

POLITICAL AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN WOODLAND MANAGEMENT IN  
KANYATI COMMUNAL AREA, ZIMBABWE.



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## INTRODUCTION

One characteristic of studies on woodland management strategies in communal areas of Zimbabwe is the prominence given to the part played by "traditional" religious and political systems in the management of the resources (Schoffeleers, 1978; Mukamura, nd.; Wilson, 1986; Gumbo, 1992). It is, however, acknowledged that these systems were eroded by colonial and post colonial state interventions regarding land use, political institutions, and family and personal matters in the countryside. The erosion of these "traditional" management systems is also linked to scarcity, itself a manifestation of the concentration of people in communal areas and the attendant problems of poverty, overpopulation and overexploitation of resources. Either way the development of "traditional" systems into fully fledged common property resource institutions was sidelined even though residual forms can still be detected, which perforce were used by communal area inhabitants to react against state initiatives (Wilson, personal communication). New initiatives to establish viable resource management institutions have led to a saga of conflicts among "traditional" authorities and state instituted political structures (Gumbo, 1992). These conflicts need to be contextualized and fuller explanations drawn. Still there is a general tendency to award exogenous factors more importance regarding inadequate institutional arrangements to manage the resources.

Transposing this scenario to newly settled areas, which are primarily resettlement schemes and communal areas in the Zambezi

valley which had lower population densities, presence a challenge not least because these newly settled areas might or might not recreate the older communal lands scenario. They are not, however, necessarily weighed down by the multiplicity of authority structures.

This paper seeks to elaborate the factors determining the inconsistencies related to non-application and/or differential application of rules and controls among community members in a recently settled area. In the case study area context it emerged that there is a de facto management strategy adopted at the household and community levels, in the former case to act as insurance against possible depletion of community resources and to supply products that otherwise would not be available; in the latter case to ensure continued supply of resources from the communal woodland resource. The management strategy incorporates cultural forms of control and a project-imposed management strategy which fixed the community/political boundaries and created community resource control institutions. Households' control over their resources is tight except during the dry season when domestic livestock are not herded during which time appropriate measures are taken to protect the trees. Cultural forms of control are undermined by the absence of "traditional" authority, short term residence in the area and antipathy to "traditional" forms of religion. Community resource control institutions are lax and discretionary in their application of unwritten, vague but commonly understood rules and regulations to inhabitants of their locality although they are effective

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against those perceived to be outsiders. The rules and regulations entail the need to seek permission from elected resource overseers and/or Village chairs, not to ring bark trees, not to cut trees near river banks, and not to cut fruit trees. The sanctions that can be effected are extra work at the schools or paddocks or woodlots, imposition of a fine, or in the case of recalcitrants, eviction from the area. In some resettlement schemes control of outsiders is a pernicious problem linked to claims on access by the outsiders, resource overexploitation in adjacent communal areas and commoditization of the resource (Fortmann & Nhira, forthcoming)

→ *there are common property resources + institutions*

*Ostrom  
is focus on  
community*

The approach taken in the paper is to investigate the interactions among community members (that is, those with rights of use over the resources) and between them and agents of the state (a la Berry 1988, 1989; Peluso, 1992). Several state-initiated community institutions are identified which act as power bases and serve as channels of access to resources. Power operates within a political, economic, social and cultural context, which affects how power manifests itself and the uses to which it is put. As Pauline E. Peters (1987:178) notes, there is "need for the social embeddedness of a commons (which takes into account) the structure of relations, differentiation among groups, and the set of shared meanings and values". Struggles over resources can be embedded in struggles over meanings (Moore, 1992). Borrowing from Giddens, power is defined as "situated in transformative capacity", thus power and the "social relations through which it manifests itself are directly related to the

agents' capacity to produce form through work (and because it shows up through social relations) power can then be related to rules, resources and domination (Karp, 1986). In the local context the forces have coalesced around the operations of the land use project. Four power bases are identified 1) state based power, 2) "traditional" power, 3) inter household power and 4) intra-household power. An attempt is made to explain apparent resistance to initiatives emanating from these power bases. More specific to trees and woodlands are the narratives of the discourse used to justify existing arrangements.

In conclusion it is pointed out that while the legal framework for a communal property management regime (Berkes, 1989) does not encourage the emergence of such a regime, developments in the study area have led to a nascent regime being in place. However, the rigid control by the state over land settlement and land use coupled with a laissez faire attitude to the management of woodlands, a lop-sided extension strategy, increasing economic differentiation, local patronage arrangements, the state's focus on cash cropping and the imperative to use resources to accumulate account for the apparent inertia of community institutions to effectively control the usage of woodlands. An attempt is made to draw the implications of these findings for the evolution of effective common property management institutions in Zimbabwe in relation to resource rich, newly settled areas.

The discussion begins with notes on the site and the research

methods employed. Attention is then given to how state power manifests itself. Three issues are taken up i.e. land use provisions, extension and project investment and distribution of benefits. A discussion of traditional power then follows particularly relating to its potential considering that it has been sidelined thus far. Inter household power is discussed with respect to the factors making for convergence or divergence of interest which are identified as economic differentiation, ethnicity, lineage organization and local patronage arrangements. A discussion of intra household power then follows particularly focussing on gender differences. Finally, an attempt is made to draw possible implications of these findings.

#### THE RESEARCH SITE

Kanyati lies in Mashonaland West Province and covers some 62 500ha. (ARDA, 1987:10). It was settled after 1980. Subsequent to settlement a land use programme encompassing tsetse-fly eradication, service provision, promotion of cash crops, land use reorganization (i.e. separation of grazing and arable), drilling of boreholes, creation of micro-irrigation projects, among other programmes was executed by a government parastatal.

#### RESEARCH METHODS

This research was conducted over an eleven month period involving both quantitative and qualitative methods. The research site was chosen on the basis of relatively new settlement and abundance of woodland resources so that the processes under which a common property management system emerges and evolves could be studied.

There were four parts to the research: open-ended interviews with the earliest settlers; a random sample survey of households in three out of ten villages in the study area was selected on the basis of natural region and observed political dynamics; a wood usage, tree planting and conservation survey of the sampled households; open-ended intensive interviews of the sampled households; and key informant interviews with project personnel, officials of the local district administration, local community members and attendance at meetings and other community events.

FINDINGS

State Power

State power in the project area is represented by extension personnel, district administration, the district council, project management and the various institutions emanating from the Prime Minister's Directive on Provincial Administration and Provincial Governorships of 1984 i.e. Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), District Development Committees (DDCs), Ward Development Committees (Wardcos) and Village Development Committees (Vidcos) (see de Valk & Wekwete, 1990 for an extended treatment of these structures). In theory development plans were to be channelled up the hierarchy where choices would be made about what should be implemented and in turn channelled down the hierarchy. In practice the two lowest structures do not have budgets nor are they legal persona, therefore their plans do not usually see the light of day. In the project area, although they are comprised of local residents, Vidcos and Wardcos should more appropriately be seen as agents of the state because they have little autonomous action beyond serving as conduits for ideas emanating

from the state, to paraphrase Brand (in Mukombodzi, 1990) Senouga and Matose (1992) observe that the ties of Vidcos to the state have left them politically dependent. This role contrasts with that expected by the community which they represent and whose expectations they endeavour to meet. This dialectic is still working itself out within the study area and elsewhere in the country. Community leaders do react to state manoeuvres just as ordinary community members do, but these reactions fall far short of an imposition of their own agenda. In the local context "development" goods are a monopoly of the project made possible with external donor funding, therefore state power will be discussed in so far as it relates to the project in relation to three issue areas: land use provisions, extension, and project investment and distribution of benefits.

#### Land Use Provisions

Squatting and land disputes are contentious issues in the project area. This is so because land demarcation was superimposed on the then existing land use practices. Some residents had cleared more land than was subsequently allocated but which they were unwilling to part with. Outsiders still regard the area as a frontier. The typical intervention strategy is for Video chairs and councillors to call in extension workers when they have failed to mediate satisfactorily themselves. Extension workers intervene on the presumption that if the disputants are shown their boundaries as reflected on the land use maps, then the disputants will heed the extension workers. Often their advice is taken, but in several instances it was not, mainly because the



amount of land cleared was so extensive that the original settlers were loathe to give it up. If extension workers fail to mediate, the district administration is called in to arbitrate. District Administration act on behalf of the district council which is the authority with legal jurisdiction over the area, as per the provisions of the Communal Lands Act 1982 and the District Councils Act 1980. Vidco chairs and councillors stay out of the more intractable disputes until district administration has reached a conclusion on the matter. Local leaders fear inadequate legal protection should their intervention result in violence as has happened several times when the district administration has intervened.

District Administration use a "development" discourse in the first instance in their intervention style. This entails appealing to the disputants in a manner that emphasizes rationality of the land use plan and the obfuscating nature of disputes for other development plans. If the disputes continue, district administration then threaten the protagonists with eviction from the project area. On their part and as a way of backing the stance taken by district administration, councillors and Vidco chairs enjoin people not to go against government regulations as people would ultimately suffer. Extension personnel, who tend to keep themselves out of the more volatile disputes because this would interfere with their extension function, usually fall back on blaming community leadership i.e. the councillors and Vidco chairs for not knowing their duties or for being hesitant to make decisions. Having intervened,

successfully or not, district administration usually end up reinforcing the idea that in fact Videos and councillors should be able to solve issues concerning the community on their own. The dilemma facing community representatives is thus one of having been placed in an intercalary role and being accountable to technical and administrative staff as well as to their electorate.

There has been resistance by individual community members against the overtures of the district administration. Resistance has taken the form of litigation in courts of law against eviction. None of these court cases has been conclusive. The settlers concerned have remained in the project area in spite of the district administration's desire to have them evicted. In the meantime the project has withdrawn its services from areas widely affected by such disputes on the assumption that the district administration was still pursuing eviction of the settlers. Community leaders have often confronted district administration with a request that a conclusion be reached so that amends could be made with the settlers involved so that "development" activities can continue. District administration maintain a brave face on an issue that, by some accounts, they appear to have lost in courts of law.

District Administration has been more successful in evicting squatters who tend to be new arrivals than in evicting long term settlers. The eviction of these squatters is a constant reminder to settlers and community leaders that the control over land by

the district council is rigid local people have begun manouvering to wrest some power from the district council and the district administration over land allocation because of untoward practices by the district council which would allocate vacated plots to strangers rather than to community members without land. The community has done this by pointing out to administration staff at local community meetings that the turnaround period between the council being informed about a vacant plot and actual allocation was unnecessarily long and that the practice of allocating plots to strangers was prejudicing locals. The community was assured that in future Vidco chairs and councillors would allocate land and that any further land use planning would respect the old plans and would not involve the shifting of people (Proceedings of the Workshop on Wildlife and Institutional Developments in Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe Communal Lands, Kariba 1/4/92).

It would therefore appear that on the crucial matter of land settlement and land use the district administration and the district council will devolve authority to elected bodies (ie. Vidcos and Wardcos) within the project area. However, thus far a regime of rigid control over land settlement was coupled with a laissez faire attitude to the use of trees and woodlands as will be pointed out later even though the District Council can invoke the Natural Resources Act, The Communal Forest Produce Act, the Communal Land (Model) (Land Use and Conservation) By-Laws of 1985 and associated legislation which has been argued to be restrictive, rule oriented and undermines the development of

local resource management capacity (Schoones and Haggren, 1992: 40). This does not apply to an adjacent game area which will be managed under a Campfire model resource management programme for the benefit of the community. Campfire refers to the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources which was conceived in the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (Martin, 1986). The programme has so far been limited to the management of wildlife despite its all encompassing acronym. This programme is still in its infancy in Kanyala. The laissez faire attitude taken by the state with regard to woodland resources in the study area has given room for the nascent institutions to attempt to manage the resources.

### Extension

Extension services are geared towards cash cropping especially cotton and burley tobacco. In future, attention will be given to soya beans and horticulture. Cotton and burley tobacco tend to be labour intensive and to involve relatively high input costs and therefore tend to be grown by the better off farmers.

Extension takes the form of extension meetings (or extension messages being passed on at other community meetings), visits by extension workers to farms, master farmer training courses and demonstrations and trials some of which are done on-farm. Farmers reported that master farmer training did not have an on farm training component. Selection criteria favour those who are literate, who have time available, status in the community and who are "innovators" (Zwart, 1990:25/26).

In Ward A of the 325 plotheolders 125 had acquired master farmer certificates, some since they had settled in Kanyati, while others had acquired the training in their areas of origin. The project is training at the rate of ten farmers per Video per annum (100 farmers per annum). The courses have a component on agroforestry dealing with protection, pruning methods and the management of orchards. Coupled with the attention given to establishing woodlots on the presupposition that in time the woodland resource would be depleted, the bias against an explicit focus on managing existing woodlands is apparent.

In a survey done by the Agricultural Development Corporation/Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Board (1990:47) it was reported that 60% of farmers had attended at least one or more extension meetings a month and that in descending order farmers wanted more information on crops, livestock, transport, health, education, water, conservation and wildlife management. It would appear that in the farmers' own perceptions, issues of conservation and management of natural resources take low priority. At any one gathering men usually outnumber women. The reasons for this are multiple. They have to do with the extension workers being men, high levels of illiteracy among women and women carrying a considerable burden of work around the home and so not being able to attend meetings (Zwart, 1990:28). Unlike other communal areas where there is heavy labour migration, there tends to be a preponderance of men in Kanyati possibly because it's a new area.

Among sampled households 14% reported that they had been visited by extension workers at least once during the 1990/91 agricultural season. The better off farmers reported more than one visit while the bulk of farmers did not report any.

Demonstrations and trials are best illustrated by the introduction of burley tobacco into the project area. Burley tobacco growing started during the 1990/91 agricultural season with 14 volunteer farmers who received all the inputs required including transport for marketing the crop except the labour and the land which farmers had to provide themselves. Farmers pocketed all the revenue and were supposed to continue on their own after that initial boost. The project then took on 14 other farmers during the next season and will continue at this rate presumably until its withdrawal from the area. Tobacco growing has necessitated the building of tobacco curing barns and grading sheds. Each barn needs at least 222 poles and each grading shed 18 poles. Farmers select hard woods for these purposes, with Colophospermum mopani being the favoured specie. If each pole were to represent a tree felled, then 240 trees would be felled by one farmer to construct both the barn and the shed. The prize winning farmer during the 1990/91 season was expected to need at least 2 more barns in addition to the one he had finished building for his 1,5 acre crop. No suggestions have been made for these farmers to obtain their materials from elsewhere such as buying treated poles. The farmers involved maintain that other community members are allowed to cut trees for logs to be used in beer brewing, so they are morally in the right by cutting

trees in such numbers for their tobacco barns.

The extension worker-project staff-farmer interface is reminiscent of Peluso's (1990:418-431) description of forestry extension in Java where connections are made with villagers through the formal administrative leaders or through informal leaders who tend to be the more wealthy farmers. These leaders prevail on farmers to do what the government wants them to do. Peluso points out that it is difficult for the forester (read extension worker) to bypass the patrons as the state has extended its power and influence down to the village level (in Zimbabwe's case through village and ward institutions) such that if the extension workers do not succumb, the patron can sabotage their efforts. This alliance with government representatives is exploited by community leaders as a source of status and access to government resources (Scoones & Matose, 1992). In Kanyati community leaders went to the extent of notifying the representatives of the Zimbabwe Farmers' Union that community leaders could not be expected to co-operate with ZFU programmes since the ZFU representatives do not bother to inform the leaders when they come into the area to visit their area committees (Proceedings of the Workshop on Wildlife and Institutional Developments in Kanyati/Gatshe Gatshe Communal Lands 1/4/92). Peluso goes further (quoting Fortmann 1989) to point out that such an extension strategy leads to a programme or project being personified in the officers responsible, who are then expected to dispense their services as patrons. In spite of the fact that extension workers are tied to a bureaucracy they do not control.

there is some latitude for the extension workers and project staff to use their discretion in dispensing their services. An incident involving the approval by project staff of a request by a resident of one Vidco to cut trees for poles to build a tobacco barn in another Vidco when the responsible community leaders had turned down the request is a case in point. The community leaders could do no more than inform the project staff that future requests would be vigorously resisted.

#### Project Investment and Distribution of Benefits

More illustrative of the form and content of the power which the project and its staff wields over the community are the issues surrounding project investment and the distribution of its benefits. Despite earlier commitments to devolving control and ownership of the Tillage Association, which combines the functions of a tillage unit and an input supply and marketing unit, to the membership, project management continued controlling and making critical decisions for the association without consulting the elected management committee and the general membership on the pretext that the community could not be trusted with running the association because its members do not have the requisite skills. The membership of the association reacted to such a mode of operation directly in a general meeting whereupon a commitment was made to involve them in decision making. Sentiments had been gathering before the meeting to the effect that the association was used as a sweetener for the community to accept all other components of the land use programme, particularly if it continued falling outside of community



control. For the community to be able to manage the association effectively requires a sustained training programme which had not yet been put in place. There is a tendency to neglect members of Kanyati Ward B in terms of tractor service provision on the erroneous perception that Ward A members do not possess livestock for draught power when in fact a sizeable proportion of them possess cattle and donkeys. Complaints have been made that tractors spend disproportionate amounts of time on tobacco farmers than with the rest of the farmers (interview with group of farmers 28/1/91).

In one Vidco, Kanyati, there is almost a complete absence of the project's presence because of the prevalence of land disputes and subsequent neglect by extension and project staff. No boreholes have been sunk and no secondary roads have been cut.

Other spheres of the project's operations are similarly conducted without consideration of community sentiments. There was widespread discontent with road cutting operations which ate into people's fields despite the project having been involved in the land use planning exercise in the area and therefore could be expected to know better. No compensation was made to those farmers whose fields were affected. Instead community leaders were asked to deal with the complaints individually, in reality these community leaders had nothing to offer and ended up prevailing on the road cutting crews not to point road drainage lines towards people's fields.

Unlike other countries such as India (Arnold and Stewart, 1991) where there is an acute form of social differentiation, investment in agricultural production has not been shown to lead to less dependence on communally held resources in Zimbabwe although there is evidence to the effect that richer farmers do not participate in community tree growing exercises because of the opportunity cost of labour involved (Gumbo personal communication). In Kanyati, inequities in the distribution of project benefits leads to increasing household differentiation as will be shown in a later section.

#### TRADITIONAL POWER

A mhondoro (lion spirit medium) resides in Kanyati and he was the person responsible for the initial impetus to settlement when he moved with his family into the area with the intention of creating a chiefship. Mhondoros have traditionally provided spirit guidance to much larger areas than do ordinary spirit mediums who provide guidance to lineages. Mhondoros also act as advisers to chiefs. The mhondoro tradition survives in the northern and north western parts of Zimbabwe (see Bourdillon, 1982). The power of the mhondoro is limited by the state and to an extent by the local population whose relationship to the person and the institution he represents is ambiguous. The potential role of the mhondoro is important only to the extent that he might want to provide a check on state plans in the area and establish control over land settlement and use. So far his influence has been limited to a small group of his relatives. Beyond this group there is some support from former sabhukus who

were replaced by the Videos.

In some cases lineages with spirit mediums consult the mhondoro on whether or not their lineage spirit medium can be recognized. Some settlers observe rest days (chisi) declared by the mhondoro. The arrangement introduces a complication in the sense that these settlers would then need to observe two rest days in a week, one day following their own traditions and the other as dictated by the mhondoro (referred to as chisi chahawira - friend's rest day). As a result some of these settlers do not bother observing the mhondoro's rest days as it would involve losing time from their work schedules.

Spiritual traditional power has also been used in land disputes. A case in point was when a settler was unable to take over fields allocated to her because the fields were being used by a spirit medium and traditional healer and she feared that a spell would be put on her. The spirit medium continues to use the fields. The owner has not bothered to involve the local leadership on the issue.

It would appear that having been disregarded and ignored by state agencies these traditional authorities are bidding their time and have chosen to engage in activities that have no direct bearing on land and natural resource use but could be important as recruiting grounds for followers thus increasing their hegemony. These activities include healing the sick and consultations with other spirit mediums. It serves to remind the community of the

traditional authorities' potential power. It also means that they have a potential for influencing the evolving system of local governance and in an indirect manner the management of natural resources although it is difficult to delineate what form it might take.

#### INTER HOUSEHOLD POWER

In this section an attempt is made to point out and explain those factors making for convergence and/or divergence of interest among households. These factors are the tendency to split or band together along economic interests, lineage and ethnic lines and because of the influence of the state and the project which allocate resources differentially.

#### Economic Differentiation

The ADA/TTCB (1990) report contains considerable detail on incomes and is quoted here at length. The information is supplemented with that obtained from a smaller sample survey administered in three Vidcos.

The report points out that the largest source of household income was from the sale of crops. The main crops grown are maize (which all farmers grow), cotton (which 53% of farmers grow, groundnuts (which 66% of farmers grow) and sunflowers (which 26% of farmers grow) (p.21). Only 7% of farmers grew all the mentioned crops. Income from crops makes up 69,5% of income earned on average. The

average income is \$757-00<sup>1</sup>. The report points out that there has been a steady increase in the percentage of farmers growing cotton and sunflower (p.21). The survey was done before tobacco was introduced. The smaller sample survey indicated that the mean agricultural income is \$497, the median is \$320 and the range is 1901, thus showing a high degree of skewedness.

Crops were followed by off-farm income in terms of overall household security, which makes up 24.8% of the income on average. Of the off-farm income 13% was earned within Kanyati (average \$142-00). Employment opportunities are available through the project in building, construction of dams and through the tsetse control programme. The bulk of those employed are temporary employess. Incomes earned outside Kanyati constitute 11% of total income and were at \$128-00.

The average income earned within Kanyati inclusive of all income sources was \$1089-00. Six percent of the households did not earn any income and of these 14% had just settled in the area, but 86% of them had been resident there for four years on average.

28% of the households had earned off-farm income within Kanyati, 12% earned off-farm incomes outside Kanyati and 5% earned both. 9% of households earning off-farm income in Kanyati and 22% of households earning off-farm income outside Kanyati received wages of over \$1000-00 a year. The average wage of these was \$2204-00

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<sup>1</sup> At the time the US\$ was equivalent to approximately 481.5. Since then the value of the US\$ has risen five fold

and \$2097-00 respectively. The average income increases with livestock ownership.

The numbers of cattle owned by residents are increasing all the time. At the time ADA/TTCB did their survey it was found that 31% of farmers kept cattle and on average each farmer owned 4,8 head. 17% of farmers kept cattle outside of the project area, on average keeping 6 head. Farmers expressed a wish to bring them into Kanyati as soon as the ban on cattle keeping was lifted in Ward B (p.34).

With the introduction of tobacco the gaps in incomes among households will increase as tobacco is a high income earner but a high input crop. It could be expected that not all the farmers will be able to grow the crop even with project subsidies initially.

As previously noted the gaps in incomes have occurred at least in part under the sponsorship of the state. A considerable number of farmers are not happy with the unevenness of state intervention. To quote one farmer,

"no, I am not a member of the ZFU or the Tillage Association. I still want to see how they function. I do not have cattle. I am still suspicious of ADA intentions. I was not happy with being moved from the fields I had initially chosen. They were more fertile than the ones I was allocated under the project" (Interview with Maramba, Makande Vidco, 16/8/90).

Those benefiting more from the project are grouped around economic interest organizations such as area committees of the ZFU and Catholic Development Commission (CADEC) input supply co-operatives. The project tillage association is still exclusivist in terms of dispensing its services although as initially envisioned it should be all inclusive in its activities and membership. Some farmers are therefore at the least ambivalent about the project's presence while others are outright hostile to it. It is not surprising that some farmers are also ambivalent to the woodlots set up under the project particularly since arrangements for benefit distribution have not been discussed in the community.

Inequalities also tend to express themselves among Vidcos due to differences in natural resource endowments, household resource endowments and unequal service provision. The latter two have been commented on above.

ADA/TTCB (1990:3) point out that some areas in Kanyati have shallow soils whereas the southern and eastern parts have deeper soils. The deeper soils are associated with *Jubbernadia globiflora* and *Brachystegia spiciformis* woodlands while the shallow soils are associated with *Colophospermum mopane* woodlands. As pointed out earlier, Vidcos deny access to those who do not live in the Vidco

It would be impossible to separate out the individual effect of the three factors pointed out above on production and the

differences in average incomes earned per household in different Vidcos. The differences in average household income among Vidcos are noticeable as is shown in the following table on one variable contained in the original ADA/TTCB table

TABLE 1

TOTAL AVERAGE INCOME EARNED PER HOUSEHOLD IN EACH VIDCO

	<u>VIDCOS</u>									
	Kan	Kem	Chi	Mak	Nyad	Kad	Hur	Che	Hyal	Hua
<u>Ward</u>	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	B
Total	1174	1222	983	1182	1784	1247	1144	578	622	1263

(Adapted from ADA/TTCB, 1990:18)

Household differentiation can lead to uncertainty and lack of concern with the aims of communal management of natural resources (Lawry, 1990). In Kanyati, as the above sections have shown, social differentiation is occurring under the sponsorship of the state and is being achieved in ways that ignore community opinions but ways which are transparent to members of the community, and ways which involve the exploitation of communally held resources for private gain. However, in a real sense, social differentiation is symptomatic of the occurrence of development, in the minimal sense of increasing incomes however unequal the distribution. The absence of community sanction to members who make above average demands on the communal resource points to the need for legislative reform in the direction of empowering local communities to the extent that they can charge "rent" to such members of the community.



### Ethnicity and Lineage Organization

ADA/TTCB (1990:10) point out that the settlers came from all parts of the country with the majority coming from Masvingo Province (42.8%) and the Midlands (20.9%). While ethnicity is not strictly related to geographical area of origin, it is not surprising that the majority (59.25%) consider themselves as Karanga. Karanga is an ethnic group that is generally identified with South Central Zimbabwe which includes Masvingo and Midlands provinces. These areas are drought prone and highly populated. The Karanga ethnic group provides the political leadership such as councillors and Vidco chairs because Karanga voters who are in the majority tend to vote for other Karangas.

The smaller sample survey conducted in three Vidcos suggests district of origin, ethnicity and residential location (Vidco) are closely associated. In general those who are related (either classificatory kin or consanguinial kin) tend to reside in the same Vidco. As was noted earlier there was some limited choice as to where one could settle.

Having found themselves living in close proximity these households which were previously unrelated are increasingly becoming related through intermarriages and manipulation of social identity as pointed out previously, both as labour recruiting strategies. Cases of land disputes discussed above suggest that in cases where neighbours still regard each other as strangers, there is a potential for seemingly acrimonious and endless disputes to occur without the Vidcos being able to

mediate effectively.

But social identity could make for common interests as was shown when each Vidco presented a common position on the need for Vidcos to control land so that it could be distributed to local residents fairly. There is also a consensus that Vidcos should control access to trees and woodlands within their boundaries. However, social identity seems a tenuous factor in determining effective control over the usage of the woodlands within the Vidco.

Labour sharing arrangements, the loaning of cattle for ploughing and informal credit arrangements are prevalent in the study area. It would not be too far out to suggest that it is also in consideration of these underlying arrangements that Vidcos are constrained from applying the rules and regulations for woodland use as the community has laid down and to further sharpen the definition of these rules and regulations. More generally, Jocelyn Alexander (nd.:5) has pointed out that access to and control over cattle, land, urban remittances and agricultural services and incomes shapes local and lineage interests and affords power over others through patronage in rural Zimbabwe.

#### INTRA HOUSEHOLD POWER

Males tend to control household tree resources. They also dominate community institutions as office bearers. There is little participation by women in community institutions hence their appeal for government intervention and the hardening of

rule application whereas community leaders and other male community members use a type of discourse that is a reaction against further government interference. The discourse points to more community empowerment. Examples of the discourse used by men are: "The situation has not worsened" implying that the controls on the ground are effective, "Vidcos need to control the use of the woodlands" thus obviating alternative institutional arrangements than the ones presently effected, "let the woodlot trees mature first before bringing in further controls", and "we do not need controls on the use of the woodlands but on further clearance of land for agriculture". Loaded as they are, such statements are a reaction against and at the same time a reflection of the balance of power in the community. They are also a justification of existing arrangements. On the other hand, women appeal for government intervention arguing that present controls are not effective. Women bear the brunt of collecting fuelwood for household use. Their fear is that as agricultural land is cleared they might have to travel greater distances to obtain fuelwood than at present.

#### CONCLUSION

The rigid control over land settlement and land use in the area has had the effect of putting brakes on large scale clearance of land and additional in-migration, although it might be undesirable from the perspective of empowering local communities. It is a moot point whether the community would have been able to effect the same controls had the state remained ambivalent given that initially the locals did not control in-migration. However,

community residents are now exhibiting a willingness to control land settlement. In the long term locally specific interests can be the only guarantor for balancing these interests and the resources available.

There is a void in terms of building the institutions for the management of woodlands. Extension services have an ill-placed focus in an area of woodland abundance, which partly accounts for the ineffective institutional mechanisms in place. Extension needs to have a proactive strategy. In the project area political units equate with resource management units. Extension needs to support the efforts of these units to make for sustainable resource use. Within these units representation of different interest groups and genders needs to be encouraged. As these bodies are strengthened they should be able to act as a countervailing force to some of the forces that have been identified as acting to detract from good management. However, local representation would not by itself be able to contain these divergent interests. Extension personnel need to provide back up support not just in terms of technical advice but also in terms of active involvement in the institutions to obviate autarkic and self-interested tendencies.

Finally, the resource management units need to be recognized legally as authority structures (Scoones and Matose, 1992:78) and economic units. This would confirm them as resource management units and it would confer proprietorship, not just subjectively as is at present where in fact the state holds title ultimately.

but objectively as well.

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