Data collection methods to
193 characterize land management and decision-making highlight the importance of semantics in
194 defining distance relationships (e.g. distance to markets).

195
196

197 **3. Spatially Explicit Ontology of Social-Ecological Systems**

198

199 The foundation for the ontological structure presented here is defined by the salient
200 components within a social-ecological resource system and the relationships between those
201 components. Many of those relationships are explicitly spatial, including the fundamental
202 challenge of defining the spatial boundaries of a system or what defines a “closed system”. Here
203 we focus on a community scale approach and set of case study examples, although we
204 acknowledge that there are complex social-ecological systems that are not as driven by local-level

205 forces as the examples we describe here. However, in order to describe the spatial relationships
 206 within institutional settings we focus on this community scale context, as this is the level at which
 207 much of the common-pool resources institutional literature has focused in the past.

208 The main components of the framework are the *actors*, *resources* and *institutions* (Figure 1)
 209 within a SES. This framework is an extension of Ostrom’s diagnostic conceptual design (2007)
 210 which is defined by users, a resource system, resource units and a governance system. Actors are
 211 components of the social-ecological system with some participation in decision-making processes
 212 specifically with regards to the management or utilization of resources. For example, a village
 213 may have a committee of residents that makes decisions about local property rights that are
 214 allocated to specific households. Thus the community committee is an actor in the SES that in
 215 part is responsible for the pattern of land management in the community. Households in turn
 216 make land management decisions about partitions of the landscape that are allocated to them. So
 217 this system would have both a community committee actor as well as a set of household actors.
 218 Each individual actor within a specific actor class is referred to as an instance of that class.

219 The basis for the spatial relationships within a social-ecological system is articulated by the
 220 relationships between the core components, i.e. actors, resources, and institutions. There are two
 221 main types of relationships in the ontology. First, institutional action-based relationships consist
 222 of a management or governance action applied by an individual actor to a specific object of the
 223 action. Here we represent these action-based relationships with the following structure:

224

225 <Actor+Action+Object>

226

227 Actors and objects can take different forms depending of the research question and scope of
 228 interest to the researcher. For instance, an actor can take the form of a household making
 229 decisions about the management of a parcel of land. This would be represented as
 230 <Household+Manages+Parcel>. Examples of management or governance actions include *harvest*,
 231 *own*, *sanction*, *monitor* or *enforce*. Once constructed, the action-based structure can be used to
 232 identify each actor who affects a particular resource, and the chain of actions that affect a
 233 particular resource.

234 The second type of relationship in the ontology are spatial relationships. These are used to
 235 define the spatial structure of the system that affects system function. These spatial relationships
 236 are represented as:

237

238 <Actor.spatial-relationship.Object>

239

240 or

241

242 <Resource.spatial-relationship.Object>

243

244 where object is usually a resource of interest to the researcher (e.g. scallop, timber or a
 245 parcel of land).

246 Topological rules are used to define these system characteristics which include the following
 247 (Egenhoffer and Franzosa 1991):

248

249 COVEREDBY

250 COVERS

251 EQUAL

252 CONTAINS

253 INSIDE

254 COVERS AND CONTAINS AND EQUAL

255 COVEREDBY AND INSIDE AND EQUAL
 256 TOUCH
 257 OVERLAPBDYINTERSECT
 258 DISJOINT
 259 TOUCH AND OVERLAPBDYINTERSECT
 260 ANYINTERACT

261

262 In addition to these topological rules, system relationships are often described using
 263 semantic forms such as NEAR and FAR (Worboys 1992; Grigni, Papadias et al. 1995) in the SES
 264 case study literature and we allow the use of these semantic terms here. We then use triples to
 265 define key linkages in the system. An <Actor.Relationship.Resource> triple defines the
 266 relationship between an actor and a resource, while <Actor_a.Relationship.Actor_b> describes the
 267 relationship between two actor classes. For example, one instance of the Household class can be
 268 associated with an instance of the FishingGround class via the Near relationship
 269 (<Household_x.Near.FishingGround_y>). Spatial relationships can exist with resource class types as
 270 well (e.g. <Scallop.Inside.FishingGround>).

271 As with Kuhn (2001) we consider actions as having an actor and an object of that
 272 activity. In implementing this framework we code actions that are perceived to be the most
 273 salient to the dynamics of the SES. This is clearly a subjective decision made by the researcher
 274 who is hopefully familiar with the dynamics driving the SES. Any system has a multitude of
 275 dynamics that are of potential relevance to a particular actor instance, but can be considered less
 276 significant than overarching dynamics that affect the majority of actors in a system. For example,
 277 a household allowed to harvest timber from a community forest may be limited by the amount of
 278 labor the household can expend due to seasonal migration for wage labor, health of the household
 279 members or the demographic characteristics of the household. But if these household attributes
 280 are responsible for only a small deviation from the average timber rate of all households than a
 281 decision can be made to exclude these from the implementation of the ontology.

282

283 **4. Applications of Ontological Framework**

284

285 To describe how this ontological framework can be implemented, we describe three distinct
 286 case studies and demonstrate how the structure and dynamics of these SESs can be defined. We
 287 have intentionally selected case studies that include a variety of resource types to emphasize how
 288 the ontology can be used to describe the spatial structure of the system within the context of the
 289 institutions affecting resource use. The first case study describes an irrigation network in the
 290 southwest united states where the common-pool resource is water and the actors manage access to
 291 water in the irrigation network. A second case study describes an intentional community
 292 (Questenberry 1996) that includes private and communal property with forest as the resource of
 293 interest. The last case describes a fishery in the Gulf of Mexico where the harvesting of scallops
 294 in a series of distinct fishing grounds is managed by community members.

295

296

297 **4.1 Acequias system**

298

299 The acequias in Taos valley of northern New Mexico are an example of a community-based
 300 natural resource management system (Figure 2). They have historically persisted by transporting
 301 water to irrigate land in a high desert environment. Such harsh conditions, with low levels of
 302 technology, have required sustained collective action on the part of the users in order to assure
 303 that each individual is able to grow enough crops and survive in the area. Irrigation systems such

304 as the acequias, where humans continually interact with each other and with land and water
 305 resource systems, are excellent examples of social-ecological systems.

306 While they are relatively decentralized, the acequias do have key actors who have more
 307 authority with respect to the resource system and regular members. Each acequia has a
 308 mayordomo and a commission (most commonly made up of a president, a secretary, and a
 309 treasurer). Is it the mayordomo who is in charge of allocation water within each acequia. When
 310 disputes arise between acequias, no one acequia or acequia official has authority over other
 311 acequias. Instead, mayordomos and/or commissioners may meet in order to resolve a dispute in
 312 times of scarcity in accordance with historic practices. The acequias interact with four different
 313 resources: a surface water system, a groundwater system, an irrigation infrastructure (headgates
 314 and canals), and a land resource system.

315

316 *4.1.1. Spatial relationships*

317

318 The acequias employ several institutional arrangements in order to manage the resources in
 319 their resource system. These can be understood better through the spatial relationships that they
 320 exhibit. First, the groundwater resource, the land resource, and the acequia members all cluster
 321 around the linear surface water resource and irrigation infrastructure that makes the surface water
 322 available: <Groundwater.Near.Surfacewater>, <Land.Near.Surfacewater>,
 323 <Members.Near.Surfacewater>. Drakos et al. (Drakos, Lazarus et al. 2004) describe a very close
 324 connection between surface water and a shallow groundwater system in Taos valley. This is also
 325 reflected in qualitative accounts by members that were interviewed, as well in hydrological work
 326 conducted on acequias in other parts of New Mexico (Fernald, Baker et al. 2007). The land
 327 resource and actors cluster near the surface water resource and partially overlap the groundwater
 328 resource because in such an arid environment, land has little or no value without the availability
 329 of water subsidies.

330 Because the private parcels of land are contiguous, and members reside on their private
 331 parcels, this creates a potential conflict over water use between acequias along different reaches
 332 of a river. Thus, the acequias as a decentralized system have to cope with potential conflicts both
 333 within and between acequias. Both these conflicts are part ameliorated by the partial overlap
 334 between the land resource and the groundwater research, as both cluster near the surfacewater
 335 resource. In times of surface water scarcity, many of the acequias may rely on groundwater
 336 seepage as an alternative source of water.

337

338 *4.1.2. Institutional arrangements*

339 The resolution of conflicts is quite different within acequias than between them. The linear
 340 branching property of the surface water resource leads to a nesting of institutional arrangements
 341 within acequias. At the lowest level, members privately own parcels of irrigated land as well as
 342 the ditch and headgate that most directly feed their parcel: <Member_x+Owns+Parcel_x>,
 343 <Member_x+Owns+Headgate_x>, <Member_x+Owns+Ditch_x>. The main canal, the land
 344 immediately on each side of it, and the main headgate off the river headgate are common property
 345 and are managed mostly by the mayordomo <Acequia_x+Owns+MainCanal_x>,
 346 <Acequia_x+Owns+MainHeadgate>.

347 Within acequias, members tend to indirectly monitor their neighbors' use of water, by
 348 noticing when water is unavailable during their period of allocation, caused by a neighbor using
 349 water out of turn <Member_x+Monitors+Neighbors>. This practice is enabled by the contiguity
 350 between private land parcels, as well as by the use of a rotational system of surface water
 351 distribution with each farmer allotted a time in a schedule maintained by the mayordomo.

352 Additionally, the mayordomo actively monitors the use of water for the whole acequia:

353 <Mayordomo_x+Monitors+Acequia_x>.

354 The institutional arrangements between acequias have been likened to international
355 diplomacy, and there is no obvious property regime that exists for the main river that a group of
356 acequias may each divert from. There are no formal monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms at
357 this level, although in many situations there is a standing agreement between acequias about how
358 to divide the water in times of scarcity. Again, it is likely that in many instances the need for
359 formal arrangements between acequias is lessened by the availability of groundwater, even during
360 droughts (Rodriguez 2007).

361 362 **4.2. Intentional Communities and Forest Management**

363
364 An intentional community is “a group of people who have chosen to live together with a
365 common purpose, working cooperatively to create a lifestyle that reflects their shared core
366 values” (Questenberry 1996). These communities design, implement, monitor and enforce a set
367 rules or institutions to manage the forest and its products.

368 Tulip Poplar in Southern Indiana in the United States is an intentional community
369 development surrounding two man-made lakes. Tulip Poplar includes a series of landscape
370 partitions of both private and common property. Individual lots are privately owned and governed
371 by private property land rights which are restricted by community covenants
372 <TulipPoplar+Owns+PrivateProperty> <TulipPoplarOwners+Own+CommonProperty>. The
373 common areas consist of the two lakes and a sizable forested area within the community
374 boundaries <Community.Contains.Lakes> <Community.Contains.Forest>. These areas are
375 managed by a neighborhood association, of which all landowners and their families are members
376 <Landowners.Inside.NeighborhoodAssociation>. The rules governing the types of authorized
377 uses of the forest and lakes by members of the association are established in the association rules
378 and regulations handbook <ResourceSystem.CoveredBy.RulesAndRegulationsHandbook>.

379 The neighborhood association owns and manages 197.8 acres of forest dominated by sugar
380 maple and tulip poplar trees which are common species in this region. None of the families living
381 in the community rely upon the forest for daily subsistence activities; however landowners
382 regularly extract a variety of products from the forest such as firewood, morel mushrooms and
383 ginseng (Poteete and Welch 2004). Landowners also derive secondary benefits such as aesthetic
384 enjoyment and recreational opportunities.

385 The forested areas of Tulip Poplar are divided in two categories: private and communal
386 (Donnelly, Ostrom et al. 2004). The six patches of land owned and managed by the community
387 are surrounded by private forests with no boundaries demarking the end of the communal forest
388 <CommunityForest.Within.CommunityBoundary>, <CommunityForest.Adjacent.PrivateForest>.
389 Within the communal forest a portion is managed under a classified forest and wildlands program
390 established by the Indiana Division of Natural Resources <CommunityForest.Contains.
391 ClassifiedForest>. The program restricts development of the property and requires preparation
392 of a management plan (Nelson 1998). In return, the community receives up to 90 percent break in
393 property taxes.

394 The community of Tulip Poplar governs their common and private forests by separate sets of
395 user rules. As of 2005, private forest owners need to obtain a permission from the Association to
396 log any tree bigger than six inches in diameter at breast height (DBH). This rule was established
397 after a landowner decided to clear cut his forest increasing the erosion problem already occurring
398 around the lakes. In general, harvesting forest on private property lands is motivated by the need
399 of firewood, to gain access to the lakes, or for home construction. In communal forests, nobody
400 (community members included) is allowed to take any firewood
401 <Firewood.Inside.CommunalForests>. Other products such as morels mushrooms and ginseng
402 are harvested by some residents but are not major contributors to total income. This community
403 does not have serious trespassing problems with outsiders. Hunting is allowed, during the hunting
404 season but firearms are prohibited.

405 With regards to the spatial structure of the community, the fact that private landowners are
 406 in such close proximity to the communally managed forest is a significant characteristic. Also,
 407 the fact that parcels are relatively small (size) means that landowners can observe the activities of
 408 other landowners relatively easily.

409

410 **4.3. Seri Indigenous Coastal Fishing Community**

411

412 The Seri indigenous community stands out among other fishing communities in the Gulf of
 413 California, Mexico (Figure 3), for their ability to govern and conserve their fishing resources
 414 without collapsing the social-ecological system in which they depend on (Basurto 2005; Basurto
 415 and Ostrom 2009). The Seri mostly harvest two species of callo de hacha (CDH): *Atrina*
 416 *tuberculosa* and *Pinna rugosa*, which are sessile bivalve mollusks harvested for their adductor
 417 muscle sold at varying prices in the national and export markets. Fishers use 24 feet-long
 418 fiberglass outboard motor boats where divers go underwater to unbury CDHs off sandy bottoms
 419 using a rudimentary underwater breathing apparatus called hookah (Basurto 2006). Fishing teams
 420 vary in the number of crewmembers and can be conformed based in kinship ties or not. Seri
 421 fishing grounds can be partitioned in three different types: "hookah fishing areas"
 422 <HookahFishingAreas.Outside.SeriFishingGrounds>, "non-hookah fishing areas" <Non-
 423 hookahFishingAreas.Outside.SeriFishingGrounds>, and "no-take fishing areas" <No-
 424 takeFishingAreas.Outside.SeriFishingGrounds>. Hookah fishing areas are those places purposely
 425 selected by commercial fishermen because they are deemed as especially suitable to harvest
 426 CDHs. Non-hookah fishing areas are very shallow and exposed at low tides therefore allowing
 427 harvesting CDHs without the use of hookah diving equipment. Finally, no-take fishing areas
 428 constitute places where eelgrass areas grow densely and so are generally not targeted for CDH
 429 harvesting, given that it is common practice for many divers to walk over the bottom, and diving
 430 there is more laborious and presents the risk of stepping on a hidden sting ray or swimming crab.
 431 These areas assure that a portion of the fishing stock remains off-limits during part of the year,
 432 likely allowing the regeneration of some Seri fishing stock (Basurto 2008). They can cover up to
 433 12% of the Channel's bottom for up to eight months of the year (Torre Cosio 2002).

434

435 This community-based fishery is not actively regulated by the federal government
 436 <ResourceSystem.CoveredBy.FederalGovernment> and solely self-governed by the Seri
 437 community under a common property regimen in the Infiernillo Channel (Figure 1)
 438 <ResourceSystem.CoveredBy.CommonPropertySystem>. While all Seri fishers have the right to
 439 harvest from any fishing ground inside their common property
 440 <SeriFishers.Covers.FishingArea>. The Seri have found it important to design a number of
 441 rules—or institutions—to govern the uses of their communal resources (Basurto 2005). One
 442 informal rule dictates that hookah divers must not harvest in "non-hookah fishing areas", where
 443 traditionally non-commercial fishing members of the Seri community such as women, children,
 444 and elders, participate. Community members have a variety of ways to monitor that divers do not
 445 brake these rules <Community+Monitors+FishingAreas>, and the Seri government can enforce
 446 and sanction rule-breaking of communal rules, especially when non-Seri fishers are caught
 447 harvesting Seri fishing areas without explicit permission from the community
 448 <SeriGovernment+Sanction+Non-SeriFishers> <NonSeriFishers.Outside.FishingArea_x>.

448

449 Fishers have developed in-depth knowledge about their fishing areas and the species they
 450 harvest, and use such knowledge to govern and manage their fishery. For instance, Basurto
 451 (2008) documented more than nine different hookah fishing areas in use between 2000 and 2001,
 452 and a similar number of non-hookah fishing areas more recently. Differences in adductor muscle
 453 size between *A. tuberculosa* and *P. rugosa*, and among different fishing areas plays an important
 454 role in choosing some "hookah fishing areas" over others at particular time periods, and it is
 455 likely that fishers practice a haphazard rotation pattern among their hookah fishing areas.

455

Roughly, there are some areas that are used throughout the year

456 <A.tuberculosa.Inside.FishingArea_x> <P.rugosa.Inside.FishingArea_x>, other areas that are
457 generally visited once a year <A.tuberculosa.Inside.FishingArea_x>
458 <P.rugosa.Inside.FishingArea_x>, and yet others visited only once every few years
459 <A.tuberculosa.Inside.FishingArea_x> <P.rugosa.Inside.FishingArea_x>. So while Seri Fishers
460 know that there are a number of fishing areas of A. tuberculosa that are close to their home
461 village <FishingTeam.Near.FishingArea_x>, they might or might not visit them depending on the
462 level of abundance thought to have at that particular moment in time. Similarly some fishing
463 teams are only found in the farthest fishing areas during particular time periods
464 <FishingTeam.Far.FishingArea_x>. The selection for harvesting of non-hookah fishing areas is a
465 bit different, given that these are only available at particular low tide periods, making them
466 suitable to manual harvesting. Here some households always visit the same non-hookah fishing
467 area whether is far or close to their home <Household_x.Far.FishingArea_x>. Some have been
468 doing it for many years and its become a traditional gathering among certain families.
469
470

471 5. Discussion and synthesis

472
473 From these case studies we can see the influence of spatial structure and spatial relationships on
474 the function of those systems. The spatial structure and salient spatial relationships necessarily
475 varies across these systems as we intentionally chose case studies that provided some variability
476 in context (irrigation, marine fishery, community forestry). Still we can see some common
477 threads through the application of this ontology to these case studies.

478 The presentation here does not delve into a quantitative analysis given the small number of
479 case studies described here. Instead we have focused on the challenges of decomposing the
480 system components and characteristics into a framework that would enable quantitative analysis
481 given a sufficient number of cases. However, from this structure a series of coded case studies
482 could be defined by spatial attributes defined in the ontology such as the size of the landscape
483 partition containing a common pool resource. Or the system could be defined by whether the
484 actors live adjacent to the landscape partition containing the common-pool resource (as with the
485 intentional community and the community owned forest) or outside/"far" from the resource (as
486 with the Seri fishers and fishing grounds. These two spatial characteristics are tied to the ability
487 to monitor the activities of users who are allowed to or excluded from harvesting a resource.

488 Social-ecological systems are inherently complex and the ontology presented here of course
489 simplifies the complexity in these systems. And of course the issue of complexity poses
490 challenges for analysis (Manson 2001) that are not limited to the application described here. In
491 some ways the implementation of the ontology can be considered a method to simplify the
492 implicit complexity of SESs. Given a sufficiently large sample size analytical methods could
493 then be used to determine which attributes or structures explain dependent variables such as the
494 change in a resource over time. But of course the utility of this approach is limited by the data
495 collected describing a particular SES.

496 One of the largest obstacles to implementing this ontology for cross-site analysis is the
497 subjectivity involved in deciding which spatial relationships and which actions are to be included
498 or not included. If the analysis were limited to one particular category of SES then it would be
499 plausible to define a set of required relationships to be coded (e.g.
500 <Household.(Near/Far).Canal>). But this would limit cross-site analysis of SES with different
501 resource types. Previous efforts to define frameworks for the analysis of SESs have attempted to
502 find the balance between the desire to have a generalizable framework but also one that is specific
503 enough to capture the salient dynamics in a system. If those salient dynamics are not
504 generalizable across systems then this poses a fundamental obstacle in the implementation of
505 frameworks for the cross-site analysis of SESs.

506 It can be difficult to decide who to code specific relationships in a system using this
507 framework. For example, in the Seri case described above do households in the community
508 monitor other households <Households.Monitor.Households> or do they monitor the fishing
509 sites<Households.Monitor.FishingGrounds>? Each of these choices is plausible given the
510 definition of the system and the distinction between the two is arguably subtle. A researcher may
511 choose to code both of these in the ontology to provide the most comprehensive definition of the
512 system, but this can increase the effort required to complete the coding. Alternatively a
513 researcher may choose to code just one of these options which could potentially lead to
514 difficulties for cross-site analysis if a researcher defining a similar system chose to code the
515 alternative option. These two relationships could be reconciled after the coding is completed, but
516 it should be acknowledged that relatively subtle differences in how a researcher perceives a
517 system can lead to discrepancies in how that researcher implements the ontology. Future work
518 will include documentation of the ontological framework that documents complete examples of
519 specific case studies as well as user tutorials to address these potential coding problems.

520

521 **6. Conclusion**

522

523 We have presented an ontology to define spatial relationships in social-ecological systems with
524 an emphasis on institutional dynamics. We consider this a first step implemented for a series of
525 case studies that are similar in spatial scope (community level) but diverse in the ecological
526 domain (marine, irrigation and forest systems). This work provides a framework that can
527 facilitate the cross-site analysis of social-ecological systems. To date, much of the previous work
528 on institutional dynamics in social-ecological systems has consisted of case studies. Because of
529 the institutional and ecological complexity across case studies, it has been difficult to produce
530 generalizable findings from this literature. This framework contributes to efforts to organize this
531 scientific domain (Anderies, Janssen et al. 2004; Anderies, Rodriguez et al. 2007; Ostrom 2007)
532 by developing a spatially explicit approach to the definition of these systems. The next challenge
533 in this research is to apply this ontology to a larger array of case studies that would enable a more
534 quantitative analysis of the relationships driving the resilience of these systems.

535


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
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Figure 1. Conceptual design of ontological framework



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
Figure 2. Spatial Structure of Acequia System in New Mexico

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Figure 3. Seri Fishing Community in Gulf of Mexico



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Figure 4. Relative location of community and fishing grounds

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567

Appendix 1. Overview of Spatial Explicit Ontology for Social Ecological Systems

567

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