W84-12

7/2/84

AUTHORITY NEITHER MALE NOR FEMALE: STEPS TOWARD A MORE SUBTLE DEMOCRATIC THEORY

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Abstract

The patriarchal paradigm, a cornerstone theory for centuries to the ideology of the absolute, divinely ordained rule of kings, was given most coherent formulation in opposition to intellectual and revolutionary challenges in seventeenth-century England. Hobbes's analysis of social relationships as human artifacts represents a primary expostulation of this view that authority relationships within such social organizations as the family and the political order were natural, determinant, and immutable. Locke, in remonstrances directed to the patriarchalists, also attacks the view of political order as given by God to the sons of Adam. However, Locke differs from Hobbes in arguing that political artifacts and social artifacts, such as the family, are not homologues. Locke then can lead the challenge against the patriarchalists' theory of the political order while leaving other aspects of this paradigm in place.

Although for many scholars Locke's writings settled the issues patriarchalism raised for political order, the remaining influence of patriarchalism has affected the theoretical development of liberalism, republicanism, and democracy. The writings of J.S. Mill and the observations of the American experiment in democracy by Tocqueville suggest that the theories of liberal democracy and applications which denied full citizenship for women in the designed political order offered contradictions which could not easily be swept away. In the twentieth-century writings of Beauvoir, we are brought again to Hobbes's analysis of authority which is neither male nor female, and the relationship between political artifacts and human artificers with her critique of the organizational structure and costs of sexist relationships.

Beauvoir's analysis coupled with that of Tocqueville suggests that democratic theory does not reach its normative ends in the context of artificially imposed gender inequalities.

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Patriarchal Paradigm

Patriarchal thought postulates that all human relationships, including political ones, are the natural outgrowths of familial society and, more particularly, its paternal form (Schochet, 1975). Patriarchalism was a dominant paradigm in 17th Century England and a cornerstone of the divine right theory of monarchy. The best known of patriarchalism's advocates, Sir Robert Filmer, argued that no one was born free; everyone was born in subjection to some patriarchal superior.Against republicanism, contract theory, and democracy, Filmer supplied theorem and corollary that one's place in life was not a matter of individual effort or choice, but was assigned by God: Adam had dominion over all the earth, the King was the absolute, divinely ordained father of his people, the father was the natural authority of the family (Filmer, 1949).

The divine right of monarchy and the patriarchal theory at its foundation were both assaulted during the English Civil War. Thomas Hobbes is one of the great articulators of challenge to the patriarchalists' paradigm.

Hobbes: Authority Neither Male Nor Female

It is neither a disagreement with the view of a homologous relationship between human relationships such as those found in familial society and the structure of the commonwealth, nor the view that the sovereign must be absolute that separates Hobbes from the dominant paradigm of his period. It is the idea that any such relationships are natural or determined and that the observed homologue is paternal rather than parental which is at the heart of Hobbes' differences with the patriarchalists.

There is nothing natural about paternal dominion or patriarchalism in Hobbes' reasoning. Authority is not generational in its origin. Dominion within the family exists, for Hobbes, as it does from sovereign to subject

in the commonwealth: by consent, "either express or by other sufficient arguments declared" (Hobbes, 1958, 163-164). Moreover, Hobbes includes in his theory of the essential equality of individuals,one to another in the state of nature, the free and equal female as well as male individual. This view of the family as a social artifact is further delineated by Hobbes' reckoning of dominion within the family. He explains that it is an error to attribute authority to fathers only. Using the same logic that differently able individuals would still be able to subdue one another equally in the state of nature through the use of wits as well as strength, Hobbes explains that the differences between man and woman are not so great "that the right can be determined without war" (Hobbes, 1958, 164).

A distinction can be found in Hobbes between the theory of social relationships as artifacts and the history of the origin of these artifacts. He explains that the rights within the artifact of Commonwealths are usually decided in favor of men, but explains that is perhaps because "for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers,.not the mothers of families" (Hobbes, 1958, 164). As the effects of such an observation on the causes of this particular historical note are not central to Hobbes' thesis, these ideas are left unexplored.

Hobbes' central theme is to demonstrate the artifactual nature of authority and he, more than most authors using reason to argue against the patriarchalists, makes the logical conclusion that authority is without gender. He supports the authority of a female sovereign in a letter to one critic whom he has offended by attributing to the civil sovereign all power sacerdotal. He writes, "But this perhaps may seem hard when the Sovereignty is in a Queen. But is because you are not subtile enough to perceive, that though Man be male and female, Authority is not (Hobbes, 16:62, 48-49).

Hobbes remains in his reasoning true to the idea that human relationships are artifacts of human design. His radical view of individual equality in the state of nature includes the female individual. In application, his discussion of the relationship of the sovereign of the commonwealth to the male heads of families is derived from an implicit historical model in which the female individual disappears. The theoretical construction of the commonwealth and the later articulation of government to individuals excludes the female individual.

Hobbes, in summary, challenged the patriarchalist paradigm that relationships from the family to the commonwealth were natural, determined, or God-ordained with an analysis of the artifactual essence of all relationships. He challenged this paradigm specifically on the basis of its predispositon to have the principle of authority be gender differentiated. He did not, however, challenge the idea of a relationship between the design of artifacts such as the family, and, specifically, the dispositon of authority within the family, and the design of artifacts such as the conventional relationship of the commonwealth. In fact, Hobbes saw a multitude of linkages between what is termed "private" and "public" spheres of human interaction.

John Locke: Contracting Patriarchalism

John Locke also articulates a theory against patriarchalism. Locke in fact has been accepted as the major theorist dealing a decisive blow to the patriarchalists' arguments (Schochet,1975; Butler, 1978). But as I hope to show, Locke's ideas can be much less easily separated from patriarchal theory than the theory of Hobbes and the consequences which follow from the Hobbesian view.

Among the primary differences between the analyses of Locke and Hobbes is Locke's propositon that there are different types of power which lead to different types of relationships. In comparing "political" relationships of sovereigns and subjects and other "social" relationships such as the family, the locus of power is not merely different, the power is different in its origin and legitimacy and can be distinguished as of a different kind. A primary objection of Locke's to Filmer's patriarchal theory derives from Locke's claim that patriarchal authority in social relationships such as the family has no bearing on the political relationships of government (Locke, 1960,341). Observation of such authority as exists in one sphere does not set the rule for what ought to exist in another sphere. A second way that Locke assails Filmer's view of the origin of patriarchal power is in Biblical exegesis. And, finally, Locke makes a case against Filmer's view of patriarchal power by arguing that generations are not bound to their predecessor's form of government because of filial obedience owed their parents' authority (Locke, 1960, 329-330). As Locke's is taken to be the foremost case against patriarchalism, it is useful to consider each of these points and the uses Locke makes of them.

In a discussion of the importance of language, Locke reasons that paternal power in the family should actually be termed parental power. Consulting reason and revelation, Locke finds that if nature and generation lay any obligation on children, they are bound to both parents equally by the positive law of God "Honor thy father and thy mother" (Locke, 1960, 321).

These thoughts on the obligations of children are not used to reason toward a participatory citizen role for the female individual, however, but to illuminate the differences between the obligations of a child in the family and the obligations of a subject in a sovereign commonwealth. Particularly Locke's discussion is used to underscore the absurdity of using the family as a model for political forms since the family thus has a divided authority (both mother and father), while government must have an undivided sovereignty. Locke explains that if women are included in the governing structure of the family, the family becomes an illegitimate analogue for government (Locke, 1960, 322). Explaining that the impression of language has allowed what seemed an appropriate understanding of the power of the father as being the same as the King's authority, it would seem inappropriate and indeed absurd "if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental and thereby discovered that it belonged to the mother, too" (Locke, 1960, 322).

That two individuals could not logically govern simultaneously and that joint governance is the mode of authority relationships in the family is used as the primary error of the patriarchalists' model in Locke's reasoning. However Locke avoids the analysis of autonomous individuals in a designed relationship which Hobbes more clearly makes by applying his political model of undivided authority to the family. Locke instead uses the historical model of the patriarchalists which was discounted by logic. He uses a logical model of the family with authority divided between the parents as an example to show the lack of application to political order. In later chapters, this logical model notwithstanding, Locke takes away the judgment and authority of the wife and parent. Locke considers that there may be different opinions and contesting wills between parents, but offers no logic for giving the final authority for decisions to the male (Locke, 1960, 339).

Lest these ideas be taken to undermine Locke's earlier argument that the family is an improper analogue to political order because of its

divided sovereignty (since now it could be shown that authority historically is unitary in the family), recall Locke's argument that social and political authority are not homologous ~ that paternal authority in the family is not political. The accommodation that Locke's theory can a residual of patriarchal theory because of this point is not often appreciated (Brennen and Pateman, 1979).

Locke's argument is that the subjection of women in Genesis carries no political import because the subjection of Eve was not a grant of favor to Adam. Locke points out, "This was not a time when Adam could expect any favours, any grant of privileges from his offended maker" (Locke, 1960, 190). His distinction of powers turns on the methods of legitimately enforcing claims to right. Political authority has power over life and death and is thus distinguished from other types of power. The father and husband no more have authority to use this power than do any other members of the family (Locke, 1960, 341). It is this lack of the authority in the family to use the sword to enforce rules which, regardless of the other divisions of authority within the family, means that all individuals have a natural freedom, sharing in the same common nature, facilities, and powers. Even holding with the subjugation of women to the fathers of families in nature, because this is not a political power being exercised, Locke can say that all "powers in nature are equal and ought to partake in the same common rights and privileges, till the manifest appointment of God . . . can be produced to show any particular person's supremacy or a man's own consent subjects him to a superior" (Locke, 1960, 208).

When the import of these ideas is considered for democratic theory's reconciliation with a genderless conception of authority, Locke's arguments

are **a mild deflection** from the **patriarchalists' postulate that Adam or man** is superior to Eve or woman. His primary **purpose** was to show that God was not responsible for women's status, that is, to refute the idea of a divine grant to Adam. Locke's objectives in these arguments were not focused on a commentary on the status of women except insofar as the patriarchalist homologue of family and commonwealth could be disclaimed. Thus although as with Hobbes the foundation may exist for demonstrating that the customary rule of male over female is not of divine origin, but is artifical or artifactual, Locke makes the consequent grant of rights to women in the political sphere in fact inconsequent to his political theory. Locke undertakes this not without some vacillation in his expositions of different facets of the consequences of his conclusions. The artifactual nature of families is not explored so much as it is replaced by a historical model of what is thought to have been observed of authority in the family.

Although Locke does not see the authority of the husband over the wife as a political authority which is at all homologous to the design of authority in the political order and although he can separate the historical model of male authority from a moral precept, it cannot be concluded that such authority as he advocated in the family and in conjugal society is unimportant to his model of political order. The assumption that the free and equal female individual will naturally enter a contract which places her in subjection to her husband is not without consequence for the manner in which Locke argues his case against patriarchalism and the conclusions he reaches.

When Locke distinguishes social from political relationships (or, in other words, makes the authority design of the family be qualitatively

different from that of political order), he can then describe the origins of political order and the relationship of those origins to patriarchalism in a way fundamentally different from Hobbes. Both Hobbes and Locke discuss the origins of political order using the heuristic device of the state of nature. Hobbes' picture of the state of nature is one of individuals, including women, however, and Locke's view is a state of nature made up of families. Locke's state of nature does have a government, in fact: one of the fathers of families, a patriarchy. Since one of the points of the state of nature concept is that no power is illegitimate, it is unclear how the exercise of power in the family in this state of nature would not be a form of government. The wife and mother either already lost or was never in the war of equals each against all. By considering the family in a much less artifactual analysis than Hobbes, it is easier for the wife to be dropped from the political arena within the logic of Locke's theory. This twist separates Locke less clearly form the patriarchalists than might superficially have been expected.

Locke's social contract theory prepares the way for a significant accommodation'- " of patriarchalism by first dropping the distinction between parental and paternal (Locke, 1960, 322). For Locke the fact of children being born less competent to use reason than most adults leads to some necessary form of decision making authority being introduced into the historical picture of the state of nature. Locke explains that children are "not born in this state of equality" of right and natural freedom, "though they are born to it " (Locke, 1960, 322). Parents have the jurisdiction and obligation to transmit information from one generation to the next. This power of parents over children (and at least in theory, this includes the power of a mother, too fLocke, 1960, 328)) is "rather a privilege of children and duty of parents than any prerogative of paternal power" (Locke, 1960, 330).

The idea of such socialization may not be problematical. However the prior discussion of the locus of final authority with the father predetermines the process and content of socialization in a way that Locke does not consider.

With this picture of the state of nature which includes paternal power, Locke can show how natural freedom and subjection to a father may occur in the same model, with paternal power not extending to political power as the patriarchalists suggest (Locke, 1960, 326). Although Locke presents a case that this power is not so much a function of biology as it is due to the act of accepting responsibility (and thus mothers or foster parents could annex such a duty), Locke again leaves off this logic of artifacts for a model of history when describing the procession from the state of nature to political order.

At the age of reason father and son stand as equals before the law in the political order or as equals to be subdued in the state of nature. In the political order the child consents to the sovereign as a free person, not because of the prior consent of the father to be a citizen. Yet, Locke points out, in this model of learning this assumed paternal form of parental power will play a role in the citizen's view of what forms of government are possible (Locke, 1960, 333). Locke explains that though the father's legal power extends no farther than the minority of his children, it is easy to conceive how "the father of the family could become the prince of it" in the early stages of political order (Locke, 1960, 334). This statement is removed only by the loss of divinity from patriarchalism. Locke's picture of the difference between the rule of the father and the law of the fathers becomes even less distinct as he makes clear that although the mother may have the same parental duty, her role does not have the same meaning nore does it have the same effect on the citizen's

view of government as a paternal caretaker unified in the rule of one man.

Describing further the advances of the child in the state of nature, Locke uses a patriarchal model. The father had been the ruler from the child's infancy and "since without some government it would be hard for them to live together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were grown up, be in the father where it seemed without change barely to continue, when indeed nothing more was required to it than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that executive power of the law of nature which every free man naturally hath. . . " (Locke, 1960, 334-35). This permission resigned to the father a "monarchial power" according to Locke (Locke, 1960, 335).

Although this "tacit and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's authority and government" was "easy and natural for the child," the consent of the free and equal female individual, who is also assumed to be the subject of this rule, is not analyzed (Locke, 1960, 335). What can be concluded is that Locke's historical model expresses a picture of political order growing out of patriarchy, while his logical analysis adds importantly that this has occurred by consent and reason, not by divine order. Patriarchy is accommodated now by reason if patriarchalism is not.

Locke is no less explicit than I about this relationship of patriarchy in the state of nature to the origins of the commonwealth. He explains that government commonly began in the father because the father, "having by the law of nature the same power with every man else to punish as he thought fit any offenses against the law, might thereby punish his transgressing children even when they were men and out of their pupilege" (Locke, 1960, 354-55). They would be likely to submit to his paternal authority and join with him against other offenders, as well. This would give him

the power to execute his will against any transgression and thus we have a small government. Locke considers the content and process of socialization to have been important in this consentual government, explaining, "the custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easier to submit to him rather than to any other" (Locke 1960, 335).

What has happened to the free and equal female individual is as lost in this history as is the logic which might dispense with patriarchalism. Although Locke changed the patriarchalists' model to one of consent rather than the subjection of all to divine order, all who were subjected were now seen as consenting: the patriarchal form remained intact. Why the mother, who has the same parental power, cannot make this simple procession into political order is not explored. Nor does Locke's discussion of succession to power in the political order aid us in dispelling the patriarchal picture of non-political relationships.

This historical model works to dispose of patriarchalism only with the assumption in the logical device of the state of nature that the free and equal female individual submits and that in nature there is paternal rule.

The patriarchal society exists by consent and there is little way in Locke's theory to see it as an artifact that could cease to exist. Although scholars like Gordon Schochet: in Patriarchalism in Political Thought find that "Locke, more fully than anyone else analyzed the patriarchal political theory and tried to put something in its place" (Schochet, 1975, 254), Locke might better be described as legitimating the patriarchal form by this consent argument. Locke's theory is the patriarchal update in the form of a contract theory of patriarchy and perhaps paternalism.

To be sure the patriarchal form and the theory of patriarchalism are different, but Locke less than Hobbes has replaced the idea of patriarchal

divine order with a new form. There is a difference between consent and contract in Locke's description of action relating to the design of political order. The premise of the contract is that it is made only by those who reason, that it is not necessarily perpetual or intergenerational, and that the parties to it set the terms according to reason. The idea of consent is complicated in the Lockean formulation because consentual relationships may be formed by those who do not yet reason——children may consent or may be assumed to consent without assuming they have obtained facility in reason. That the child's consent to the"non political" paternal authority is in many important respects a condition for the later social contract is not fully explored by Locke.

Perhaps the biggest difference from Hobbes' analysis is Locke's state of nature, in which patriarchal government exists with no challenge from Locke's logic of parental powers. This paternal government is carried into political relationships in the historical model, thereby impugning the artifactual nature of these relationships. Patriarchy can coexist with the contract theory, thus limiting the logical extension of liberalism to the articulation of government to the individual instead of to the male heads of families. Locke, however, leaves us with the foundation argument for why we should look for the missing free and equal female individual in his description of what it means to be a citizen. Membership in society is not gained by submitting to the laws of a country, living quietly and enjoying privileges and protection under them. Rather a person enters into society by "positive engagement and express promise and compact" (Locke, 1960, 367).

Mill and the Residue of Patriarchalism

Nearly two centuries after Locke, John Stuart Mill used similar

words concerning the function of participation in political life to make a different point. Mill argued that patriarchalism had not been swept away in all its important facets, simply because the challenge of reason had made it superfluous in a world in which the divine right of kings was a dead issue. The central norm of patriarchalism, that individuals are not free but entirely subject to the facts of their birth and situation in a social and political hierarchy, persists (Mill, 1984, 273-75, 286).

As one who embraced the tenets of political economy (particularly the idea that, through the unhampered bargaining of individuals of diverse preferences, the best ideas, if not the truth, would out), Mill found that it was not only irrational and unjust to disenfranchise women, it was inefficient. In an analysis similar to Tocqueville's on slavery, Mill delineated many of the costs to the development of democracies which left the independent consciousnesses and diverse wills of the female individual without an individual political voice (Tocqueville, 1945, 1: 94; 1951-58, 1(1)J92; 1864-66,1: 151; Mill, 1984; 1977, 469, 479-81).

Mill's ideas on the subject of female individuals in the political community are part of a larger expression of what conditions are necessary to form a social contract. The larger concern involves the necessary conditions for an individual to be able to gain a method for using reason to constitute rule-ordered relationships of responsibility and self government. Among the necessary conditions which are articulated by Mill and others is that the individual, as an artifact herself, might be able to develop the personal characteristics of one who could know herself and others well enough to develop and articulate a common theory of the choices involved in constituting self-governing relationships (Allen, 1981). The primary costs of not including the will and consciousness of female individuals which Mill underscores are the limitations of activating this learning model in a

situation of what Mill believed was a fundamental tyranny of some individuals by others.

Mill analyzes gender as a social artifact. Nothing can be known of any true nature of males and females; they can only be seen in their present relationship (Mill, 1984, 276). Mill observes that the natural tendency of a person is to impose her or his will until it is opposed by another and explains that the institutionalization of such imposition as a right in any social relationship "offers to him a licence for the indulgence of those points of his original character which in all other relations he would have found it necessary to repress and conceal, and the repression of which would have in time become a second nature" (Mill, 1984, 288-289). Such an institutionalization of this tendency is found in conjugal relationships, where Mill finds that the "present social institution gives [to a man this power] over at least one human being" (Mill, 1984, 289). Mill likewise describes the subversive power left to women who find themselves in such a situation in which positive power is foreclosed (Mill, 1984, 289).

The idea of this unlimited power leading to personality defects suggests to Mill that in conjugal society and the society of the family a way of situating authority different from Locke's prescription is in order. Mill compares conjugal relationshiups with other voluntary associations between two people such as partnerships. He finds that there are many examples in which the voluntary association between two people does not lead one of them to be the absolute master. He moreover suggests that no one (that is no man) "would enter into partnership on terms which would subject him to the responsibilities of a principal, with only the powers and privileges of a clerk or agent" (mill, 1984, 291). This is Mill's analogy for the marriage contract depicted by Locke and found in Mill's observation. Mill's larger view of the

situation of authority in these relationships is that there are alternatives to the unity of a single person authoring the actions of any couple or group. The common understanding which would be the basis of finding unity in several actors in these social relationships would be unlikely to come if institutional arrangements led to systematic miscalculations, ignorance of others and mistrust, however. For Mill this alternative, or change in institutional arrangements in social relationships, took the form of a separate, but equal administrative design, with men and women entering a marriage contract empowered to make determinations in different functional areas of the relationship. Thus Mill's proposals were limited in their application to women who married and were also limiting to those married individuals in their role-divided view of joint governance (Millett, 1971; Eisenstein, 1981, 117 and 134; Okin, 1979, 226 and 230).

Mill understood the interactions of political artifacts with these social relationships and their profound effects on the learning facilities, attitudes, and behavior of individuals. His discussions of the importance of political participation and the effects of foreclosing some modes of participation to particular classifications of individuals exemplifies this understanding. In his writings on the extension of suffrage, particularly to women, he attributes much of his understanding of the role of political participation to Tocqueville (Mill, 1977, 468). His logical analysis commences with the observation that if majority tyranny is to be mitigated, the institutions of political participation must not be available only to one class of individuals who would be likely to advocate only their own position. His argument for voting rights for women is the same as for extending rights to men. "All human beings have the same interest in good government, the welfare of all is alike affected by it, and they have equal need of a voice in it to secure their share of its benefits" (Mill, 1977, 479).

While Locke has argued for participation of citizens on the grounds of justice, and, in fact, as a major tenet- of the definition of citizen and the delineation of the commonwealth, he failed to consider the injustice done to women by excluding them from participation. In fact his theory can accommodate this injustice, Mill, on the contrary, considers the necessity of including the participation of women in the political order, and it is noteworthy that although he mentions "fairness" and "justice" in his discussion, it is in truth the great inefficiency of their unjust treatment to which he objects. Injustice can be analyzed as an inefficient long-term strategy and the residual of patriarchalism in political relationships can be critiqued on grounds exposing the truncated individual's personality's limiting effects on social and political institutions.

Mill describes his argument as part of the age of liberalism which pronounces "against the claim of society to decide for individuals what they are and are not fit for, and what they shall or shall not attempt" (Mill, 1977, 468). He concludes that if the principles of political economy have been of any use "it is for proving that these points can only be rightly judged of by the individuals themselves" (Mill, 1977, 479). Mill finds that if this tendency of modern social improvement, the new political science,particularly of Tocqueville, has not been in error, then there is no reason in logic for it not to be carried out "to the total abolition of all exclusions and disabilities which close any honest employment to a human being" (Mill, 1977, 480).

Yet the force of his argument does not rest simply with what the individual gains, but also with what the community could gain by the full participation of citizens. Mill remarks on the application of the learning model of Tocqueville to political participation, expanding on

the effects of **rules** in the **political order on behavior and rules in** the social order. Mill, through the use of Tocqueville's writings, analyzes the interdependencies of these two orders, again showing the pertinance of Hobbes' picture of authority relationships in which these interdependencies may be found. In both the arguments of Mill and Tocqueville, the persisting assumption that there will be a natural tendency for stability in popular male and female roles limits what each theorist is able to predict for both citizen and community. Yet their theories of the interaction of political and social orders are a foundation for understanding the development of social roles which has occurred and the interaction effects of participation in both the political and social orders, as these effects are related to the patriarchal residual Mill analyzed. The view of the political and the social, or more personal, order of relationships is more similar to the Hobbesian homologue than the Lockean depictation of different kinds and degrees of power.

The ideas of Mill and Tocqueville are concerned with the articulation of a larger picture of what the necessary conditions for a contract theory or a popular sovereignty might be. Such conditions have to do with views of the consciousnesses of individuals and the individual's ability to learn a theory of constitutiong relationships based on beliefs held in common and informed by experiences gained from experimentation.

Tocqueville: Paternal Consciousness and Political Design

Tocqueville understands humans to be both the artificers and the materials of the political order. Thus the very personalities of these building blocks of the commonwealth will be factors which limit or promote various possible designs of political order. That relationships can be designed or are, in other words, artifacts is one of the assumptions Tocqueville makes (Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 243-47; 1951-58,1 (2):238-43;

1864-66,3: 374-83). In order for the design repertoire to include possibilities of self government, several necessary conditions must be met which might best be understood as aspects of a model of learning. Tocqueville articulates this learning model for individuals alone and in various political and so-called non-political relationships. It is an important conclusion of Tocqueville that the placement of authority in relationships affects the learning facilities of individuals (Tocqueville, 1945 2:10; 1951-58 1(2): 17; 1864-66,3: 16). In Tocqueville's theory, individuals are seen as being capable of symbolizing and giving meaning to the symbols that inform their own thinking and enable them to articualte their experiences to others. Individuals are capable of creating a common language, are capable of being and knowing themselves to be the decision makers who design and constitute various types of relationships with others. Individuals are capable of error correction in this model as well. Thus individuals are capable of knowing and articulating their interests and having a right understanding of their interests in their interaction and communication with others. They are capable of forming relationships based on this model of learning, or of having sympathetic understanding of themselves and with others.

Tocqueville explains that this theory of the individual's capabilities of learning has to do with how the unity of the political body is maintained in a polycentric, constitutional order. Unity may be obtained from the consensus of the represented as an alternative to the singleness of the representer (Tocqueville, 1945, 1: 269-70; 1951-58, 1(2): 17; 1864-66, 1: 142-43). This conception is significantly difference from earlier ideas that for authority to have force and effect it must logically be unified and necessarily find unity in the personation of authority by a single individual. For this consensus of the represented to be possible, however, individuals must have the intellectual, emotional, and moral

capacity to make themselves instruments through which they may come to know others.

These instruments must use the tool of language to translate consciousness into conversation and constitutional choices. Knowing others does not mean simply transposing oneself into the situation of another to try to see things as she does. Rather, to know others and develop a common understanding of beliefs and -practices involves also making these phenomena intelligible in one's own frame of reference and informing and changing one's frame of reference. Learning about others also involves making the individual more intelligent about herself. Tocqueville shows that strategies of willed ignorance of others and hence oneself are contrary to the necessary conditions for a democratic order of distributed, limited authority. Extrapolating from Tocqueville's conclusions, willed ignorance is contrary to the conditions which prevent a democracy from degenerating into despotism (Tocqueville, 1945, 1: 255; 1951-58, 1(1): 249; 1864-66, 2: 121-22).

The great problem in relationship designs is that individuals can tyrannize each other through ignorance and bad faith. Such tyrannies can be institutionalized in government forms. Such institutionalization of bad faith and ignorant relationships may take place at many levels of individual interactions. Democratic governments with checks and balances against minority and majority tyrannies may be instituted within a gestalt which maintains bad faith relationships in non-governmental relationships, however. Among the remedies which may exist to such errors in knowing others is the theory of participation which Tocqueville called the science of association (Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 125; 1951-58, 1(2): 123; 1864-66, 2: 192).

Individuals must learn this science of association in order to be artificers of self government. Opportunities must be available for individuals to learn of their responsibilities to others, more fundamentally,

to learn that that there are others and that one's actions often affect them. What people learn through their public participation in voluntary associations are reasons why individualism and tyranny of others is not in their interest.

Situations may certainly be constructed in which individuals learn only with difficulty that their desires are connected with the good of others. In many cases one may persist in individualism, ignorance, prejudice and error in symbols and meanings, no matter what information experience contrary to these beliefs should provide. If we observe people continually refusing to learn, however, Tocqueville suggests we look not to the incompetencies of the person, but to the incompetencies of institutional designs which do not permit learning (Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 132; 1951-58, 2(1): 186; 1864-66, 4: 195).

To the extent that such relationships persist, however, the ability of the artificer to be effective as a tool of knowing is limited. Thus is the necessary consensus limited. Thus are the possibilities for self government limited. Tocqueville explains that as the consensus degenerates, individuals seek simple-minded designs of centralized government and uniform law instead of the more complex designs of constructive inter-dependencies. How individuals in the community remain responsible to each other and themselves is the ultimate concern of political science in Tocqueville's analysis of political order (Tocqueville, 1945, 1:7; 1951-58, 1(1): 5; 1864-66, 1:9). Tocqueville looks at the idea of multiple possibilities to handle expected diversity from narrowly defined government problems, to interpersonal relationships, to how the individual handles diversity within her personality (Allen, 1981). Tocqueville points the way to an analysis of how the education one receives in personal

relationships affect **one's ideas about participation in relationships more narrowly defined (Allen, 1981). Tocqueville also** presents an analysis of how social roles affect personalities and, in turn, affect the individual's political participation. In this exploration of the interaction between authority in social relationships and political relationships, the contract theorist accommodation of patriarchalism seems even less logical.

Although Tocqueville provides a way to understand and critique the remaining vestiges of patriarchalism, he does not take this step. With the exception of such important discussions as his analysis of the aristocracy of manufacturers, Tocqueville does not discuss the effect of maintaining hierarchical relations in the social order on the possibilities for democratic political relations (Allen, 1981; Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 169; 1951-58, 1(2): 165; 1864-66, 3: 259-260). In his discussion of the affects of democratic political relationships on personal relationships such as occur in the family, Tocqueville is concerned with the negative affect democracy may have on what he believes are rightful hierarchical relationships (Tocqueville, 1945, 1(2): 222-225; 1951-58 1(2): 219-222; 1864-66, 3: 343-348).

The role of women is important to Tocqueville, although the same theoretical logic is not applied to their case as has been applied in other portions of his analysis. Less than Mill does Tocqueville challenge the residual of patriarchalism found in the American democracy he observes. He, too, states a position of separate but equal roles, but, unlike Mill, takes no account of the political participation of women, describing them as concluded by their husbands' votes. There are few roles in the political order for the unmarried woman except through a father or brother. However,as Tocqueville perceived many important political acts besides voting, such as those found in voluntary associations, women are in this way included in his view of the political order. Tocqueville perhaps more

than any other theorist analyzed the Important role of the women who ran many of the voluntary associations which were the free schools of citizen education in his democratic theory (Allen, 1981). It is Tocqueville's theory which most allows us to see that the expression of bad faith relationships and relationships of ignorance in the residual of patriarchalism — even after the successful eradication of the king's claim to a divine right — is important to the outcome of democratic structural design. Tocqueville does this by demonstrating a theoretical link among the individual's personality, personal relationships, and political relationships through his theory of learning and analysis of the effects of participation on learning.

Beauvoir: Patriarchalism and the Developing Artificer

The writings of Simone de Beauvoir most explicitly amalgamate this model of learning with the earlier works of writers arguing against the patriarchalists. She does this by providing a model of learning, an analysis of social roles and family authority as artifacts, and thereby furnishing the basis for a homologous view of social and political relationships. The works of Tocqueville and Hobbes make it clear that personal relationships are important to political relationships. The work of Beauvoir makes it clear that the residual of patriarchalism in personal relationships is important to the development of democratic relationships personally, and, extrapolating from Hobbes and Tocqueville, therefore in the political sphere, as well.

Beauvoir shows that patriarchalism in personal and political relationships exists (Beauvior, 1974, 59). Even more than that, she shows that though patriarchalism has meaning in language and symbol, it is, in fact, one dogmatically applied method of establishing authority in artifactual

relationships. Patriarchalism in the personal sphere is not a logical system founded on reason, Beauvoir shows, just as Hobbes has shown it is not a logical system when applied to the theory of the structure of commonwealths. Beauvoir shows in an analysis similar to Hobbes' that these are homologous relationships, and her analysis of the manner in which women and men coalesce in a preponderance of negative relationships gives insight into the nature of Locke's theory of consent.

Beauvoir's analysis of the situation of women is initiated by showing that it is an artifactual state which is prompted by the same human tendencies assumed by many political theorists to lie at the foundation of all human artifacts of social order (Beauvoir, 1974, 158-59). It is essentially a philosophy of developing rule-ordered relationships that Beauvoir uses to develop her theory of the status and meaning of "woman."

The similarity to Hobbes' analysis of political order rising of necessity from a state of nature is striking, as is the similarity to Tocqueville's analysis of the tendencies of human artificers to short circuit the human personality and tyrannize each other. Beauvoir writes that the tragedy of the unfortunate human consciousness is that each separate conscious being aspires to set himself up alone as sovereign (Beauvoir, 1974, 158-59). Each tries to fulfill himself by making all others slaves. This sort of Hobbesian war of each against all leads to diffidence, dissembling, and little collective action.

Beauvoir presents methods for removing oneself from this situation of war, and they are analogous to the choices of situating political authority in either a single sovereign individual or in a polycentric constitutional order. She suggests, however, that it has always seemed more difficult to maintain relationships structured to account for diversity and easier, instead, to seek uniformity, government

and responsibility outside oneself (Beauvoir, 1974, 160-61). It has always seemed easier to short-circuit the personalities of every other being and reduce them to slavery, colonize them, or institutionalize other forms of tyranny to make power over others the mode of relationships rather than positive interdependencies. Beauvoir gives a theoretical view of why other choices would be so hard. "Man attains an authentically moral attitude when he renounces mere being to assume his position as an existent; . . . . but the transformation through which he attains true wisdom is never done, it is necessary to make it without ceasing, it demands a constant tension" (Beauvoir, 1974, 158). Thus to enjoy authentic relationships and power with others requires a considerable effort. The alternative, power over others and solitude as a master or slave, is less demanding. Some needs cannot be met in the alternative of solitude, however. As Beauvoir writes,

> And so quite unable to fulfill himself in solitude, man is incessantly in danger in his relations with his fellows: his life is a difficult enterprise with success never assured (Beauvoir, 1974, 158).

In these passages, Beauvoir is describing the relationship of men in the situation of equality. The analysis of Tocqueville for individuals in the social condition of equality is not dissimilar (Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 306; 1951-58, 1(2): 291; 1864-66, 3: 475). Relationships of women are described differently from these, however. Tocqueville, too, saw these relationships as different, but it is Beauvoir who explains the functions and importance of these differences to the development of authentic relationships between men and women which engage all individuals in learning situations.

In analyzing the situation of equals, Beauvoir explains that since an individual does not like difficulty and is afraid of danger and,

furthermore, aspires both to meaning and to repose, he looks for something between the difficult relationship with an equal and the lack of a relationship in solitude or in conquering that which lacks consciousness, nature (Beauvoir, 1974, 158- 60).

Nature is the total stranger having no consciousness, being too easily conquered, and offering often less than nothing after the destruction. An equal is too similar and maintaining a relationship between two free and equal consciousnesses is a constant if exhilirating struggle. However the artifact woman "opposes him with neither the hostile silence of nature nor the hard requirement of a reciprocal relation; through a unique privilege she is a conscious being and yet it seems possible to possess her in the flesh,"Beauvoir i974, 159).

Beauvoir presents an artifactual account of the development of decision making structures based on ideologies of gender differentiation and gender superiority. Her analysis of the political, social, and psychological stress related to conditions of equality in rank or role augments Tocqueville's explorations of the affects of democracy (Allen, 1981). The analysis of fear of diversity, the desire for uniformity, the return to role and rank,and the institutionalization of tyranny as answers to the "unboundedness of the soul" which Tocqueville analyzed, are applied by Beauvoir to the creation of the artifact woman. In addition, Tocqueville's hypothesis that the decline of hierarchical relationships in the political world will necessitate an increasing desire for role and rank in other spheres of the individual's existence can be found in complimentary themes in Beauvoir's works (Allen, 1981).

The problems which Beauvoir explains follow for both women and men in such artifactual roles and ranks represent an avoidence of knowledge of both self and other. Beauvoir looks particularly at why the female

may accept this role unless relationships are structured otherwise. A primary reason is simply that reciprocal relations and the foundation of an autonomous, authentic self are just as hard for a woman to achieve as they are, in Beauvoir's analysis, for a man. Beauvoir explains that friendship and generosity are not facile virtues (Beauvoir, 1974, 158). Secondly, Beauvoir makes the point that "in order to change the face of the world, it is necessary to be firmly anchored in it, but the women who are firmly rooted in society are those who are in subjection to it" (Beauvior, 1974, 148).

This second argument is directly related to the institutional arrangements which exist to foster or hinder the participation of female individuals in social and political relationships. Such institutional arrangements influence both activities and the meaning of these activities for individuals who undertake them. Not only are the actual situations of participation important, then, but the meaning given to them through social learning matters as well. The residual of patriarchalism will have such import to the development of political order based on such artifices and artificers.

Beauvoir's discussion of self definition is illuminating in this context. For males, Beauvior suggests, the development of the ego comes from (among several stimuli) conquering others and defining himself thereby even if the other is, in fact, some facet of himself which he tests himself against. Girls, on the contrary, experience from the beginning of ego development a conflict between their autonomous selves and their objective selves — a self which derives meaning only in relationship to some primary subject, i.e. a parent or husband. To please she must try to please; she must make herself the object of affection (Beauvoir, 1974,316).

Tocqueville, too, elaborates a view of female socialization that is not at odds with Beauvoir's. He finds that in America the education of girls in logic and reason and their independence of mind, coupled with the socializing restrictions of trying to be an object rather than a subject, make it easier for female adults to bend to the yoke as a way of preserving several important relationships. A high degree of moral development is attained, in Tocqueville's estimation, because she sees her good in relation to others. Rather than striking a blow for independence, she submits for the good of relationships or the good of the whole social group (Tocqueville, 1945, 2: 225; 1951-58, 1(2): 222; 1864-66, 3: 347-48).

In this development of herself as object, not as a subject, merely in relationship to others, Beauvoir shows that the artifact woman, when found in real humans, is divided against herself; her will to be and her desire to please do not coincide in activities which develop the human consciousness (Beauvoir, 1974, 57, 316). The male, too, though not divided in so fundamental a way, must maintain tyranny against the information that may come to him that he is a tyrant. For both individuals, the roles they play develop personalities which may be antithetical to the learning which must be done for full participation in democratic relationships.

It seems certain that artifacts of patriarchal relationships persist in the commonwealth. The work of Beauvoir suggests that an artifactual analysis such as that which has been carried out on political relationships could be effectively applied to social relationships. Moreover she suggests that the persistence of patriarchal artifacts may

hinder the development of the instrument of consciousness which must be used to inform the consensus that maintains the integrity of the concept of popular sovereignty. An amalgam of the theories of Hobbes, Tocqueville, and Beauvoir can help social science gain leverage to analyse several aspects of these issues.

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