J99-6

Workshop on the Workshop 2

WOW

Bloomington, Indiana, June 9-13, 1999

DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND INTEGRATION: SURVIVAL AND LEGITIMACY ACROSS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

by

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INTRODUCTION

One of the four main themes of the Second Workshop on the Workshop is "development," with the present panel concerned with "Aid, Development, and the Global Context." A second theme, which will be linked to development in this paper, looks at "Democratic Transformations." I will attempt to connect these two themes by presenting an essay which links the democratic peace to the now-classic theories of international integration developed by Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas.[1] Through the phenomenon of integration I hope to highlight the importance of the development of community and responsiveness in the democratic peace, and outline the commonalities of this process to the domestic processes which lead to the development of legitimacy.

As indicated in McGinnis and Ostrom (1999), a longstanding perspective of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis can be captured in the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. By placing decision makers and decision situations within broader environmental or contextual settings, the IAD may be viewed as one type of agent-structure framework where decisions, choice and choice processes take place within different contexts of possibility, contraints, and opportunity. And, as with all such agent-structure formulations (including the opportunity and willingness framework which I have used extensively in my own analyses; e.g. see Starr 1978, Most and Starr 1989, Starr 1997a), the IAD *must* cross several levels of analysis and deal with several arenas of action simultaneously. The present paper similarly picks up this multi-level and multi-arena theme— by looking at the nature of integration for interdependent units within the international system, at the democratic peace which exists at the dyadic and regional levels, and finally at democracy and legitimacy within single units.

The use of an integration framework provides a number of advantages. Perhaps one of the most important is the explicit notion that where there is integration there may also be *disintegration*.

If the democratic peace, and the impact of democracy on development rests on the creation and maintenance of legitimacy— in processes analogous to those found in models of integration— then those processes must be constantly attended to or disintegration can occur.[2] Indeed, my use of integration theory to address the democratic peace (and the effects of democracy on development), speaks directly to a major critique of the international politics literature raised by McGinnis and Ostrom(1999,16):

> This is where the connection between Toqueville's analysis of democracy and the prospects for a peaceful world order lies. If the conditions of democratic self-government are by their very nature vulnerable to decay, then any democratic zone of peace is potentially at risk. We argue that a crucial step in the democratic peace argument has been overlooked by international relations scholars...

The primary purpose of this paper is to review the connections that demonstrate the democratic peace to be a subset of more general integration processes. The following sections will discuss integration, democracy and legitimacy. I will show how the key element of the democratic peace— the absence of large-scale military violence between democracies— flows from the development of a Deutschian "security community." After pulling all of these elements together in a discussion of "the good society," the paper will turn to democracy and development.

INTEGRATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE[3]

As noted, the core of the democratic peace concerns the lack of war among democratic states. Indeed, much of the writing on the democratic peace— whether devoted to analysis, proof, or critique— loses track of exactly what is under discussion or what is to be explained. That is, the

author(s) often forgets that the democratic peace proposition (or hypothesis, or law, or whatever) is a statement that claims the following: there is a virtual absence of war among dyads of democratic polities. Thus, the democratic peace proposition, at its most basic, is about the absence of war. It is about a set of conditions that explains the variance in a specific dependent variable— war. While this question is an important starting point for a number of other theoretical interests and empirical analyses- see Russett and Starr (2000)— it is also important to understand that this is the central linkage to Deutschian theories of integration. Once we deal with this issue, we can drop back to look at broader implications of the the Deutschian concept of security communities.

Since integration is all about the positive ways in which interdependence can be manged (see Starr 1997a), the democratic peace is also about how democracies manage the conflict that is generated by the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1989). The democratic peace proposition— and whatever the combination of theories used to explain it— makes a simple empirical claim: that war does not occur in democratic dyads. To Realist critics this appears to be a radical claim. If, however, this proposition is placed within the context of the peace created by processes of integration, the position is not so radical. After all, both the theory and findings reported in the integration literature have presented exactly the same type of challenge to Realism by identifying state behavior which, according to Realists, was not supposed to occur in the international system (or if it did occur was to be trivial in nature); (see Puchala 1981 for a presentation of this argument).

In sum, the discussion of the democractic peace challenges Realist views on conflict, cooperation, and the role of norms. It also challenges central Realist assumptions about the distinction between domestic and international politics and possibilities for system change without

war. Focusing on the nature of governments and societies, and how they can have an impact on state behavior in the international system, forces us to face a part of the context or environment generally ignored in Realist analyses— the two-level interaction of domestic and foreign politics.

Security Communities

The end product of the process of integration according to Deutschian theory is the "security community":

> A security community is a group of people which has become 'integrated.' By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure... dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change (Deutsch, et al. 1957, 5).

This Deutschian definition of integration— just as the democratic peace proposition— focuses on peace, and the conditions for peace; but it does more. A security community involves not only the absence of war, but more importantly, the absence of the military option in the interactions of the states within the security community. Importantly, Deutsch allows for the existence of pluralistic security communities, where such conditions can hold even among a set of independent, non-amalgamated, states. It should be clear then, that the Deutschian pluralistic security community is an outcome which is broader than, but overarches, the democratic peace phenomenon. With such prerequisites for the formation of security communities as compatibility of values, the extension of political elites, and multiple forms of transactions and communication (Deutsch, et al. 1957), it is

not surprising that the only historically identified security communities- either amalgamated or pluralistic— are composed of democracies.

When we look closely at the components of the Deutschian social-communication model of the integration process as well as the neo-functional process model of Ernst Haas, we find all the primary components of the two central theories used by scholars to explain the democratic peace: (1) the structural constraints model, which looks at the constraints of organizations and formal laws or constitutions; (2) the democratic culture argument, which involves the presence of community, responsiveness, shared values, and norms. Thus, key components of the two basic explanations of how the democratic peace works are found in the two basic theories of integration. Additionally, the theories of integration stress the role of learning in the development of norms of cooperation and a sense of community; they stress the need for mutual benefits and the positive impact of interdependence on the management of interdependent relations. Again, these are key components of theories attempting to explain the democratic peace. Below, I will show how the international interaction game of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) can help us understand how Deutsch gets from a social communication process which explains the development of responsiveness (see Russett 1963) and community to the outcome of that process, namely a security community.

From an integration perspective, what does it mean when one uncovers evidence that democracies might intervene in other democracies, or escalate a conflict with another democracy to the point where the military option is considered? From this perspective, all it means is that there has been, to to that point in time, incomplete integration in terms of "dependable expectations of peaceful change." That is, the democracies involved exist within a not yet fully formed, or imperfectly formed, pluralistic security community. Here, under certain dispute conditions, the

military option may indeed be raised— but still does not escalate to actual war. Does such a situation invalidate theories of integration? Is there not a difference between claiming that integration does not exist or is a failure, and merely indicating that the processes involved have not yet produced the final end-product of integration— the pluralistic security community as Deutsch envisioned it? Before returning to further correspondences in conditions and processes between pluralistic security communities and the democratic peace, it is necessary to discuss one of the basic features of democracy that is central to any theory attempting to explain the democratic peace— the notion of transparency.

Democracy and Transparency: Hawks, Doves, and "Separation"

One possible factor which distinguishes democracy from other governmental forms is its "transparency." Democratic transparency— the openness of its political processes and the vast amount of economic, political, and social information which is public and generally available— is a prerequisite for democracy as conceptualized in terms of the contestation for political leadership, and/or "effective participation," regardless of the specific definition used (see Dahl 1998,1989).

Such a conceptualization sees democracy as providing an environment within which oppositions can effectively challenge incumbent governmental office holders for power in a legal, legitimate manner through prescribed procedures. In order to do so, the range of political and civil liberties commonly understood as those embodied in the American Bill of Rights, must obtain— freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly, freedom from a range of techniques of repression available to a government. It is only through transparency that a society can monitor and know of abuses of political and civil liberties. It is only through transparency that a government

would fear the repercussions of such abuses. Thus, only transparency can provide the safe environment for effective governmental opposition that is at the core of democracy as conceptualized in terms of the contestation for political leadership.

The concept of transparency is also a useful point of departure for investigating how the nature of democracy could explain the democratic peace. Why should transparency be important? One way to approach this question is to look at the arguments presented by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) regarding the policy choices of "hawks" and "doves" and how these two types of states are related to democratic and non-democratic states.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) develop the extensive form "international interaction game" to investigate the behavior of "instrumentally rational" foreign policy decision makers. They use this game to analyze how the sequence of actions taken by decision makers may lead to war or one of several forms of peaceful resolution. What is key to us here is that they present the central problem facing decision makers as that of separation: how to distinguish what type of opponent one is facing in terms of its preferences and preference ordering. Under what conditions will the opponent prefer the status quo? prefer negotiations over other alternatives? prefer capitulation to war? prefer war it initiates over war initated by the other party? They analyze the outcomes that will be produced with states that might be characterized as "doves" (states with preference orderings that make them generally averse to the use of force, depending, of course, on the nature of the opponent they face), as they interact with other doves or non-doves. They present a proof demonstrating that if both states are doves, and both know that the other is a dove, then war outcomes are impossible. As they note at several points, a crucial assumption is that there is "common knowledge" by each side of the other's dovishness.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992, ch.5) apply these results to the puzzle of why democracies rarely fight one another. In the real world, they argue, decision makers can never be sure what type of state they are facing— doves or non-doves. How can both sides in the real world attain the common knowledge regarding dove/non-dove that is simply assumed in the game model? While decision makers cannot know who is a dove/non-dove, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman argue that there is fairly common knowledge whether or not the opponent is a liberal democracy. Basing their logic on a combination of the theories used to explain the democratic peace, if a certain country is a liberal democracy then decision makers know that the leaders of that state will be under greater constraints not to use force, and will bear heavier costs than the leaders of non-democracies if they do. All of this is known because of the various elements of transparency— the free movement of information in liberal democracies, the existence of opposition groups, and knowledge of internal politics, institutions, and debates.

Using transparency and separation, I have summarized their argument as follows:

(1) it is formally demonstrated that two states who are doves, and each of whom knows that both of the pair are doves, will not go to war;

(2) this separation requires common knowledge, which cannot be assumed in the real world;

(3) various aspects of liberal democracies, as summarized by cultural and structural models, can be seen as making them averse to the use of force, by the higher constraints imposed on leaders by democratic societies and governments;

(4) most often, the indications that a state is a liberal democracy are known and can be used as prior information by decision makers in helping them separate opponents into types (doves and non-doves);

(5) the greater the belief that a state is dove-like (which becomes literally one hundred percent in a security community), the lower the probability that a dove will use force against it. Again, if the indicators of being a democracy are useful in identifying another state as a dove, then the satisfaction of Deutsch's criteria for community and responsiveness, and the recognition of the conditions needed for a security community will make dove-identification a certainty.

The transparency of democracy means that outside observers can see into such states, scrutinize the activity that occurs within the society and political system, and recognize that the political behaviors conform to some broadly accepted notion of democracy, and are robust enough to cross some threshold in order to be called democracy. Such transparency is inherent in truly open societies. Transparency that reveals the democratic nature of a polity is crucial for Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's use of democracy as an indicator of dovishness. The Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman formulation only works when each party can be clearly recognized as a democracy by the other party. The mutual recognition of democracy (which equates to dovishness) is crucial to the use of the international interaction game to explain the democratic peace, just as it is to many other such theories. Transparency (including the degree or level of transparency) is thus crucial to how we measure democracy and which cases we look at to test our theories.[4]

Transparency means that leaders and populations of other states can see that a country provides for the political and civil liberties which permit the regularized and legal contestation for political power. In democratic dyads this means both sides can see into each other. If both countries are democracies, it is likely that they share a broad range of transactions, and that the levels of transactions are high enough that each society knows a great deal about the other; such a multiplicity

of transactions and communication is also strongly consistent with Deutschian integration theory (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990,436). On one broad level, this makes war between democracies much more difficult than war between a democracy and an authoritarian regime.[5]

Integration, Interdependence and Learning

As noted, the process of integration whether based on the models of Deutsch or Haas, is based on learning: the parties involved learn that such transactions provide benefits, that such benefits outweigh the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to continue such interactions and even expand them. As such interactions occur, and expand, the peoples involved become more and more interdependent, and thus raise the costs of stopping such interactions.

The discussion above specifically noted two families of theories used to explain the democratic peace: culture and structure. The international interaction game of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman exemplifies another set of models that combine the elements of opportunity and willingness inherent in culture and structure, "strategic interaction" models (see Russett and Starr 2000). Such expected-utility models of strategic decision making make it clear that that if leaders are to incur the significant costs of breaking the bonds of interdependence, then they will have to present compelling reasons for the use of force or war; (see also the work of Mintz and associates, e.g. Geva, et al. 1993). As we have seen, with two democracies this is extremely difficult. Yet another kind of learning is involved. All leaders will be punished for policy failures. They do not survive as leaders. Democratic leaders are particularly subject to this effect. According to Mintz and associates, the policy of significant military conflict with another democracy is seen as a policy failure. As Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) note, leaders of democracies tend to choose wars

with a lower risk of defeat.

The strategic interaction approach makes it clear why it is so difficult for democracies to pursue a policy of war againts other democracies. Starting with the work of Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997), Russett and Starr (2000) develop the argument in detail:

> In order to satisfy the "selectorate" and maintain a domestic winning coalition, leaders have both policy objectives and rent-seeking objectives. Leaders were assumed to be motivated to retain their hold over office. To do so they were assumed to distribute private goods to their supporters as well as to pursue collective goods— public policies consumed by all. Elsewhere, Olson (1993) shows in an elegant argument how the leaders of democracies are driven both to lower rent-seeking and to raise their commitment to the provision of collective goods that benefit all of society. These dynamics are related to the range and depth of the interests that leaders and elites have in a society, or the breadth of the stake they have in society.
>
> Olson concludes, as do Lake (1992) and Brawley (1993), that such leadership will have greater legitimacy and support from society. This would both make them "powerful" as Lake suggests, and forge a utility calculus for leaders based firmly within the domestic setting. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1997) outline domestic or endogenous institutional constraints based on the nature of the selectorate and the size of the winning coalition (somewhat akin to Putnam's 1988 argument concerning two-level games and the domestic "win set"). In sum, given the nature of the overall set of relationships between leaders and rent-seeking, the provision of public goods, the creation and maintenance of legitimacy, the care and feeding of the selectorate and the domestic winning coalition, policy

makers in democracies must pay particular attention to the overall expected utility of getting involved in conflict. In a state with a wide voting franchise, leaders cannot readily seek rents for themselves while spreading the costs of military action among the populace (Verdier 1994).

LEGITIMACY AND INTEGRATION

The argument above also merges into a discussion of the nature of governments in democracies and the legitimacy of those governments. I have mentioned the experimental work of Alex Mintz and associates, which tests a "political incentive" explanation for the dyadic democratic peace. They argue that the leaders of democracies do not pursue war against other democracies because they have no political incentive to do so. People in democracies who themselves manage conflict peacefully and within legitimized institutions and procedures, and who know that people in other democracies do the same, will expect their governments to act similarly regarding interstate conflict. People who share norms of self-government, governmental constraint, civil liberties, and the workings of democratic transparency know that people in other democracies do the same, and thus expect their governments to find appropriate modes of non-violent conflict resolution. Therefore, the range of legitimate casus belli is greatly restricted in democratic dyads. As noted, the transparency of democracies along with shared democratic norms and procedures, makes it nearly impossible for policy makers to dehumanize the people of another democracy through the manipulation of images of the other as the "enemy." In contrast, authoritarian and totalitarian states are both less transparent to others and limit their own people's access to information, facilitating the development of enemy images in both directions (Boulding 1956; White 1970; Regan 1994).

In sum, models of integration are based upon increasing numbers of interactions between countries— whether the transnational transactions of the Deutschian social communication model and/or the transgovernmental transactions of the Haasian neo-functionalist model. These interactions foster growth in the amount and quality of interdependencies between the countries. To break these bonds of interdependence which provide positive payoffs to both sides, entail costs that are unacceptable to democratic leaders. The failure to settle conflicts without force through the norms of democratic practice is also seen as governmental failure. And finally, following both models of integration, as interactions occur and increase, peoples develop greater responsiveness to one another.

As developed by Russett (1974), responsiveness entails the expectation that wants and needs will be responded to positively. It reflects both attitude and capabilities. While the war avoidance phenomenon which is at the heart of the democratic peace is a necessary component, responsiveness reflects the broader aspects of "positive peace." At some point responsiveness produces the "we-feeling", trust and mutual consideration that Deutsch called community. As cited in Adler and Barnett (1996: 67), Deutsch defines community as:

> a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we feeling, trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior... in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.

This should remind the reader of comments made in the introduction to this paper, where I noted we would be concerned with process- integration and disintegration. Also, compare Deutsch's take on

commuriity to the similar notion of democracy provided by McGinnis and Ostrom (1999) presented above.

Responsiveness and community arise out of a continuing and growing set of social transactions by which people learn they can benefit, and through which they come to respect and trust others, and expect such respect and trust in return. This is what Putnam (1993,137) has called "dense networks of social exchange." He argues that, "Networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital: the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that citizens there will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit." In a similar conclusion, Taylor and Singleton (1993) also argue that community can act to reduce uncertainty, and thus lower the transaction costs of solving collective action problems.

This is the Deutschian definition of the security community, and it also characterizes the dynamics of the dyadic democratic peace. In the words of Adler and Barnett (1996, 63): "Let us think the unthinkable: that community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition."

Legitimacy and "The Good Society"

Thus, on one level we see that the interactions between democracies reflect the interstate interactions described and predicted by theories of integration (and thus, clearly diverge from and argue against Realism). However, to fully understand why democracy has such effects, why it fits within these models, we must again step backward, and take a brief look within states to understand the nature and working of democracy. I have helped to develop arguments elsewhere (Russett and Starr 2000)

that such an understanding entails investigation of the three central relationships that exist at the state level: (1) the relationships among individuals and groups within society: (2) the relationships that exist between society as a whole (and of its various components) and government— how society sees, reacts to, and deals with government; (3) the relationships between government and society— how government sees, reacts to, and deals with society.

The first relationship is rather straightforward, and it has already been discussed. Deutschian integration models of social community work at a variety of societal levels; they describe "nationalism," and how humans form community at any level of aggregation. The elements that make up community in democratic society are summarized in the Deutsch quotation above. Adler and Barnett also present Michael Taylor's (1982) three elements of community. First, community involves shared values, beliefs, identities and meaning. Secondly it involves multiple and mutlifaceted direct relationships. Third, there is recognition of long-term interests, reciprocity and even "altruism." Democracies have not only community, but a community based on special values, such as legal and political equality, democratic process for governance, belief in civil and political liberties, etc.[6] In the spirit of the "bottom up" logic by which the organization and governance within states can affect the interaction between states (see Russett and Starr 1996, Russett 1993),[7] individuals within societies sharing democratic values and that are based on community and responsiveness, would expect their governments to behave towards the governments of other such societies in the same manner that individuals and groups within a democracy behave towards one another.[8]

For democracies the second relationship, that between society and government, must be characterized by "legitimacy." This phenomenon is considered in depth in literature presenting the

cultural/norms and structural/constraints theories of the dyadic democratic peace. However, as with opportunity and willingness, neither culture nor structure are individually sufficient to explain democracy, or the behavior of democracies. This is because they interact with one another and each contributes to a larger syndrome that makes up democracy. Each is an important component of the legitimacy of the political system. Such legitimacy rests upon the same conditions that undergird the Deutschian ideas of community and responsiveness. For example, look at Jackman's (1993, 98) definition of legitimacy:

> A regime is thus legitimate to the extent that it can induce a measure of compliance from most people without resort to the use of physical force. The compliance need not be total, but it does need to be extensive.[9]

Just as norms and procedures for dealing with each other within democratic society are seen to be externalized, so are the norms and procedures by which citizens in democracies (individually or in groups) see and deal with their governments. The community, responsiveness, and legitimacy of these relationships are assumed for other democracies as well, and fashion the relationships between democracies.

The third key relationship deals with the linkages that exist between government and society-- how government sees, reacts to, and deals with society. For many scholars this relationship is represented by the notion of the "liberal" state (e.g. see Solingen 1996; Onuf and Johnson 1995; Doyle 1995). According to Peet and Simon (1997,3), "Owen (1994:122) suggests that 'liberalism' is the antecendent concept that gives rise to liberal ideology and democratic institutions through which the democratic peace operates."

There is, however, a lack of consensus on exactly what liberalism means. As Doyle (1995,

84) notes, "There is no canonical description of liberalism. What we tend to call liberalism resembles a family portrait of principles and institutions, recognizable by certain characteristics- for example, a commitment to individual freedom, government through democratic representation, rights of private property, and equality of opportunity...".

Many scholars stress Kant's attention to republicanism as the core of liberalism, others stress private property and the free market as the basis for economic relationships. The government of the liberal state, then, supports the pluralism necessary for the popular selection and replacement of governmental leaders, as well as the workings of a free market economy. While these are part of the core relationship between government and society, it is not the whole of it. Popular representation through republicanism and the pluralism of a free market economy do not fully capture the set of important norms we have hinted at in discussing societal integration and society-to-government legitimacy. Ruggie (1982) helps us to move in this direction with his notion of "embedded liberalism" and the idea of a shared social purpose. However, Ruggie expresses this shared purpose only in economic terms, "to provide domestic stability by ensuring social welfare is improving in aggregate while maintaining a minimum standard for all" (Peet and Simon 1997, 5; see also McMillan's 1997 discussion of "sophisticated liberalism").

Leaders in Olson's (1993) analysis also share broad interests in society, and act to provide stability, low rents and high levels of public goods. Again, this is not enough. Drawing on Deutschian concepts, I argue that such interests must be set within the development of a range of social norms— "oughts" concerning how governments are to treat the members of society. Many such norms derive from Idealist assumptions about the affirmative and optimistic aspects of human nature, and even the natural law (rather than utilitarian) foundations of reciprocity and the Golden

Rule (e.g. Lippmann 1943, ch.17).

But perhaps just as important is the recognition by governmental leaders of the first two relationships: (1) governments recognize the nature of societal integration, and the community and responsiveness which orders behavior among individuals and groups; (2) governments recognize the elements of democratic legitimacy which are at the core of societal perception of government and behavior towards government. This recognition of how democracy works at other levels, this recognition of the commonalities of democracy, generates a set of norms about how government ought to behave towards society. Government responsibilities revolve around the welfare of people and society; democratic governments care about people and society (in a normative way that goes beyond Olson's economic utility arguments).[10]

To Lippmann (1943,376), one key element is the recognition that all humans are "persons" and not "things." Governments must deal with such persons through the Golden Rule and through justice. In Lippmann's (1943,363) words:

> There must be a strong desire to be just. There must be a growing capacity to be just. There must be discernment and sympathy in estimating the particular claims of divergent interests. There must be moral standards which discourage the quest of privilege and the exercise of arbitrary power... There must be patience and tolerance and kindness in hearing claims, in argument, in negotiation, and in reconciliation.

For Lippmann, these norms are at the heart of his "good society."[11] The usual descriptions and definitions of liberalism have a strong economic flavor (and this includes much of Lippmann as well). As such they do not well capture this dimension. We could add any number of adjectives to liberalism; e.g. call it "compassionate liberalism." Perhaps along with the integration of the first

relationship, and the legitimacy of the second relationship, we should simply characterize the third relationship as "the good society."

The three relationships taken together-- integration, legitimacy, and the good society- provide a set of powerful forces that are represented by the cultural and structural theories used to explain the democratic peace. Solingen (1996: 84) provides an excellent summary of the "basic conceptual links between democracy and the likelihood for conflict and cooperation." She presents five elements: 1) domestic legitimacy and accountability; 2) institutional checks and balances; 3) democratic transparency, communication and the costs of regime-creation; 4) democratic process, credibility and ratification; 5) sensitivity to the human and material costs of war.

Returning broadly to the IAD, as these forces regularly come together in democracies, they help account for the preference orderings of democratic leaders, and thus help account for the purposive choices of those leaders. Together they account for Rummel's (1997) observation of democracy as a "general method of nonviolence."

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: GOOD THINGS CAN GO TOGETHER

As Russett and Starr (1996, chs.15 and 18) have noted, "good things" can go together. While the relationship is complex, empirical research has begun to uncover the reciprocal linkages between democracy, peace, and economic development: "We can see however, that material well-being, political liberty, and stable peace really are interconnected" (Russett and Starr 1996,466). The work of Russett and Oneal (see, for example, Oneal and Russett 1997, Russett et al. 1998), has investigated the impact of all three legs of the Kantian peace. These are three multiple and overlapping liberal behaviors that result in peace among states: democracy, economic

interdependence, and international law and organizations. They have found that each separately, and together in interaction, promote peaceful behavior. In turn, there is a vast commentary on the utility of peace-*- and the stability it brings- on economic development and the survival of democracies.

These views are much more complex than the simple democracy-economic development theories of the 1950s and early 1960s. Greater numbers of democracies should be of help in generating economic growth, and the more equitable distribution of that growth. Peace is both a consequence of this process and a cause of greater growth. Even without a direct dollar-to-dollar "peace dividend," if a world of increasing numbers of democracies lowers the probability and threat of war, the enormous sums spent globally on defense could be substantially reduced.

These are external effects which exist at the level of the international system. Dropping to the societal level, the legitimacy that undergirds and sustains the domestic environment of democracy also has "spillover" effects on economic development. The transparency of society necessary for democracy is also necessary for a market system to work well. Individuals and groups within a society can understand in what ways the economic system distributes its rewards/wealth/payoffs. When an economic (and political) system can provide positive outcomes for most participants which are distributed with some degree of equity— again, conditions of Deutschian integration— this, in turn, will promote further societal legitimacy and community through the expectation of mutual rewards.

Dahl (1998) asks, "Why democracy?" He provides eight general answers, plus two relevant only to "modern democracies": peace-seeking and prosperity.[12] He notes the substantial relationship between "affluence and democracy" since the end of the Second World War. A large part of his explanation reflects the discussion of transparency and legitimacy noted above:

> The explanation is partly to be found in the affinity between representative democracy and a market economy, in which markets are for the most part not highly regulated, workers are free to move from one place or job to another, privately owned firms compete for sales and resources, and consumers can choose among goods and services... Because all modern democratic countries have market economies, and a country with a market economy is likely to prosper, a modern democratic country is likely also to be a rich country (Dahl 1998, 58-59).

Another argument derives from the legitimacy that democracies enjoy, and that comes into play when it comes to the extraction of societal resources for both domestic and foreign policies. While the studies to be noted below are concerned primarily with security interests and the survival of new democracies, the extraction of resources is also directly related to economic growth and stability. Let me conclude this paper by briefly presenting the results of several research papers that link the prosperity, stability, and "survival" of new democracies to legitimacy.

Legitimacy, Stability and Survial

The focus on democratic survival derives from two larger projects. One is the Two-Level Security Management Project which is based on the opportunity and willingness framework. It is concerned with the relationship of internal and external conflict and the reciprocal types of impact that domestic and external factors might have on one another (see, e.g. Starr 1994, Simon and Starr 1996). The Simon and Starr (1995) paper discussed below, and the two-level simulation around which it is based, is a direct product of this research program. The second project is my extension of diffusion analyses to the growth of democracy in the international system, looking at possible global, regional,

and neighbor demonstration effects on transitions to (and away from) democracy. Using a modified form of the Freedom House data, these transitions involve the movement in a state's status across three categories: Free (F), Partly Free (PF), and Nonfree (NF) from one year to the next. These analyses are reflected in Starr (1991,1995,1999) and Crislip and Starr (1996).

Briefly, what are some fundamental observations that can be made about democratic survival? Starr (1995) [as well as Crislip and Starr 1996] supports my earlier observation of modest global effects, and stronger regional effects in the transition of states from NF and PF to F. There is some indication that having bordering countries which are engaged in transitions toward democracy has some effect on whether PF countries also move toward democracy. More importantly, a combined regional/neighbor effect was found: the democratic or non-democratic status of a country's neighbors at the time of that country's transition. Countries moving from PF to NF were either entirely or almost entirely surrounded by countries who were already NF. As was stressed in Simon and Starr (1995), having neighbors who were already democratic could set the stage for governmental extraction that could be devoted to societal development.

Crislip and Starr (1996), using a proportional hazard model, present another fundamental result: the longer a democracy survives, the more likely it becomes that it will continue to survive; (this is consistent with survival analyses of governmental regimes). But what contributes to this survival? The simulations found in Simon and Starr (1995) pick up the same theme found in Starr (1995 and 1999) the degree to which there are other democratic states in the system.

The analyses in Starr (1999) paint a more complex picture of the post-Cold War system than those of some analysts. I looked not only at the number and percentage of Free, Partially Free, and Non-Free states in the system, but the rates at which transitions to and from Free and Non-Free

occur, and the duration of time that states remain Free or Non-Free. In so doing, I found some support for the" Axelrod hypothesis." I had selected different time cuts for the survival analyses. One represented the "Axelrod hypothesis," based on the existence of an Axelrod-like core of cooperators whose presence creates the dynamic for a continued growth of cooperators (e.g. Axelrod 1984). I used 1985 as a cut point, as this is the year in which over one-third of the system becomes Free, and continues as such until 1996. 1985 was also the year in which the number of Free states in the international system, in their upward trajectory, first exceeded that of the Non-Free states. What I have called the Axelrod hypothesis holds that the rate of growth of democracy— its hazard rate— will be stronger after 1985 than before. Support for the Axelrod hypothesis came not in the form of a take-off of democratic growth after a core of cooperators is created, but that the Free states created after 1985 appear to be less volatile; that is, those states moving to Free tend to stay there.

Because new (and, in the Simon and Starr simulation purposively "endangered") democracies must devote resources to increasing domestic "legitimacy," it is important to have a context of other democratic states— democratic allies. Through the "integration-effects" noted above in discussing Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, such allies will both encourage dovish policies and provide for the international security of new/endangered democracies. The simulation results generated by Simon and Starr (1995) show that ally support can provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. Furthermore, and central to the democratic peace, new democracies thrive in systems which are predominantly democratic. The simulation shows that legitimacy helps make new democracies less vulnerable to long run security problems by building up societal resources. Yet to address immediate domestic security threats, new democracies will be most successful if they pursue a dovish strategy of allocation or buying off threats in the domestic arena. This strategy will leave

them more vulnerable internationally, however. It is therefore important that democratic allies both encourage the dovish policies (via diplomacy, economic sanctions, human rights policies, etc.) and provide for the international security of the endangered democracy via new or existing alliance structures.

Thus, all three papers provide differing streams of evidence indicating that for democracy to survive governments must devote resources and effort into generating legitimacy through attention to human welfare and economic development. Starr (1995) and Crislip and Starr (1996) show that very poor countries are different— less likely to move to democracy, and less likely to stay there if such a move takes place. We are back to the complex feedback loops between democracy and development, and how each can foster the other.

I am afraid that much of this commentary has rambled, and that the organization has not been as tight and orderly as the reader might have wished. I have, however, attempted to outline the following:

- The two basic arguments (theories) used to explain how the democratic peace works— cultural and structural— are captured by the two main theories of integration, the Deutschian social-communication/community model, and the Haasian neo-functionalist model respectively.
- The key to theories of successful integration is the development of the conditions of community and responsiveness. These concepts reflect the shift of loyalties which is central to neo-functionalism. They are the conditions that make war between units sharing these conditions impossible in Deutschian security communities.
- The essential nature of democracy requires legitimacy for the successful relationship between and

among societal groups, for the way societal groups see and deal with government (and thus, the way in which government sees, and deals with society). A close investigation reveals the equivalence between societal legitimacy and Deutschian community and responsiveness.

- The societal-governmental and governmental-governmental relationships within a society that are needed for the democratic peace are based on legitimacy. That is, legitimacy is necessary for the democratic peace to occur (for democracies to be democracies, and understand that other countries are democracies). Liberal transparency is a key factor here, one which allows the democratic peace to occur.
- Finally, it can be argued that legitimacy is important for democratic survival and stability, and thus for the feedback loops that reinforce democracy and economic growth.

NOTES

1. However, most of the arguments in this essay will be based on a variety of empirical studies related to the democratic peace.

2. This reflects a view similar to that of McGinnis and Ostrom (1999, 5), where they note: "We prefer instead to think of democracy as a series of ongoing "transformations" in the attitudes of people..."

3. The material in the sections to follow draws heavily from Starr (1992,1997a, chapter 7; 1997b), and Russett and Starr (2000).

4. Some critiques of the democratic peace proposition are based on an assertion that wars between two "democracies" can indeed be identified. My response to such critiques is that if analysts, years after the wars in question, still can engage in tedious argumentation as to whether or not the countries involved were democracies, then it is most likely the case that the states involved, at the time of the war, were also unclear whether the opponent was a democracy. Such debate means that at least one party to the war had not clearly moved beyond the threshold for recognizable democracies. And, it is essential to note, any careful examination of the democratic peace proposition reveals that it does not necesssarily cover "almost" democracies! This point is important in considering analyses of, or including, new or "fragile" democracies, or countries in the process of democratization.

5. For example, one mechanism by which the leaders of states create a willingness for societal masses (and elites) to support and prosecute a war, is the creation of an enemy image which involves the dehumanization of the opponent. A number of studies indicate that this enemy image is used to portray the opponent as evil and/or non-human in some way— thus justifying the use of violence against such an enemy and warranting the costs of war. Images of the "Hun" on British posters during World War I, or the images of the Japanese in American films during World War II exemplify this phenomenon (e.g. see Dower, 1986). With two democracies, and the amount of information flowing in and out of each, it is almost impossible to create such an image.

6. Political equality is central to Dahl's (1998) criteria for a democratic process within "modern" polyarchies. It overarches each of his five criteria for a "democratic process": (1) effective participation, (2) voting equality, (3) enlightened understanding, (4) control of the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults.

7. Russett (1993, 137) notes: "Perhaps major features of the international system can be socially constructed from the bottom up; that is, norms and rules of behavior internationally can become extensions of the norms and rules of domestic political behavior."

8. This is what Michael McGinnis, in personal communication, has called the "ideology" of democracy; an ideology that serves as one of the interdependent linkages among democracies. If a government were to deny political or civil rights to its citizens other democracies would be sensitive (and possibly vulnerable) to that behavior; such a government would be threatening the ideology of democracy.

9. Nie et al. (1996, 2) in a discussion of citizenship within democracy discuss legitimacy in very similar terms as the "cement of society": "Democracy requires relatively little punitive or physical coercion for legitimacy; there are no secret police, domestic passports, or national lists of citizens in American democracy. The method of social governance for the majority of citizens is, in essence, noncoercive, voluntary, and compliant."

10. Evidence for this is perhaps found in studies like that of Gleditsch and Sverdrup (1995), which indicate that democracies are likely to mobilize against forces causing environmental degradation. Evidence is also found in studies of the international law of human rights.

11. I would like to thank Bill Kreml for alerting me to Lippmann's idea of the "good society."

12. The other eight are (Dahl 1998,45): avoiding tyranny; essential rights; general freedom; self determination; moral determination; moral autonomy; human development; protecting essential personal interests; political equality.

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