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PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND  
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONS CHILE 1973-1990

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Introduction

For almost all of its political history Chile has been a highly State-centered society. Although the nation's principal exports and main economic activities were generated in the deserts of the north, the central valley and the southern agricultural provinces, wealth and power were concentrated in Santiago, the political capital. Government policies and initiatives defined the direction, character and limits of private initiative.

Over time, the growth of the political and administrative system also concentrated social and economic opportunities in the country's most important metropolis. This was especially true for professionals, academics, technicians and political elites. Even entrepreneurs and business executives depended upon government-created opportunities and policies. Financial, agricultural and industrial activities responded to a panoply of government subsidies, loans, currency manipulation and protectionist tariff policies. Public enterprises and enterprises financed or stimulated by government programs, played an ever larger role in Chilean economic life.

By 1970 the public sector accounted for some 70 per cent of all investment in Chile; government policies—tariffs, multiple exchange rates, subsidized credit, tax credits and other non-market interventions—structured the shape and composition of the Chilean economy.<sup>1</sup>

From 1970 to 1973 a coalition government headed by Latin America's first elected Marxist president, Dr. Salvador Allende, attempted to take Chile down "the Chilean road to socialism"—a comprehensive program of political, economic and social change intended to transform the fundamental character of Chilean society. Three years of government by the Popular Unity coalition intensified the central role of the State in Chilean daily life.

The Popular Unity policies culminated in extreme political polarization. By mid-1973 government and opposition forces, unable to patch together even a short-term truce, pushed Chile toward a political and human tragedy whose enormity few of the actors imagined.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Military coup of 1973

On September 11, 1973 a ferocious military coup installed a military dictatorship in Chile. The new military government blamed Chile's political and economic crisis on "politics" and politicians who had betrayed the Fatherland and allowed Marxists to gain control of the Chilean state. General Augusto Pinochet, who gradually consolidated his personal control over the new Chilean government, affirmed

that "reality has laid bare the inadequacy of the concept of liberty as understood by classic liberalism...." and that it was essential "to deny the enemy access to the control of the mass media, universities [and] trade unions" and to recognize that "human rights...are, without exception, subject to the restrictions imposed upon them by the common good."

In the next three years there followed a systematic attack upon persons, organizations, institutions and political traditions in order to destroy the "vices of the past", to construct a new political order, and to "banish forever the inveterate habits which are an inevitable consequence of the excesses which Chilean partisanship {brought down upon itself during various generations." The attack on ex-Popular Unity supporters, other opponents of the military junta, and the institutional apparatus of liberal democracy took the form of wholesale murder, imprisonment, mistreatment and torture of detainees, "disappearances", political exile and a variety of forms of state terror and intimidation of the population.<sup>5</sup>

The new regime "legitimated" these patterns of personal and collective repression with a series of decrees, institutional innovations, and "constitutional acts" that, taken together, practically eliminated the possibility of legal/organized opposition to the military government.<sup>6</sup> Democratic participation, as conventionally understood, was to great extent outlawed. Political party activity was

banned or suspended; activities of unions, community organizations, and many other associations were controlled or repressed by the government.

Resistance, Adaptation, and Unintended Consequences

Political and armed resistance to the dictatorship, though never entirely suppressed, proved ineffective in overcoming the new regime or modifying its radical policy initiatives. Nevertheless, complex patterns of personal and organizational adaptation gave rise to important new networks of subsistence and community organizations (see below) among the urban and rural poor. Likewise, there evolved a web of private (non-governmental) associations dedicated to a variety of socio-economic "development" functions.

After sixteen years of dictatorship dedicated to purging Chilean life of "politics", the ultimate failure of the military junta's policies and programs in the political sphere was that not only had all significant pre-coups political movements and organizations survived the repression, but that new political forces and a multiplicity of new types of organizations had come into being. These organizations included a vast array of grassroot efforts focused upon daily subsistence, including such basic needs as nutrition, health care, employment and housing (for example, community kitchens, cooperative purchasing, urban gardening, and a variety of forms of informal cooperation among poor households).

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Researchers in Chile identified five general types of subsistence organizations or organizaciones económicas populares (OEP): (1) talleras or small production units; (2) organizaciones de cesantes or associations of unemployed looking for work and/or relief; (3) organizaciones para el consumo básico or "consumer organizations". (cooperative buying of food, cooking and eating collectives or comorando juntos, ollas comunes. and comedoras; (4) housing associations--groups seeking shelter, housing, housing services; (5) groups seeking to provide or improve basic services such as health care, education, local recreational opportunities. By 1986 one study of the Santiago Metropolitan region had identified some 1400 "subsistence Organizations" <sup>8</sup>

Generically called in Chile organizaciones económicas populares, these grassroots associations were typically founded to buffer urban and rural poor people, to some extent, from the impoverishment that accompanied the military Junta's radical restructuring of the Chilean economy. <sup>9</sup> As local organizations that brought together people to meet common needs and solve urgent human problems, the popular organizations inevitably involved more than narrow functional tasks--in some cases serving as the only "legitimate" social outlet for people subject to economic immiseration and political repression.

Community and neighborhood associations, including the subsistence organizations, formed a basis for new social and community networks. They also represented potential bases for alternative "political" response for poor people in the context of a dictatorship which prohibited party, union, and much other associational life. In turn, they very frequently depended upon material and organizational support from "development organizations" or "grass-root support organizations" linked to the Catholic Church, other religious organizations, or other "non-governmental organizations".

These "non-governmental organizations", a terminological catch-all for private, non-profit, charitable or socio-economic development institutions that engaged in research, informal education, health services, technical assistance, marketing, legal and accounting services and a range of other activities were given the Spanish acronym ONG (organizaciones no gubernamentales). They grew in number and scope of operations from the mid-1970s onwards, multiplying significantly in quantity and function particularly after 1981.

**The** remainder of the present article focuses on the evolution of the ONG sector in Chilean society, its linkages to international cooperation, the network of ONG-popular organization relations, the interactions between the ONGs and government agencies, the experience of ONG-local government collaboration and conflict, the official view of the

government coalition that assumed office in March 1990 toward the ONG sector in Chile, and an assessment of the short and medium term prospects for ONG contributions to socio-economic and political development in Chile.

Private Development Organizations (ONGs)  
and the 1973 Military coup

A "first generation" of post-1973 ONGs (1973-1976) emerged to deal with human rights issues and, almost simultaneously, with the immediate socio-economic impact on the urban and rural poor of the military regime's policies. From 1974-76 a small number of academic research centers, typically sheltered and/or supported in part by the Church, also initiated their activities. The most important of these was the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (AHC), created with the support of Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez in November, 1975. The AHC became an umbrella for a variety of research and action programs.

Between 1976 and 1979 a "second generation" of human rights, academic, and action-oriented ONGs emerged, testing the limits of tolerance of the dictatorship and also experimenting with organizational forms, financing alternatives, and programmatic focus. Importantly, most of the pre-1973 ONGs, including institutions like the IER, INPROA, Caritas, and Avuda Cristiana Evangelica (ACE) also ~~adapted~~ to the new circumstances from 1973 to 1980,

maintaining or enhancing programs of support for groups of urban and rural poor.

A third generation of ONGs appeared and rapidly multiplied after adoption (1980) and implementation (1981) of the new political constitution. This third generation, taking advantage of the regime's "opening" of the economy and emphasis on privatization of social and economic programs diversified the functional, programmatic and geographical reach of the Chilean <sup>10</sup> ONGs. Third generation ONGs included new human rights organizations, academic and research centers, expanded charitable services, and grass roots support organizations ranging in services from health and nutrition education, technical assistance in rural and urban settings and marketing, to union leadership training. From 1983 onward many of the ONGs also served informally as nuclei of more overt political opposition to the Pinochet government, thereby occupying temporarily part of the "political space" historically reserved to political parties and movements, voluntary associations and trade unions—all of which suffered repression and/or restriction by the military government.

[table here on growth of ong sector]

The ONGs increased in number as professionals, intellectuals, technicians, ex-government officials and, ultimately, returned political exiles, created literally hundreds of research institutes, extension and educational "firms", and more specialized purveyors of technical and human services. In some cases groups of academics or ex-government officials reconstituted previously existant entities removed from the universities or public sector.<sup>11</sup> In other cases, institutions previously supported by international organizations were transformed into "national" ONGs out of political necessity.<sup>12</sup> International agencies, such as ECLA, ILO, and other United Nations or regional entities also sheltered in the years after 1973 some Chilean professionals and political refugees who would later return and participate in the ONG community in the 1980s.

Usually, however, like-minded professionals or academics formed new research and social action entities which sought to establish a thematic, methodological, and programmatic niche within the expanding ONG universe. Ideological affinity along with professional and technical training tended to define the individual ONG—though an important lesson of the 1970-73 period, and of the harsh times following, was the value of pragmatism and efficacy. (These lessons might be a precious contribution of the ONGs to redemocratization in Chile—if they are sustained after March 1990)

A significant number of these ONG were dedicated specifically to improving, short term or long term, the living conditions and opportunities for the poorest sectors of Chilean society. They constituted a sub-sector of ONGs that might be labelled, following L. David Brown, "Private Voluntary Organizations Dedicated to Development" or, using a less formal lexicon, "grass-roots support organizations"<sup>13</sup> While sharing many attributes of traditional charitable and/or relief agencies or organizations dedicated to social action programs, the ONGs-grass roots support organizations in Chile after 1973 tended to share the following characteristics:

1. formed as private sector firms, non-profit organizations, semi-autonomous, Church-related research centers or action agencies, or cooperatives financed in part or to great extent by donations from national or international agencies;<sup>14</sup>

2. staffed by paid professionals and technicians seeking alternative employment which permitted dedication to social action and community development while solving the immediate dilemma of generating income in the context of the dictatorships' persecution of opposition intellectuals and party leaders;

3. planned and implemented research or action programs and/or projects intended to improve the living conditions of sectors of the urban and rural poor in Chile and/or to encourage long term socio-economic development;

4. served as "bridge" organizations and catalysts in development programs linking groups of urban and rural poor to national and international networks of financial resources as well as concrete goods and services (in some cases this meant filling gaps left by the repression the military government directed at political parties, labor organizations, and other local community groups).

Notwithstanding these temporary functions, the ONGs do not claim to represent their constituents or clientele as a traditional political party nor to make demands upon government and non-government actors (e.g. business) as a lobby, labor union or interest group. (Exceptions would be ONGs working in the area of human rights, legal services, and other entities dedicated to influencing the content and implementation of public policy along with research or service provision, for example, environmentally-focused ONGs) Unlike religious organizations, the ONG do not typically seek "converts" or adherents;

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5. whether religious or secular, and whether focused on charitable activities, emergency relief, education, technical assistance, or provision of other types of services, depended upon significant external support, which frequently influenced their programs, budgets, and orientations.

By 1990 some 700 private organizations relied upon external financing for their Chilean operations; perhaps 300-400 would be classified as ONGs/ grass root support

organizations in the sense used herein. In a sense, then, the military regime's repressive policies and emphasis upon reducing the role of the public sector had the unintended consequence of spawning an array of "non-governmental organizations" which provided employment and income for displaced professionals and political opponents of the regime as well as a new socio-political influence in Chilean life and socio-economic transformation.

In part, the expansion of the ONG universe also was encouraged when the policies of the military dictatorship forced international organizations, foreign governments and private donor agencies to rethink their relationships with the Chilean government and to reevaluate their ongoing programs in Chile. Unwilling to be perceived as supporters of the military junta, yet anxious to ameliorate the impacts of the government's policies and to continue long-term commitments to Chilean development, many external agencies and foreign governments looked to the "private sector" to provide alternative channels for charitable and development assistance.

In other cases, foreign governments, political parties, trade unions, and donor agencies also sought ostensibly "non-political" counterparts through which to assist opponents to the military regime--even if these had to be created parallel to the repressed Chilean political parties and labor organisations. In these cases the donor agencies

clearly intended to support the political role of certain NGOs, but *preferred*, for reasons related to internal politics or the niceties of international relations, to support less explicitly "political" institutions—the NGOs.

Subsequently, a minority of NGOs, staffed by persons sympathetic to the general outlines of the Pinochet government's neo-liberal policies—if not the repression—added a more conservative sector to the networks of Chilean NGOs (for example, the Fundación Kast and the Corporación Privada de Desarrollo. CORPRIDE)). This even occurred within the network of human rights NGOs when a pro-Pinochet group called CORPAZ was created to denounce acts of terrorism and provide reparation to police, military personnel and other victims of terrorism. Unlike most other NGOs, CORPAZ apparently operated almost entirely with national financial resources.

With the victory of the opposition in the December, 1989 elections, new conservative NGOs emerged, including groups involving leading ex-government personalities such as presidential candidate Hernan Buchi. After March 1990 a number of such NGOs emerged along with other "regional" NGOs stimulated by legislators in the recently re-opened Congress to promote "development" in their legislative districts. By 1990, the demonstrated organizational flexibility and political utility of NGOs appealed to politicians across the ideological spectrum as well as to entrepreneurial professionals and academics.

Certain ONGs, usually those associated with the Catholic Church and other religious organisations, constituted a particularly significant response to the brutal repression that followed the coup of 1973. Inasmuch as the military government sought to avoid an explicit break with the Church, organizations associated with the Church or part of the Church's own networks were not subjected to the same formal restrictions on meetings and censorship of publications as were unions, political parties, or community organizations. This did not mean freedom from harassment or persecution, but it did provide a unique, if ambiguous, "political space" within the authoritarian regime. This "political space" allowed the operation of a small number of human rights groups and other ONGs focused on social action and relief programs in the early years of the dictatorship.

The "human rights organizations" (see below) formed a permeable umbrella raised by the Church and other allies to shelter Chileans from the reign of terror from 1973 to 1976. Efforts to meet basic needs in the areas of nutrition and health care occurred almost simultaneously.

Viewed with hindsight, a certain irony characterizes the evolution of these ONGs in Chile. The ONGs working in the areas of human rights and charitable-relief activities, as well as the early academic centers and the later-formed grass-roots support organizations, were staffed by persons who, by and large, had always favored a State-centered,

government-directed transformation of Chilean society. Most of the early post-1973 ONGs began as desperation survival strategies to confront government repression or official policies, momentary responses to the available "political space", and the reality of human needs unmet by public sector programs. The ONG was a tactical instrument adopted without much theoretical rationale or long term commitment to non-government responses to the challenge of socio-economic development.

Only later did the survival strategies generate a more reasoned and permanent commitment to the role of ONGs, premised on theoretical arguments regarding democratic development and local initiative, as well as the diverse practical experiences of the years after 1973. Committed socialists and revolutionaries, as well as Christian Democrats and "non-political" religious, utilized ONGs to ameliorate the effects of government policies and to adapt to enforced privatization schemes and reduction of government programs.

These experiences forced upon participants a conscious recognition of the importance and potential of private initiatives in social and economic development—particularly in local and community settings. The freedom from bureaucratic regulation, the necessity of creativity, spontaneity, and efficacy, the consequences of failure—for themselves and their clientele—all conspired to produce a

heterogenous pattern of pragmatic adaptations and socio-economic experiments in neighborhoods, communities, rural areas, and, less frequently, regions. Professionals and intellectuals who had previously looked to the State as the appropriate agent to direct socio-economic development now defended the role of private action, of local initiative, of diversity and experimentation rather than reliance on centralized policy and administration.

What followed constituted a complex privatisation of social and economic development experiments, popular education, and social welfare programs—as well as an elaborate network of private agencies and firms previously of very limited significance in Chile. By 1990, as General Pinochet's regime neared its end, Chilean civil society was more complex, more variegated, and in many respects more talented, specialized, competent, and innovative than anytime previous in Chilean history.

To very great extent, regime repression, countered by an "informal diplomacy" <sup>17</sup> of international cooperation and the personal courage and innovation among regime opponents, had left the Chilean polity a legacy of organizational talent, and new institutional capacity within the ONGs. The ONGs' linkages to international agencies, both private and public, for funding, ideological and programmatic orientation, and as politico-moral buffers against the Chilean dictatorship, created distinctive patterns of vulnerability and opportunity

for the international agencies, for the ONGs, and for Chile. The recent role of these ONGs in Chilean life also represented serious dilemmas and important opportunities for the incoming (March 11, 1990) government elected December, 14 1989 in Chile's first presidential election since 1970.

#### Evolution of the ONGs in Chile Prior to 1973

Whilst the ONG sector mushroomed as a response to the policies of the military junta, important historical and institutional foundations for ONG activity already existed in Chile. The foundations were strong, if not extensive, and provided a basis for initial ONG activity after 1973. Likewise, the experience of the pre-1973 ONGs in the rural areas and among the urban poor offered models for charitable and development programs, personal and institutional contacts, and a certain legitimacy for social action projects that preceded the conflicts of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Religiously-inspired ONGs had played a vital but limited role in Chilean society from colonial times. Charitable institutions, emergency, health care and educational institutions of the Catholic Church were a common feature of Chilean life. In the first decades of the twentieth century newly founded institutions dedicated to informal education, technical assistance and service provision among the rural and urban poor served as precedents for the rapid expansion of ONG after the mid-1970s.

Generated by initiatives of the Catholic Church from approximately 1915, and to lesser extent by a variety of protestant missions, (for example, Obra Rural Metodista in the 1920s), small centers for popular education, worker and peasant cooperatives, mutual aid societies and more politicized adjuncts of labor and political parties were woven into the Chilean social fabric—both in the countryside and urban areas.

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It is difficult to overestimate the role of the Catholic Church as a social and political force in modern Chilean history. This is particularly true in the formation of intellectual and political elites committed to social change in accord with emergent Church social doctrine. In these efforts were spawned some of the first "ONGs" and "grass root support organizations"; in these efforts also were forged resistance to dictatorship in the 1970s and the umbrella for the ONG of the 1980s.

In 1915 Preb. Julio Restat and two students, Eduardo Cruz Coke and Emilio Tizzoni founded the National Association of Catholic Students (ANEC) as an elite group to study and incorporate the social gospel into Chilean life. Parallel development of "circulos de estudios" on social themes presaged similar "circulos de estudios" at the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano supported by the Church after 1976 (see below). By 1928, under the influence of Oscar Larson, these organizations had begun to form a cadre of

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Catholic-inspired leaders who would become dominant figures in Chilean political life, first in the Conservative party, and especially within the Christian Democratic party, into the 1990s.

In the midst of political and economic crisis associated with the depression of the 1930s, the Church founded Acción Católica (1931)—ostensibly following the dictates of Pope Pius XI's encyclical "Ubi Arcano Dei" (1922). Inspired both in social Catholicism and in the fear of socialism, Acción Católica absorbed earlier Church organizations such as the "circuitos de estudios". It also created new "grass root support organizations" through its secretariates, including the Secretariate of Social and Economic Activities.<sup>21</sup> Over time, this agency of the Church provided support and orientation for youth, worker, and peasant organizations and for organizations dedicated to solutions to the "social question".

By the 1930s, Conservative party landowners were protesting the initiatives of a small number of priests in formation of agricultural unions and industrialists decried Church support for workers organizations. Nevertheless, small scale Church involvement in grass-roots support organizations continued, if not without setbacks and controversy. In the late 1940s and early 1950s a rural union organization, Acción Sindical Chilena (ASICH) with support from Church leaders in Talca province provoked a region-wide

strike that culminated with a march on Santiago (1953). A year earlier (1952) the Chilean Conference of Bishops had decided to create Acción Católica Rural (ACR) as a separate entity as a response both to increased protestant penetration of the countryside and also to expanded political activities by parties of the Chilean left in rural areas. ACR established "centres campesinos" in rural towns and farms to promote "community development".

As part of this effort, in 1955, ACR established the Institute for Rural Education (IER)--a prototype ONG which has survived to the present. The IER, since its foundation, has been a dominant force in training leadership cadres for peasant unions, cooperatives, and production centers, carrying out a wide gamut of formal and informal education and technical support activities, publishing technical and doctrinal materials, engaging in educational radio broadcasting, and, more generally, acting as a multifunctional rural-oriented ONG. Through the years it has received financial and other support from international agencies, entities of the U.S. government and the Church. The IER also sought cooperation from progressive landowners to support education services among the rural labor force.

In many respects the IER was a forerunner for future Church-supported and secular ONGs working in the countryside and/or doing research on rural issues. In 1963 Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez and Bishop Manuel Larrain Errazuriz sponsored

creation of the Institute of Agricultural Promotion (INPROA) which carried out experiments in land reform, agricultural cooperativism, and technical assistance in the rural sector. INPROA continued its work from the 1960s through the period of military dictatorship and expanded its activities to include a wide range of extension and direct assistance programs among rural workers and smallholders. INPROA, unlike the IER, relied entirely on private donations and external assistance, thereby avoiding allegations of subordination to the Pinochet government due to financial dependence.<sup>23</sup>

Caritas-Chile, another Church-related ONG, also carried out rural-oriented programs during this period. However, in the rural sector as in most other areas of work, the ONG-grass roots support organization was a relatively rare entity in Chile prior to the 1960s. Thus, Sergio Gómez reports that only 8 ONG of the 61 working in rural areas in 1988 were established prior to 1973.<sup>24</sup> A similar pattern prevailed for the 123 ONGs working in social action and urban development programs in Santiago, Valparaíso, Concepción and Iquique, studied by Carlos Pina and Irene Agurto in 1988, and for the 107 ONGs with health programs studied in 1989 by Judith Salinas, Carlos Vergara, and Giorgio Solimano.<sup>25</sup>

The Catholic Church and Church-related entities also supported formation of the most prominent non-government research and research-based social action centers in the

1930s and 1950s. These included the Jesuit Centre Belarmino, Institute de Humanismo Cristiano, DESAL, CIDE, CEPAL, CPU, and ILADES. Most other serious research took place in the universities and certain government agencies prior to 1973. While precedents also existed for ONG activity in non-Church supported private research organizations, typically supported by international secular organizations—for example FLACSO, CEPAL, CELADE, ILPES— these were rare. The military coup and the repression that followed would change this social reality and stimulate the dramatic expansion of ONGs in Chile.

#### ONGs and Defense of Human Rights After 1973

In the immediate aftermath of the military coup of 1973, widespread violence and human rights violations confronted Chilean Church officials and priests with the human tragedies that were brought to their attention. Certain protestant denominations and Chilean Jewish leaders also faced the moral and political challenge of the repression. Before the end of September, 1973 selected protestant organizations established CONAR (National Committee to Aid Refugees) to assist foreign nationals in Chile affected by the coup;<sup>26</sup> in October, 1973 the Committee for Cooperation for Peace (COPACHI) was inaugurated under the formal leadership of Lutheran Bishop, Helmut Frenz and the auxiliary Bishop of Santiago, Fernando Ariztia. These organizations, both of which later changed

names and expanded their functions, attempted to provide legal assistance, shelter, and economic relief to victims of government repression.

COPACHI included a highly ecumenical political and religious membership and constituency; government attacks and Accusations of Marxist influence eventually led to arrest and harassment of religious and lay personnel and, ultimately, to its "dissolution" in 1975. General Pinochet intervened directly in the attack upon COPACHI, revoking Bishop Frenz's residency permit for Chile and communicating directly to Cardinal Silva Henriquez the government's anger at COPACHI activities.

To replace COPACHI, and bring its legal, socio-economic and "relief activities under closer Church control, Cardinal Silva created the Vicariate of Solidarity in 1976. After 1976 the Vicariate was a leading moral and political force in Chile—in the area of human rights and also in the support of a variety of organizations engaged in delivery of health, nutrition, informal education, and legal services.

With the departure of most foreign refugees and the fulfilment of CONAR's mission, persons connected to CONAR created the Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC) in 1975. FASIC received support from the World Council of Churches and linked up with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, It provided assistance to victims of political repression, exiles and their

families, and initiated pioneer studies and psychological services (Programa Médico Psiquiátrico) for victims of torture, political prisoners, and their families. It also extended financial assistance to refugee and detainee families.<sup>27</sup>

After 1976 a number of new ONGs dedicated to work in the area of human rights appeared, each with its own unique focus and objectives. These included Servicio de Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ), founded in 1977 as a Chilean affiliate of SERPAJ of Latin America; the Chilean Human Rights Commission (1978);<sup>28</sup> Protection of Children Affected by States of Emergency (PIDEE) (1979); the Committee for the Defense of the People's Rights (CCODEPU) (1980) (a more politicized and leftist ONG); CINTRAS (Center for Treatment of Stress, 1986)<sup>29</sup> which provided assistance to victims of torture and, in 1988, ILAS (Latin American Institute for Mental Health and Human Rights).<sup>30</sup>

In addition, certain specialized membership organizations (MOs) which acted more as traditional interest groups or "lobbying" organizations—with the limitations that such a term must have in the context of radical authoritarian regimes, evolved. These included the Agrupación of Relatives of Political Prisoners (1974); the Agrupación of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared (AFDD, 1975); the Agrupación of Relatives of Political Executives (1979); and the Sebastián Acevedo Movement Against Torture (1983). These latter

organizations did not have the professional mission and organizational formality of most of the ONGs, including those such as SERPAJ or groups related to the Vicariate. They tended to appear or expand their activities in the early-to-mid 1980s as limited "political spaces" opened up within the political system.

A key precedent for human rights ONGs in Chile, as well as for other ONGs, was established through a variety of  
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international and bilateral donors to these programs, especially in the case of COPACHI and the Vicariate of Solidarity. Private U.S. foundations (e.g. Ford Foundation) and the InterAmerican Foundation (IAF) played critical support roles in the early years. Indeed the role of the IAF, an agency of the U.S. government, became a matter of concern and anger to General Pinochet and his supporters. Government security forces confiscated documents outlining the IAF programs in Chile in early 1978) the conservative newspaper, El Mercurio blasted the IAF support for dissidents and "communists".<sup>31</sup> Only concern for alienating international financial agencies and the U.S. Congress prevented the Pinochet government from curtailing many IAF support programs in Chile.<sup>32</sup>

Academic, Research, and "Development"-Oriented ONGs

The military junta that took power after the coup of September 11, 1973 targeted the universities and academic community as a dangerous source of opposition and centers of Marxist and leftist ideologies. Military control was established over the universities, including the Catholic University. Thousands of students and hundreds of professors were expelled and sought refuge in non-academic tasks for survival. Many were detained or jailed; some were murdered, executed or "disappeared", while others fled into exile. <sup>33</sup>

As in the case of the human rights ONGs, Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez played a central role in establishing under the Church's umbrella a limited sphere of "protected" action for small numbers of academics confronted by loss of employment and professional freedom. In November, 1975 the Cardinal established the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (CAHC), as a response to military intervention in the Catholic University. The Aademia sought to provide employment and protection to selected academics, encourage research in the social sciences, prevent flight or exile for leading Chilean intellectuals, and to focus on policy problems derived from the military programs—particularly in the areas of education, nutrition, health, housing, and the economy. Funding came from the Ford Foundation and later from a large number of external donors including the InterAmerican Foundation, International Research Development Centre (Canada), SAREC (Sweden), NOVIB (Holland), ICI (Spain) along

with assistance from other European governments and private donor agencies.

The AHC commenced operations with three small programs and a handful of investigators; by 1989 the individual ONGs associated with the AHC employed almost two hundred professionals, maintained many high-quality research and extension programs, and published numerous books, magazines, technical bulletins, newsletters, and educational materials. Some of the ONGs also maintained important linkages to OEPs and with other ONGs.

Over time the AHC affiliated certain pre-existing research groups—for example the Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Educación (PIIE), among the most important groups working on educational research in Chile.<sup>34</sup> Other programs evolved out of "circulos de estudios"—seminar groups focused on particular topics or policy areas such as health, women's issues, environment—sponsored by the AHC. Still others were newly formed but typically reunited small cadres of investigators who had worked on the same themes or in similar programs during the Popular Unity years.

The AHC served essentially as an institutional umbrella; each ONG program sought its own funding and maintained relative organizational and programmatic autonomy. Internal conflicts were not entirely avoided and ideological or programmatic discrepancies between Church authorities and

"circulos de estudios" sometimes led to breaking of ties. For example the "circulo de estudios de la condición de la mujer" lost AHC sponsorship in 1983 over issues relating to abortion, divorce and sexuality. Divisions within this study circle gave rise to two separate ONGs: Centro de Estudios de la Mujer (CEM). more research oriented, and Casa de la Mujer. "La Morada". which took on the character of a core group of a Chilean feminist movement.

This pattern in some ways typified the growing ONG universe after 1981, with new organizations defining themselves in terms of spheres of action (urban, rural) policy areas (health, nutrition, environment, housing, labor, artisan production, education); subjects of study or "target populations" for programs (women, youth, ethnic minorities,) or "dominant activities" (research, technical assistance, health services).

To some extent pressures by donor agencies for more action-oriented "development" projects pushed the ONGs to expand the scope of their activities from the earlier emphasis on research. Growing specialization, refinement of organizational niches, and also competition for resources and recognition came to characterize the ONG network.

Thus Arteaga's study of ONGs working on women's issues found 87 ONGs that dealt with "womens' issues", and 7 ONGs "of women that work almost exclusively with women." These ranged from essentially academic research centers such as CEM

**TABLE 1**  
**Number of Researchers in the AHC, by Program**  
**(1981-1987)**

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
CERC	--	--	6	13	16	22	21
GEA	7	6	6	14	15	22	34
GIA	19	19	28	22	25	35	22
PET	11	13	17	16	25	30	28
Proy. Círculo							
Condición de La Mujer	16	16	26	10	--	--	--
PIIE	19	14	22	15	21	25	17
PDH	3	7	5	3	3	11	8
Proy. Boletín							
Realidad Universitaria	2	2	2	2	2	--	--
FLACSO	21	21	24	29	29	29	29
ILET	5	5	12	14	17	11	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>170</b>

Source: Memoria de Activades AHC 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987.  
 Does not include research assistants and students. After Maria Teresa Lladser  
 LL, in José Antonio Abalos and Rodrigo Egafia, Una Puerta Que Se Abre, Taller de  
 Cooperación al Desarrollo, 1989.

to groups working with OEPs and delivering technical training, marketing assistance, and organizational support to production cooperatives (talleres) in poor neighborhoods, such as FORMA. All of these ONGs were created as independent organizations after 1981.

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In the late 1980s, as Chileans anticipated an end to the Pinochet regime, the AHC was transformed formally into a small university and certain of the ONGs went their own way. Likewise many non-AHC-related academic and research ONGs appeared after 1981. By the end of 1988 Maria Teresa Lladser included 32 research centers and research-based social action programs in a study of academic ONGs in Chile.

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insert tables on AHC and list of centers

The academic and research ONGs thus encouraged and protected by the Church and international donor agencies, along with the others which later emerged, formed centers of intellectual ferment and political resistance to the dictatorship. They also provided the most important ongoing technical assessments of the impacts of Pinochet's government. In the post-1983 period of so-called "political opening" the writings and research of ONG personnel proved a key factor in forging opposition consensus; research groups also provided "legitimate" fora for contacts among leaders of the various leftist and centrist political forces that sought to create a unified opposition to the dictatorship.

Perhaps most importantly for Chile's future after 1990, these NGOs fostered diverse international support networks, encouraged professional advancement and training which created groups of skilled researchers, developed personnel with expertise and experience in policy studies, and served as the base of the "policy commissions" which developed the Concertación for Democracy programmatic platform for the 1989 elections. These NGOs also provided key personnel in the first post-Pinochet administration. Indeed, in the case of CIEPLAN, FLACSO, CED, PET, and PIIE, among the most obvious, high-ranking staff and ministers have been associated with these ONG over many years. In this sense, not only academic and professional elites—but key political elites—have emerged from the ONGs of the 1970s and 1980s.

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#### The ONGs and the Pinochet Government

The emphasis by the Pinochet government, and the neo-liberal economic model which underlay the government's policies, upon privatization of social and economic activities previously reserved to the State, or predominantly carried out by the State, created multiple opportunities for far-ranging initiatives by ONGs. These initiatives included programs and projects in education, health care, nutrition, micro-production units, marketing, consulting, and professional services. Expansion of private research and private secondary and university education also offered new niches for ONGs. Organised as private consulting firms or

purveyors of other services, voluntary non-profit organizations, or Church-linked, quasi-autonomous agencies, the ONGs took advantage of the government's liberalization of trade, financial flows, and currency exchange to finance their activities with funds and resources from international donor agencies.

So long as the ONGs did not overtly engage in "politics", the neo-liberal model sanctified their activities as part of the principle of subsidiarity<sup>39</sup> and the movement toward privatization. At times ONG personnel crossed the ambiguous line separating "politics" from "business", "consulting", or "charity"; harassment, raids on work centers, or repression<sup>40</sup> and incarceration of ONG staff then followed. Prior to 1981, in particular, the small number of active ONGs and their focus on human rights issues and work in the poorest urban neighborhoods or with rural laborers and peasants, made them obvious targets of regime repression—even with the partial protection provided by the Vicariate of Solidarity or other religious affiliations.

Since the ONG spatial universe also replicated the centralization of Chilean life more generally—some two-thirds of the ONGs were based or worked exclusively in Santiago in 1989—the Pinochet regime was understandably sensitive to efforts by political partisans or union leaders to shelter opposition politics in the capital under the umbrella of the ONGs.<sup>41</sup> This meant, inevitably, a certain

level of tension, self-censorship, dissimulation in project design and language, and non-transparency in organizational behavior—some for benefit of donor agencies, some for benefit of public legitimation, some for constituency and clientele groups—some, perhaps clandestine or at least unadvertised—intended to forge longer-term development alliances and political bases. The extent of such activities varied, naturally, among the ONGs and within the ONGs, over time and depending upon immediate personal as well as institutional circumstances.

Whilst antagonism characterised much of the interaction between ONGs and the Pinochet government, this pattern was not universal. A minority of ONGs collaborated with government programs, worked in technical capacities quite similar to the "opposition ONGs" with urban community groups (e.g. health and nutrition programs), in rural towns and agricultural regions (organic farming, informal education, agricultural extension programs), and, more generally, in local "community development" programs.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, the IER, (see above) one of the oldest ONGs working in rural Chile, was severely criticized for what other ONG and opposition political elites perceived as support for the Pinochet government's policies in the countryside.

In some instances, local and provincial government officials named by the Pinochet government sought quiet cooperation with selected ONGs. Local needs, the talents and

resources of the ONGs, the pragmatism of mayors or officials of government health, education, or housing agencies, all contributed to isolated experiments in ONG-government collaboration.<sup>43</sup> These experiments, limited both by the unwillingness of most ONG personnel to become a political arm of the Pinochet government's clientelistic networks managed by the appointed mayors in each municipality, and by the government officials' distrust of the long-term intentions of "politically motivated" ONG personnel, nevertheless demonstrated the potential utility of contractual relationships between ONGs and government agencies in the provision of community services. This is particularly true in the area of local government, given the relatively small size and resource base of most ONGs, but could also be extended in certain program areas to larger communities and regions. Reforms and administrative reorganisation of municipal government since 1981 provided contradictory circumstances for ONG-local government cooperation—even after transition from the authoritarian regime to a more democratic system in March, 1990.<sup>44</sup>

National Administration. Municipal Reform and the ONGs

Prior to 1974 Chile was divided into twenty-five provinces for purposes of internal administration. Each province was subdivided into departments, subdelegations and districts headed by administrative officers who served at the pleasure of the president. Administrative reforms introduced

by the military government reorganised the country into twelve regions, subdivided in turn into provinces (51) and communes <335>. While in theory the military rulers advocated decentralisation and administrative rationalization, in practice these reforms tended to intensify the centralist political tradition characteristic Of Chilean history.

As part of a package of policy initiatives labelled collectively "the seven modernizations", the Pinochet government drastically modified the role and structure of municipal government in 1980-81.<sup>45</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the coup of 1973 municipal government had ceased to depend upon elected mayors and councilpersons; all mayors were designated by the military Junta (Decree Law 25, September 22, 1973). Decree Law 573 (July 12, 1974) defined internal administration and local governance as "intimately linked to order and internal security of the country". The "autonomous" municipality became a local territorial administrative unit of the national government—presided over by a mayor selected by the chief executive of the national government.

Local politics and local government, to the limited degree it had existed in Chile, disappeared. At the same time administrative decentralization assigned new and more diverse functions to the municipal authorities. In many cases retired or active duty military officers or police

assumed the positions of mayor. Local administration became the level of government surveillance and control responsible for implementing the military regimes new policies. Thus the military regime's decentralization of administrative tasks reinforced the centralist, statist tradition of national politics, as the "decentralized" administration implemented the policies imposed by the national government.

Modifications in this scheme came with Decree Law 1289 (1976), the increase in revenues for municipal government in 1979 (Decree Law 3063), and the 1980 Constitution (implemented in 1981). However, the municipality remained an integral part of the system of "internal administration of the State", leaving the country without any elected, representative regional or local government or any means of direct citizen participation in the formulation and implementation of public policy within the municipalities. At the same time, however, the municipalities assumed responsibility for educational services, and administration of previously national-level welfare and employment programs.

Under this scheme, the appointed mayor became the unique source of local authority and was responsible for administering government programs within the municipality. Important differences in programmatic emphases and styles of administration depended upon the idiosyncracies of the local mayors personality, political ideology, family and friendship

networks, business interests, professional training, and technical skills. This reality provided both opportunities and dilemmas for ONGs wishing to carry out programs within particular municipalities or to cooperate with the local government officials in designing and implementing socio-economic development programs.

The Organic Law regulating municipal government adopted by the military government in 1988 (Law 18605) vested authority for municipal government in a mayor (alcalde) and a municipal development council (consejo de desarrollo comunal). The mayor was to be named for a four year term by a regional development council (consejo regional de desarrollo), itself composed of governors of each province within the region, a representative of each of the armed forces and carabineros, five government officials from specified state or semi-public enterprises, and representatives of "the principal private sector groups with activities in the region" (60% of the total members of the council). An exception to this rule was provided for sixteen municipalities—Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Valparaíso, Viña del Mar, Santiago, Conchali, La Florida, Las Condes, Nunoa, Concepción, Talcahuano, Temuco, Puerto Montt, Coyhaique and Punta Arenas—where the alcalde would be named by the president of the republic, and removed at presidential discretion (Arts. 47, 48).<sup>48</sup> Determination of which groups constitute "principal private sector groups" corresponded to

a commission headed by the intendente (the chief administrative officer of the region) (Law 18605, Arts. 2-6).

In short, the law provided for a complex form of corporative and indirect "representation" of interests within regions, provinces and municipalities. No conventional democratically elected officials figured in the scheme of internal administration. This applied from the peak of the governmental hierarchy (Minister of Interior) to local government.

In contrast with the limited role of municipal government prior to 1973, however, the new municipal regime provided for a broad scope of political and administrative functions: urban planning and administration, implementation of public transportation programs, housing and public utilities, sanitation, and "municipal development". In addition, municipalities had discretionary authority in the areas of social welfare, public health, environmental protection, education and culture, adult education and employment development, sports and recreation, tourism, urban and rural road maintenance and development, public housing and urban infrastructure, emergency planning and relief, and "the development of activities of common interest at the local level" (Arts. 3-4). In order to carry out any or all of these discretionary activities the municipalities were authorized to charge fees, grant concessions, enter into contracts with private or public enterprises, acquire,

manage, and alienate property, and grant subsidies or make direct grants to non-profit institutions that collaborated directly in carrying out the programs of the municipality (Art. 5).

Thus while the internal organisation of municipal government was highly detailed by the organic law (Arts. 12-19), and its constitution was highly undemocratic, great potential existed within the authority of local government for collaborative programs with ONGs.

The Aylwin government sent proposals for democratization of municipal government (essentially for elections of mayors and councilpersons) to Congress in the first months of its administration. When and if democratization of local government occurs, it may offer a more opportune political moment to expand such collaboration. However, in the interim, it should be expected that mayors and municipal development councils in a number of localities will take advantage of the existing legislation to incorporate the skills, resources, and energies of the ONGs into selected public programs. The extent to which this occurs will depend more upon political decisions made by government officials and the creativity of ONG leaders rather than legal or administrative impediments in current legislation. Personal or political constraints, or lack of awareness by ONG leaders and municipal authorities of mutually beneficial relationships constitute more serious dilemmas than existing legal or administrative obstacles.

For example, in the first months of the Aylwin government the ONGs tended to focus their attention on municipalities where President Aylwin had designated mayors and hesitated to take initiatives in other municipalities. By June 1990 some ONGs had recognized this trend and began to test the water elsewhere. Meetings between mayors, municipal officials, and ONG personnel working in nutrition, health, housing, child-care, recreation, and micro-enterprise programs generated both skepticism and enthusiasm, but identified potentially constructive program initiatives. Ability to diversify the spatial scope of their activities, combined with the functional and budgetary expansion of municipal government introduced by the Pinochet regime, may thus induce important long-term changes in local politics—particularly after democratization of municipal government occurs.

ONGs and Democratization of Municipal Government:

**Constraints.**

Democratization of municipal government after March 1990 required constitutional *reform* and modification of the Organic Law regulating municipalities. It also presented a short-term political dilemma for the Concertación, requiring a visible definition of the relative political strength of the numerous parties making up the coalition. Such an explicit repoliticization of local government might potentially put stress on the Aylwin coalition, re-ignite historical animosities and personal quarrels, and create

tension between the national government and local coalitions. While such developments are inevitable as democratization proceeds, they threatened to complicate seriously- the initial phases of the transition from authoritarianism.

In its first year the Aylwin government proposed limited reforms of municipal government, focusing on restoring elected mayors and city councilpersons. The proposed reforms slightly expanded the authority of municipal government to operate public enterprises, but hardly altered the basic functions and internal operation of the municipalities as defined in the laws adopted by the military regime. This included a failure to address the dominance of the mayors in local government, to the exclusion of an authentic legislative role for the municipal councillors (regidores).

Replacement of the mayors appointed by the military government with elected officials threatened the local political machines and the bastion of patronage of the opposition parties. Thus, the political right resisted municipal reform and sought to delay municipal elections until later in Aylwin's presidential term. The veto power of the political right in the senate prevented passage of the constitutional amendments for municipal government proposed by the government in its first year in office (March 1990-1991).

This meant that ONGs working as grass roots support organisations in urban and rural communities had to preserve their capability for autonomous action, to seek some collaborative relationships with the municipal authorities bequeathed by the Pinochet regime, or to take the initiative in collaboration with the mayors appointed by the new president in the fifteen exceptional municipalities. As democratization and the national and municipal levels proceeds from 1991-1994, interactions with community groups, political parties, unions, and the Aylwin government itself will also require the attention of the ONGs.

Indeed, the Concertación leadership had already posed the question during the election campaign concerning the role the ONGs might play in post-Pinochet Chile. <sup>49</sup> During the discussion of this issue it became evident that the competition for external financing, the desire to channel foreign assistance into programs identified by the new government as priorities, and the intention of some Aylwin supporters to "coordinate" ONG activities represented a serious challenge for ONGs after March, 1990. Some ONGs perceived the new "Solidarity Fund" (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversion Social, FOSIS), created by the government to mobilize programs directed at elimination of "extreme poverty", as a potential competitor for donor agency funding. Similar concerns were voiced in regard to the potential influence or control over ONGs that might be

exercised by the new Agency for International Cooperation within MIDEPLAN, the new Ministry of Planning and Cooperation established shortly after Aylwin assumed the presidency.

The Concertación Program and the ONGs.

Recognition by Concertación elites that the ONGs had played a key role in the political contest against the Pinochet government as well as in designing alternative policies and programs led to explicit considerations of the ONGs in the Concertación program. Inasmuch as ONG personnel from a variety of ONGs elaborated much of the Concertación program, this should not have been a great surprise, but never before had such an issue surfaced in a Chilean presidential election. <sup>50</sup> In October, 1989 the Concertación "ONG Working Group" issued a background paper on the ONGs, with a preliminary estimate on the number of active ONGs by policy areas 40 "academic"; 45 agriculture or rural sector; 73 dependent on the Catholic Church (across policy areas); 135 urban social action—for a total of 251. Later estimates raised this total closer to 400.

In late November, 1989, the Concertación circulated a document titled "La política de la concertación frente a las corporaciones privadas de desarrollo y los organismos no-gubernamentales (ONG)". This document recognized that the proliferation of ONGs in Chile was paralleled by similar

developments in other parts of Latin America as well as in Asia and Africa and that "these private development corporations and ONGs have earned themselves a role as effective instruments to support development, a manner of fortifying civil society, and encouragement for popular participation." The Concertación further noted that the ONGs, supported by important levels of international cooperation, had contributed to redemocratization of national life.

With this in mind the Concertación defined its "policies toward Private Development Corporations and ONGs." as follows:

The Concertación recognizes the value that these organizations have in the promotion of development. Therefore, it promises to respect their autonomy, to support their institutional development and, in those areas where it is possible, to establish working agreements so they may cooperate in the implementation of public policy.

Likewise, the Concertación promises to support and expand upon the successful experiments of these types of entities which favor the development of the popular sectors and which, in the framework of the social policies of the future government, motivate popular participation.

In implementing its government plans, the Concertación visualizes diverse areas—in the fields of economic, social, and cultural development—in which it will be possible to count upon collaboration between public sector entities and ONGs and private development corporations. The Concertación commits itself to finding adequate and expeditious means to operationalize this collaboration. This may take the form of working agreements, contracts for research, carrying out experimental programs, etc.

In reference to international cooperation, the Concertación specifically recognizes the non-governmental channel as a way to canalize international cooperation. It affirms that their views, procedures, manners of operation and independence in relation to government action will be

respected so long as legal norms and democratic conviviality are not violated. The Concertacion desires that present programs be maintained and, to the extent possible, that they be expanded. Given the economic situation facing the country, it cannot be expected that the resources obtained by the ONGs during these years can be replaced with national resources.

...The Concertacion of Parties for Democracy recognizes the role that the ONGs have fulfilled in the past years in establishing the so-called informal diplomacy, whereby solidary ties have been created with many organizations from friendly nations. It is hoped that in the democratic [government] these entities continue to fulfill this role as members of civil society, assuming a co-responsibility in the forging of international relations. This role will be seen as distinct, but complementary, to that exercised by the government in the design and conduct of the country's foreign relations....

This conceptual formulation of government-ONG relations, both in the domestic and international sphere was unprecedented in its specific recognition of the potentially important role of ONGs in Chilean socio-economic development and in enriching international linkages to foreign governments, foreign ONGs, and foreign donor agencies. It was also unprecedented because it recognized, and ostensibly rejected, the temptation of a new government to regulate ONG activities with the rationale of "coordination" of national development programs. At the same time, if sustained, the Concertacion declaration on ONGs represented a modified intellectual vision of Chilean society and politics, founded upon diversity, an enhanced role for private and local initiative, and a new faith in political pluralism.

Just prior to the elections of December 1989 a summary of the policy commissions established by the Concertacion to formulate proposals for various policy areas ranging from defense, health and education to social security, agriculture and urban development reported that almost all the commissions proposed incorporating NGOs into policy development and implementation. <sup>51</sup> Also mentioned was the possibility of public subsidies for certain NGOs, for example those working in the health field, as well as contracting for service delivery by NGOs in other fields of action, such as the Agrarian Development Institute (INDAP) contracting with NGOs providing services in agriculture or the Ministry of National Resources with NGOs providing research or services in environmental affairs.

This possibility also contained risks of further politicization of the NGOs, domestication of NGOs as transmission belts for implementation of government programs, and consequent loss of autonomy, initiative, and capacity for critical assessment of government policies. Government contracts or subsidies will inevitably involve competition among NGOs and also a reluctance to bite the hand that feeds.

These risks are not merely theoretical. During the 1989 election campaign some NGOs dedicated more resources and energy to the elections and the policy commissions of the Concertacion than to their formal programs. This occasioned subsequent conflicts with, or "accounting dilemmas" for,

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donor agencies. With the Concertacion government, the personal and professional relationship of ONGs with appointees to the new administration, and the desire to "make a difference" after seventeen years out of power, many Chilean ONGs face difficult tests in retaining key personnel, autonomy, and credibility in the post March 11, 1990 milieu. The transition to a more democratic political system also provided opportunities for ONG personnel to return to the university, Church, labor union, political party, journalism, or other "place of origin" in addition to the lure of jobs in the public sector. A natural flow of professionals, technicians and academics to "normal" activities was to be expected.

The transition to more democratic government also entailed other sorts of challenges for the ONGs. They faced increased scrutiny by donor agencies now that the latter no longer felt a "protective" or "survival" urgency with the transfer of the presidency to Aylwin from General Pinochet. The sloppy accounting procedures, slack internal administration, and even poor use of resources that sometimes afflicted the ONGs would prove less acceptable than in the past. Overcoming these deficiencies, which affected individual ONGs to greater or lesser degree, will require organizational reforms.

#### Prospects for the ONGs

Several days before taking office in March 1990, the Concertación scheduled a meeting with donor agencies and ONGs in Santiago. President-elect Aylwin and other soon-to-be officials of the new government reaffirmed the commitment to ONG participation, autonomy, and diversity as earlier provided in the election platform.<sup>S3</sup>

Amongst the first initiatives of the government was the creation of a Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. Within the Ministry, an Agency for International Cooperation (ACI) and a Fund for Social Solidarity and Investment (FOSIS) were established as instruments to implement the government's international and domestic programs. The ACI would coordinate the complex network of international cooperation with foreign government agencies and private donors. FOSIS would be an agency charged with channeling investment into projects specifically designed to overcome poverty and marginality, through community organizations, ONGs, municipal government, and other public agencies.

By appointing Rodrigo Egaña, editor of an important book on ONGs (*Una puerta que se abre*, 1989) and active participant in a well-known ONG himself (PET), as executive secretary of the newly-created Agency for International Cooperation within MIDEPLAN and professional staff from CIEPLAN, FLACSO, PET and other ONGs to key positions in FOSIS, the government also signaled its awareness of the need to formalize ONG-government relations.

Egana's appointment, along with appointments of other ONG personnel to key government posts, also indicated the immediacy of the challenge to ONGs of loss of staff to the government, the competition among ONGs for government posts and contacts, and the tension between government and ONGs as focii of policy initiatives. This tension will surely persist, indeed intensify, as certain ONGs form close associations with government agencies and obtain government support while others find themselves less favored. The extent of these dilemmas were not fully clear taking into account only formal appointments, inasmuch as many ONG staff were also called upon as consultants, part-time employees, and informal advisers in a number of government agencies. (Perhaps the tendency for most ONG staff to take leaves of absence rather than to resign from their respective ONGs should provide some optimism regarding the long-term intentions of those temporarily leaving for government service?)

From July to August 1990 six meetings with ONG personnel at MIDEPLAN, organized by the Taller de Cooperación al Desarrollo, a center dedicated to the study of ONGs and international cooperation, examined the challenges and opportunities for the ONGs in the democratic transition. 54 Included on the agenda were the rising concerns in some quarters over government competition with the ONGs for donor agency resources, with the perception that FOSIS and

the ACI might disrupt existing donor agency-ONG relations, with the potential for politicization of these two agencies, and with a range of other thorny issues.

Most of these issues were openly discussed at a meeting attended by ONG personnel and government officials at Punta de Tralca in October, 1990. Efforts to create more formal relations among the ONGs, for example national and regional federations, to increase collaborative projects and sharing of information, and to clarify government-ONG relations continued as the Aylwin government entered its second year (March 1991-92). The ONGs wrestled with the challenges posed by their transformation from anti-regime institutions under the military junta to institutions supporting the elected government, but without losing their character as non-government, autonomous and innovative elements in grass roots development.

In the short run (1990-1993) a likely "shaking out" in the ONG sector seemed likely to result in redefinition, refinement of roles, pressures for internal efficiency and more professional personnel administration. This may be accompanied by a reduction in the number of ONGs and/or further specialization—though new ONGs will also appear as the emergent political situation presents new opportunities—  
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and new challenges.

To survive, most ONGs must stream-line their internal operations and present a clear definition of their role in the democratic transition to donor agencies. Some will benefit from government contracts; others will continue to rely fundamentally on external or Church resources. Still others may find new, if partial, forms of self-financing, though limits to this option for most grass-roots support organizations seem rather severe given the poverty characteristic of clientele groups. In other cases ex-officials and supporters of the Pinochet government, business interests, and ONG-entrepreneurs will make use of the ONG format to channel external and national funds into more conservative think-tanks and social projects. Divisions within existing ONGs will also spawn a number of new organizations.

Notwithstanding the challenges and inevitable disappearance, amalgamation, or reduction in size of some ONGs, the socio-economic experiments they have initiated, the leadership they have generated and nurtured, the diverse and critical approaches to public policy dilemmas they have offered, insures them a significant role in the complex social web of Chilean society for the foreseeable future. Relationships among ONGs, ONGs and political parties, trade unions, religious groups, and other social movements and organizations (for example, the OEPs, neighborhood improvement associations, and womens production cooperatives)

will make the ONG role both controversial and politically significant--across the ideological spectrum of Chilean politics.

These relationships will also offer ongoing opportunities to devise and implement experimental solutions to the most pressing socio-economic problems facing Chile at the neighborhood, local and municipal levels--and to expand upon successes achieved as partial responses to the overall socio-economic development challenges facing the country. Some opportunities may also exist on a broader scale, but the ONGs will not solve the complex, long-term dilemmas facing Chilean society nor will they replace the need for government policymaking to confront national issues. The very characteristics that contribute to success of ONGs in small scale projects and experiments--face-to-face relations, informality, flexibility,, personal commitment of staff, sense of urgency, ideological or religious motivation--are inherently difficult to replicate or sustain in large-scale more bureaucratic enterprises.

Nevertheless, the ONGs may prove key actors in formulating options, experimenting with technical and institutional innovations, and encouraging grass-roots initiatives. Recognizing the limits and capabilities of the State, local government, and the ONGs in a dynamic setting may permit Chile's traditionally state-centered society to evolve gradually toward authentic political democratization, decentralization, and grass roots development.

## ONG Notes

1. See Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Polfticas económicas en Chile, 1952-1970. CEPLAN, Ediciones Nueva Universidad, 1973; Anibal Pinto, Chile, una economía diffcil. Fondo de Cultura Económico, Mexico, 1964; Roberto Zahler et al. Chile 1940/1975. treinta y cinco anos de discontinuidad economica. ICHEH, Santiago n.d.
2. Sergio Bitar, Chile. Experiment in Democracy. ISHI, Philadelphia, 1986; Stefan de Vylder, Allenders Chile. The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular. Cambridge University Press, 1974; Brian Loveman, Chile. The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism. Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1988: Chapter 9.
3. Cited in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. The Politics of Antipolitics, University of Nebraska Press, 2nd ed. 1989: 246.
4. Ibid, P. 249.
5. "Disappearances" refer to persons who were not officially arrested or detained, but were thought to be kidnapped or murdered by security forces. See Vicaria de la Solidaridad, Annual Reports, documenting disappearances, arrests, torture and murders; Hugo Fruhling, "Organismos no gubernamentales de derechos humanos en el paso del autoritarismo a la democracia en Chile," in Rodrigo Egaña and José Antonio Abalos K. , Una puerta que se abre. Los organismos no gubernamentales en la cooperacion al desarrollo, Taller de Cooperacion al Desarrollo, Santiago, 1989: 139-172.
6. Brian Loveman, "Government and Regime, Succession in Chile," Third World Quarterly. January. 1988: 260-280.
7. Luis Razeto, "Las organizaciones económicas populares," Programa de Economía del Trabajo (PET), Santiago, 1983: 17; Arno Klenner, "El apoyo a proyectos productivos urbanos en Chile," in Egaña and Abalos (1989): 273-289; Daniela Sanchez, "Instituciones y accion poblacional: Seguimiento de su accion en el períodos 1973-1981," in Jorge Chateau, et al. Espacio v poder. Los pobladores. FLACSO, Santiago, 1987; Guillermo Campero, Entre la sobrevivencia y la acción polftica, Las organizaciones de pobladores en Santiago, ILET, 1987.
8. Loreto Jansana, El pan nuestro. PET. Editorial Tiempo Nuevo, Santiago, 1989.
9. See the ongoing analysis of the regime's economic policies in the Journal Colección Estudios CIEPLAN (1979-); Gary M, Walton, ed. The National Economic Policies of Chile. Greenwich, Conn, 1985; Jose P. Arellano et al. Modelo economico chileno: trayectoria de una critica. Santiago, 1982.

10. See José K. Abalos, "Las instituciones de apoyo en Chile, una síntesis," in Cooperación internacional al desarrollo, No. 1 1937; "Organizaciones no gubernamentales post '73," Documento del Trabajo, PREAL-ILET, Santiago, 1988; Marcela Jiménez, et al. Desarrollo Local, Municipio y organismos no gubernamentales. Escuela de Trabajo Social, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 1989.

11. For example, CEPLAN was detached from the Catholic University and became CIEPLAN, a leading private center of predominantly Christian Democratic academics who would influence significantly the course of Chilean politics in the 1980s and provide key ministers and other high-ranking officials, in the government of president Patricio Aylwin after March, 1990.

12. In the case of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) the Chilean government failed to renew the international accord with UNESCO which had allowed FLACSO to become a leading research and teaching institution in Latin America. After 1979 FLACSO was transformed into a private research center affiliated with the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. Ex-officials of the Unidad Popular government, "socialists" of a variety of orientations, and other anti-Pinochet academics made FLACSO a much more "national" institution as foreign researchers left Chile and international accords with the Pinochet government were abrogated or simply not renewed. Like CIEPLAN, FLACSO provided a number of key appointees to the Aylwin administration, including members of the presidential staff, technical personnel and consultants in education, international cooperation, the Ministry of Justice, and in agriculture.

13. L. David Brown, "Organizaciones voluntarias privadas y coaliciones para el desarrollo," in Francisco Vio Grossi, ed. ONG, estado y cooperación internacional, Una introducción al tema, Secretaria General del Consejo de Educación de Adultos de América Latina, Santiago, 1979: 185-209. Brown calls these organizations "organizaciones voluntarias privadas dedicadas al desarrollo" and adds to our inventory of acronyms OVPDD. While this is more descriptive than merely "nongovernmental organizations," it is also more awkward, and therefore not likely to become a common usage as did ONG for a period of time. Common usage in Chile refers to NGOs as asistenciales (charitable) and "de apoyo" (grass-root support organizations).

14. Many of the NGOs adopted the legal status of sociedades de profesionales which, by definition, are profit-seeking entities. However, in practice or in their internal regulations, their "non-profit" character was made clear. This legal tactic was adopted as a response to the

difficulties imposed by the government in chartering "foundations" or "non-profit corporations" as provided in Section 33, Book I of the Chilean Civil Code. In accord with Decree Law 1183, 1975 the military government imposed significant obstacles, along with menacing financial and political control over non-profit corporations. Applications for such charters were routed through the intelligence agencies and the secret police for "clearance". This discouraged most ONGs from pursuing this route, although CIEPLAN obtained a legal charter as a non-profit entity prior to implementation of Decree Law 1183.

15. Carlos Pina R. "Las ONGs en el ambito local urbano: Desafios y potencialidades", Documento de Trabajo, FLACSO, Santiago, October, 1989: 13-14.

16. For example, in 1974 the Catholic Church began a program in the rural areas around Santiago called Oficina Coordinadora de Asistencia Campesina (OCAC). In 1985, the Juridical status of OCAC was altered, becoming a somewhat more autonomous ONG—although the directorate consisted of eight bishops and a lay director. See Ivan Radovic, "Los actuales desafios que se presentan a las agendas no gubernamentales que trabajan en el campo del desarrollo rural" OCAC, Documentos de análisis y reflexion, Octubre, 1987; "ONG: Con autonomía del gobierno...a seguir trabajando", Informativo OCAC, No. 5, Enero-Abril 1990s 10-12.

17. Sergio Spoerer, "La diplomacia informal: América Latina, Europa y los NO gubernamentales," Revista Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, (July-August, 1987): 45-51.

18. A number of the older and more established ONGs such as the Institute of Rural Education (IER), CARITAS, Chile, Institute de Promoción Agraria (INPROA), and the Institute Chileno de Educacion Cooperativa (ICECOOP) affiliated in the Asociacion de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ASONG) in 1981. This Association of Non-Governmental Organizations initially included 35 diverse institutions, "inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles of the United Nations Charter." ASONG emphasized its relations with the Economic and Social System of the United Nations (ECOSOC).

19. Almino Affonso et al. Movimiento campesino chileno, Vol. I, ICIRA, Santiago, 1970: 165-170; Henry A. Landsberger and Fernando Canitrot M. Iglesia. intelectuales y campesinos. INSORA, Editorial del Pacífico, Santiago, 1967.

20. The study circles, unlike the programs of research, consisted of seminars and sessions of reflexion on a variety of topics during a period of harsh repression by the military government. Participants were unpaid professionals directed by selected Academia/Church personnel.

21. Mario Antonieta Huerta and Luis Pacheco Pastene, La iglesia chilena y los cambios sociopolíticos, Pehuen, Santiago, 1938.
22. Affonso et al. (1970): 166-170.
23. See INPROA, "25 años Junto al campesino", Santiago, 1989; Liliana Barria and Margarita de la Cuadra, "INPROA y su trabajo con la mujer campesina", Santiago, 1989; William C. Thiesenhusen, Chile's Experiments in Agrarian Reform. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.
24. Sergio Gómez, "Nuevas formas de desarrollo rural en Chile (Análisis de las ONG)" in Egaña and Abalos (1989): 65-91. Gómez lists by name and acronym 61 ONG working in the rural areas as of December, 1988. See also by the same author "El desarrollo rural y las ONG", paper presented at the 3rd Scientific Conference on the Environment, Concepción, Chile, 1-4 August, 1989.
25. Carlos Pina and Irene Agurto, Las organizaciones no gubernamentales de promoción y desarrollo urbano en Chile, Una propuesta de investigación, Santiago, FLACSO, 1988; Carlos Piña, "Las ONG en el ámbito local urbano: Desafíos y potencialidades," Documento de Trabajo, Santiago, FLACSO, October, 1989; Judith Salinas, Carlos Vergara, Giorgio Solimano, "El aporte de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil a las políticas de salud en Chile," PROSAPS, Santiago, 1989. See also Judith Salinas and Nora Bertoni, "Aportes para la toma de decisiones sobre formas de cooperación entre los servicios públicos de salud y las organizaciones no gubernamentales," PROSAPS, 1990, for a directory of 186 health-related NGOs.
26. It is estimated that approximately 13,000 Latin American political "refugees" were in Chile at the time of the coup. Many were detained by the military government and taken to the National Stadium or other detention centers, and a public campaign against "foreign subversives" was carried out by the new regime. This situation precipitated formation of CONAR.
27. See Brian Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile, Princeton University Press, 1982: Chapter 9; Hugo Fruhling, "Organismos no gubernamentales de derechos humanos en el paso del autoritarismo a la democracia en Chile," in Egaña and Abalos (1989): 139-172; Eugenia Weinstein, Elizabeth Lira, et al. Trauma, duelo y reparación. una experiencia de trabajo psicosocial en Chile. Santiago, FASIC, 1987; Elizabeth Lira, Eugenia Weinstein, et al. Psicoterapia y represión política. Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1984. FASIC

28. See Weinstein, Lira, et al. (1987) for summaries of International Commission of Human Rights reports on torture in Chile.
29. CINTRAS was initially sponsored and financed by RCT (Research Center Against Torture), Copenhagen, Denmark.
30. ILAS was created by a group of mental health professionals and psychologists who had worked in FASIC. It combined research, therapy for victims of repression and torture, and collaboration with human rights organizations in other Latin American nations.
31. "La Inter-American Foundation y sus programas en Chile," El Mercurio, 25 January, 1978 P. 24. While the article exaggerated the funding level for IAF projects in Chile it identified some 21 projects between 1973-1977--most of which were Church-affiliated. Cited in Smith 1982>s 329.
32. See Smith, op cit. for details.
33. For overviews on the military regime's repression of university faculties and students as well as the evolution of academic NGOs see Manuel Antonio Garreton, Las ciencias sociales en Chile, FLACSO-Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Santiago, 1982; Smith (1982): Chapter 9; PIIE, Las transformaciones educacionales bajo el regimen militar, Santiago, 1984: -Vol 2; Maria Teresa Lladser, "La investigación en ciencias sociales en Chile: Su desarrollo en los centros privados, 1973-1988," in Abalos and Egaña (1988): 215-270; Arturo Valenzuela, et al. "The Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Santiago, Chile," A Report to the InterAmerican Foundation.
34. PIIE, the Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Educación, included researchers who had played a role in making education policy during the Allende government. A number of PIIE staff joined the Aylwin administration in positions within the Ministry of Education and as educational consultants after March, 1990.
35. Indicative of this trend, Lucia Pardo V. inventoried approximately 70 private institutions (most NGOs) providing support of some kind (credit, technical assistance, marketing services, etc.) to small businesses and micro-firms, including talleres productivos in June of 1990. Less than one-third of these entities existed in 1981. The pace of change in the ONG sector was reflected by the fact that some of the programs listed by Pardo had already disappeared and other NGOs which provided support for small businesses and talleres were not listed in the inventory. See Instituciones de Fomento y de Apoyo a Talleres Productivos y Pequeñas Empresas o Negocios. AID/FINAM, Departamento de Economía,

Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Administrativas, Universidad de Chile, June, 1990. An overlapping directory of 70 social science research institutes and institutions of "promocion de desarrollo" published by CIPMA and FLACSO in September 1989 suffered from the same problems. See Maria Teresa Lladser, DIRINS. Directorio de Instituciones de Investigacion en Ciencias Sociales y Promocion del Desarrollo, Santiago, 1989,

36. Ana Maria Arteaga C. and Eliana Largo V., "Las ONG en el area de la mujer y la cooperacion al desarrollo," in Abalos and Egaña, Una Puerta... (1989): 329-356.

37. Lladser in Abalos and Egaña (1989) op cit.

38. ONG influence and participation in the Aylwin government was extensive. It ranged from appointments of OCAC staff to positions in CORFO in Aysen to ministerial appointments. ONG staff were serving in the Bank of Chile, CORFO, Ministries of Labor, Justice, Finance, Economy, Agriculture, National Resources, the Treasury, and the Ministry Secretaria General of Government, illustrative, but far from a complete list: the Ministry of Finance was dominated by staff from CIEPLAN and an appointee from ILADES. Key appointees in MIDEPLAN came from CIEPLAN, FLACSO, PET, PREALC, CEL; presidential advisers in the Secretaria General de la Presidencia, from CED, FLACSO, CIEPLAN; numerous staff from PIIE and FLACSO were making education policy; GIA, GEA, AGRA, FLACSO, CEDRA, and other ONG staff involved in agricultural policy; the chief of the Treasury came from <PET>; in the Ministry of National Resources, the head of the Planning Office and Executive Secretary of the Ecology Commission came from CIAL and CIPMA; several congressman (CESOC, CORDILLERA, CED, AGRA, Taller Norte) and a number of ambassador appointees (CED, ILET, CERC, TPECA, CERC, PROSPER) and high appointments in the foreign service (Academia de Humanismo Cristiano. FLACSO)---in short a broad representation of ONG personnel at all levels of the Aylwin government. According to the magazine, HOY (6-12 Agosto 1990): 4-7, every Monday at 5PM eighteen policy analysts met with Minister Edgardo Boeninger: Ricardo Solari, Enrique Correa, Edgardo Riveros, Eugenio Tironi, Angel Flisfisch, Ignacio Walker, Jose Joaquin Brunner, Sol Serrano, Mariana Aylwin, John Biehl, Pedro Butazzoni, Augusto Varas, Jaime Pérez de Arce, Carlos Vergara, Eugenio de la Hera, Juan Irarrazabal, Guillermo Pérez, Zarco Luksic. Only a handful of these persons lacked experience in the ONG sector; several continued their ONG work while working for the government.

39. Ideologues of the military regime adapted Church doctrine concerning the role of the State in society, emphasizing that the State should only carry out functions not within the sphere of other social groups or associations. In particular, the neo-liberal theorists were concerned with

limiting the economic production functions of the State and the extent of regulation of private enterprise.

40. For example, the leftist-oriented academic institute called VECTOR, founded in 1977, was subjected to a police raid in 1984. Personnel were detained and interrogated and the offices of VECTOR stripped of documentation. See Lladser (1989): 233.

41. Abalos and Egaña (1989): 30-36. For discussion of the creation of a regional federation of ONGs in Temuco see Comisión Relacionadora de ONG IX Región, "Dimension e impacto de la labor de los organismos no gubernamentales en la IX región de la Araucanía," Temuco, March, 1990; "Conclusiones primer encuentro regional de organizaciones no gubernamentales región de la Araucanía," Comisión Redactora, NEHUEN, PAS-ARAUCANIA, SERPAJ, SOC. MAPUCHE LONKO KILAPAN, SODECAM, Temuco, 1988.

42. Sergio Gomez, "El desarrollo rural...." (1989) suggests that certain ONGs "have a complimentary relationship with the military government. They define themselves through application of the subsidiary role of the State, thereby allowing private institutions to contract with the State in the execution of certain programs destined to incorporate marginal groups [into society]. Typical in this respect is the Corporación Privada de Desarrollo (CORPIDE)."

43. Marcela Jiménez, et al. Desarrollo Local... (1989); Margarita Quezada Venegas and Alfonso Raposo Moyano, "Vision-intra institucional del municipio como agente del desarrollo local," paper presented at the meeting on "Municipios y organizaciones privadas: Lecciones y proyecciones de algunas experiencias," Santiago, Chile, October 23-25, 1989.

44. Marcela Jiménez et al. (1989): 125-132. This book also contains a useful inventory of government social welfare programs and subsidies (pp. 157-169).

45. For an overview of the "seven modernizations" see Brian Loveman, Chile, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 1988: Chapter 10

46. Carlos Huneeus, "El ejército y la política en el Chile de Pinochet. Su magnitud y alcances," Opciones. (May-August, 1988): 89-136. Huneeus examines the extent to which public administration was militarized and staffed by military personnel by Pinochet. Certain groups working in local level politics, including ONGs, anticipated the dilemmas of local development through local initiatives, whether under the dictatorship or a restored "democracy", in a conference held 11-13 August, 1988 at the Centro Canelo de Nos. The overriding legacy of the centralist tradition represented a

problem that transcended the immediate challenge of working within the constraints of dictatorship. Francisco Vio succinctly stated the problem: "local development... is fundamentally a political process... characterised by satisfying the peoples' needs, but by breaking the bonds of dependence." (emphasis added). The conference was convoked by Centro Canelo de Nos, Colectivo Atención Primaria en Salud, Cordillera, EVGL, SUR, Quercum, Sochiplan and TEKHNE. See Potencialidades de la Acción Local en la Solución de Problemas Sociales. Seminario-Taller. 1989.

47. Hernan Pozo, Administración interior del estado y sistema de participación: Coredes y Codecos, Cuadernos de Difusión, FLACSO, 1988; Eduardo Morales, Hernan Pozo, and Sergio Rojas, Municipio, desarrollo local y sectores populares, Materiales de Difusión, FLACSO, 1988, Hernan P020, "La reforma municipales Propuestas, problemas y perspectivas," Documento de Trabajo, FLACSO, October, 1989. Pozo's earlier "La situación actual del municipio Chileno y el problema de la 'municipalización'," FLACSO, July, 1981 is also a helpful snapshot of early regime initiatives in the area of local government reform.

48. A "reform" introduced by the junta in February, 1990 (Law 18923) removed Iquique from the list of municipalities where the president designated the mayor. This allowed General Pinochet to orchestrate designation of a mayor to his liking in Iquique, headquarters for an important military unit, prior to Aylwin's assumption of the presidency.

49. Recognition of these issues had been made explicit much earlier. In 1985 the Taller de Cooperación Internacional, created by professionals who had worked in the ONG sector to "allow reflexion on the design of a policy of international cooperation that would benefit those most in need" began to focus on the relationship between international assistance, development, and Chilean political prospects. A seminar sponsored by this group in 1987 invited donor agencies and Chilean ONGs to "think about what happens after 1988?". During 1989 the Taller de Cooperación published pamphlets called "Antecedentes y posibilidades para una, nueva política de cooperación bilateral" which examined the policies and programs of agencies in the United States and Canada; Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; Germany, Belgium, Holland and England; Spain, France and Italy. Taken together these pamphlets are a unique synthesis of philosophies of international assistance, range of programs, scope of funding, and political orientation of these major donor nations.

50. In September 1989 a group of ONGs (CIDE, CISME, CODEPU, OCAC, AFSC, PAS) supported by the Belgian S.O.S. FAIM, convoked a meeting of ONGs and political parties ("Encuentro Nacional ONG con Partidos Politicos") in which soon-to-be key

appointees in the Aylwin administration were featured speakers! Enrique Krauss, Alvaro Garcia, Enrique Correa, Alex Rosenfeld, Sergio Molina. Ninety seven ONGs were represented in the three days of meetings, preceded by regional ONG-political party meetings in Antofagasta, Santiago, Concepcion and Temuco earlier in the year. Enrique Krauss, appointed Minister of Interior in March 1990, declared that the ONGs had been "the expression of democratization of the national soul and an instrument to improve the deteriorated quality of life of the poor." Encuentro Nacional de ONG con Partidos Politicos. Santiago, September, 1989: 28.

51. "Ambitos de trabajo con ONGs indicados en los informes e las comisiones programáticas". Certain ONGs such as PARTICIPA, IDEAS, and CIDE also played a important role in "civic education", teaching courses on electoral procedures to poll watchers, registering voters, and doing all sorts of "voter education". These groups appear committed to sustaining these functions and, in the case of PARTICIPA, becoming a sort of Chilean version of the U.S. "League of Women's Voters".

52. In some cases donor agencies had implicit understandings with ONGs which permitted "political overhead" or direct channeling of funds to political parties or labor organizations. A small number of ONGs were essentially adjuncts of political parties. Some European donor agencies fully intended to support opposition political movements in Chile with their grants, but necessarily preferred to disburse funds formally to ONGs rather than more obviously political entities. In other cases, however, ONG staff diverted their energies and resources to projects not specifically included in their agreements with donor agencies.

53. Encuentro Cooperacion y Democracia. Concertacion de partidos por la democracia. Grupo de Trabajo de Organizaciones no Gubernamentales. "La política de la concertacion frente a las corporaciones privadas de desarrollo y los organismos no gubernamentales (ONG), Santiago, Marzo, 1990.

54. See Rodrigo Egaña, "Relaciones entre ONGD y donantes en el periodo de transición democrática en Chile;" Eugenio Diaz and Sergio Gomez, "Nuevos dilemas para los ONG Chilenos, "; Bernardita Caneino D. "Los cambios en los ONG a partir del nuevo escenario político," in Taller de Cooperación al Desarrollo, Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo. Publicación Semestral 7, December, 1990.

55. For example, FINAM, the Chilean affiliate of Women's World Banking, Banca Mundial de la Mujer, obtained its legal charter in early 1988 and offered programs of credit guarantees, technical assistance and training programs to

women in the formal *and* informal sectors of the economy. Another interesting case is that of the Taller Permanente de Educacion y Capacitacion Ambiental (TPECA), financed in part by ICI (Spain), Ebert (Germany), and Diakonia (Corporacion Metodista Chilena). TPECA was organized in ISO'S and, with a variety of materials and methods,, is providing environmental education to teachers, union leaders, and local community leaders.