Who knows?
The Place of Local Knowledge in Global Environmental Governance

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ABSTRACT

The central issue facing human civilization at the end of the 20th century is governance: Who rules? Whose rules? What rules? What kind of rules? At what level? In what form? Who decides? On what basis? Given these questions, the notion of global "management" has acquired increasing currency in some circles. This is especially true given that economic globalization seems to point toward a single world economy, in which the role of the sovereign state, "at the controls," is of decreasing relevance. Contrary to some expectations, however, globalization is not leading to integration. Rather, what we see is political fragmentation and the emergence of a multi-level and very diffuse system of governance, within which "local" knowledge becomes increasingly important to coordination within political "hierarchies" and among locales. I use the issue of environmental governance, in which these contrary trends are evident, to illustrate this proposition and to discuss the nature and role of knowledge in this process.

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Even though there is desperate need for worldwide change, limited by the knowledge my place makes possible, I hesitate to legislate the law of other places.... To act in the world and make it better you have to be someone, be somewhere, tied to institutions, related to people. And be limited by that body, place, and time. You have to have a place, a home.[1]

One of the central issues facing human civilization at the end of the 20th century is governance: Who rules? Whose rules? What rules? What kind of rules? At what level? In what form? Who decides? On what basis? Given these questions, the notion of global "management" has acquired increasing currency in some circles. This is especially true given that economic globalization seems to point toward a single integrated world economy, in which the sovereign state, "at the controls," is apparently of decreasing relevance.[2] Contrary to some expectations, however, economic integration is not leading to political integration. Rather, what we see is political fragmentation and the emergence of a multi-level and very diffuse system of governance, within which "local" knowledge and rule is becoming increasingly important to coordination within political "hierarchies" and amongst locales. The issue of environmental protection and restoration, in which these contrary trends are evident, illustrates this proposition.

Governance is about the creation of institutions where they do not already exist, or their transformation where they do, and institutions are about rules and rule, as Nicholas Onuf might put it.[3] My hunch--and it is not much more than that at this time--is that the practices of global civil society--the subject of the book from which this paper is taken--are more about the creation or transformation of systems of rule and rules than about the reform, per se, of big institutions and structures. If this is so, the policy implications are rather different from what scholars of international relations and regimes have been telling us for some time. Does this presage the spread of small-scale, potentially democratic poli? I am skeptical of this. Does it suggest a diffusion of power, authority and legitimacy beyond what we have already seen in many parts of the world? Probably. Does order or chaos follow? Good question.

In this paper, I look at the relationship between local knowledge and governance,[4] inasmuch as I believe it is central to our future, and not only in environmental terms. I begin with a discussion of the by now much-noted phenomenon mentioned above-- economic integration accompanied by political fragmentation--and its political and social implications. This might not seem relevant to the question of environmental governance, but I believe that it is central. If, indeed, as I will argue below, there is a causal, or even dialectical, relation between the two processes, governance becomes a quite different proposition than "management."[5] I assert, moreover, that such governance is likely to rest with civil society, both local and global. Next, I consider what global civil society can and cannot do where Nature and environment are concerned: It cannot--in the near-term, at least--change the big structures or systems that drive much of the environmental destruction and degradation of which we are so aware. At the same time, however, agency and action are not impossible, which means that alternatives are not foreclosed. I then consider a central question implied by this analysis: Where must people act, and under what conditions, in order to begin a process of changing practices on a larger scale? Here I consider the ways in which the menu of possibilities in any given place is constrained by those big structures, but not fully determined by them. To paraphrase others: Women and men can make history, so long as they are aware of the conditions established by those who have come before. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of governance, and the problem of, as one author has put it, "coordination without hierarchy" and why there are likely to be many worlds in our future, rather than just one.

I. W(h)ither the Global Polity: Growing Together or Coming Apart?

Back in 1990--in what now seems like ancient times--the Public Broadcasting System televised a mini-series entitled "After the Warming." With James Burke as writer/ commentator/ guide, the program provided graphic illustrations of an imagined future in 2050, looking back upon a chaotic past disrupted by global warming. The impacts were, of course, widespread and horrific: How else to illustrate the premise of the show? But the proferred solution was somewhat hubristic: A "Planetary Management Authority" run, "of course" (as Burke put it), by Japan. The PMA--housed in a futuristic building that, even today, looks garish and

anachronistic--would consist of a formidable system of computers and sensing devices that, utilizing a complex climatic model, could assess the impacts on global climate of human activities all over the planet. As necessary, the PMA would then issue appropriate directives to mitigate or ameliorate the climatic consequences: A global panopticon, in other words (but within a prison in which the inmates would be free to run riot); not a *World State* but a *World Manager*, with complete authority and power.

Such a centralized management system is quite improbable. It flies in the face not only of logic but also a contemporary global politics that is characterized as much by fragmentation within existing polities as global economic integration among them. Indeed, it is probable that the two processes are intimately related to each other, a point to which I will return shortly. If this is the case, it suggests that the "global management" problem will be even more difficult than has been so far imagined, inasmuch as the number of sovereign or "semi-sovereign" entities participating in world politics could well increase over the coming decades from the fewer than 200 we now have to many more. That is not the only complication: Many of these entities may not even exercise effective political control over their own juridical territories, much as is presently the case in various "failed" states and ethnic wars around the world.[6]

Why are economic integration and political fragmentation linked? Global economic integration is a condition whose origins are to be found in the mid-19th century, with the Industrial Revolution, the rise of English liberalism and the institutionalization of free trade as propogated by the Manchester School. With fits, starts and retreats, such integration has reached into more and more places in the world, creating myriad webs of material linkages. The fact that such integration has become so widespread does not, of course, mean that all places in the world share in the resulting benefits. It is uneven development that makes capitalism so dynamic and the constant search for new combinations of factors that drives innovation; the fact that there are multiple economic "systems" present in any one location simply adds to the dynamism of that process.[7] Today's comparative advantage may, consequently, be tomorrow's competitive drag.[8]

The political implications of such a process have not been given much serious thought. Comparative advantage is no longer a feature of states as a whole--which it has never really been, in any event--but of region and locale, where the combination of material, technological and intellectual is, perhaps only momentarily, fortuitous.[9] The specific advantages of a place such as Silicon Valley--in many ways, an historical accident as much as the result of deliberate policy[10]--may have only limited spillover in terms of the country as a whole. These conditions, moreover, seem not to be easily reproduced in the short term.[11] The competition among places to attract investment and jobs thus becomes more of a zero-sum game than a positive sum one, and this point is not lost, for example, on U.S. states and cities who have established foreign trade offices in various global cities and regularly send trade missions abroad, as well.[12]

Capital has its choice of locations in which to invest; cities, communities, places--and to a certain degree, labor--have a limited set of factors that can be flaunted to attract capital. As a recent article in the San Francisco Examiner, describing the activities of a consulting firm providing city and regional marketing programs for economic development put it, they resemble those "of an international arms dealer--selling weapons to one ruler and then making a pitch to the neighboring potentate based on the new threat. Part of the pitch for these [economic development] programs is that a region needs its own program to survive against the rival programs of other areas."[13] Such competition could become the cause of considerable political antagonism, against both the neighbors who win and the authorities who have contributed to these conditions of competitive struggle in the first place.[14]

How such antagonisms play themselves out is contextual and contingent, of course, and often depends on pre-existing social and political "fault lines" that fracture under the pressures of real, potential or imagined competition. In some places, these fault lines were intended to be administrative, but were drawn up in ethnic or national terms; in other places, the fault lines are linguistic, religious, clan-based, "tribal," or even vaguely cultural.[15] It goes without saying that those places in which people have fallen to killing each other have nothing to offer global capital--they have, quite literally, fallen "out of history"--but those places able to break away from the political grip of larger polities, as Slovenia escaped the competitive drag of Serbia, could find themselves well-placed to participate in the global economy.[16] Inevitably, this process of political fracturing and fragmentation will lead to a much more complex global system, which our modern concepts of state and power will hardly begin to describe.[17]

Some have suggested that we confront a "new mediaevalism"; others have proposed as organizing principles "heteronomy" or "heterarchy."[18] Ole Wæver writes, for instance, that

> For some four centuries, political space was organized through the principle of territorially defined units with exclusive rights inside, and a special kind of relations on the outside: International relations, foreign policy, without any superior authority. There is no longer one level that is clearly the most important to refer to but, rather, a set of overlapping authorities.[19]

What is important here is the concept of "authority," rather than "government" or "power." As John Ruggie points out, in a political system--even a relatively unsocialized one--who has "the right to act as a power" (or possesses authority) is at least as important as the capability of actors to force others to do their bidding.[20] In the emerging "heteronomy," authority will be fragmented among many centers, often on the basis of specific issues. In a way, this is a form of functionalism (really, functional differentiation), inasmuch as different authorities will deal with different problems. But, whereas older theories of functionalism envisioned political integration as the outcome of international functional coordination,[21] we are now beginning to see something quite different.

In the present instance, functionalism is a consequence of rapid innovation, of the generation of new scientific-technical and social knowledge(s) required to address different types of issues and problems.[22] Inasmuch as there is too much knowledge for any one actor, whether individual or collective, to assimilate, it becomes necessary to establish knowledge-based alliances and coalitions whose logic is only partly based on space or, for that matter, hierarchy. In other words, "local" knowledge becomes spatially-situated, while at least some aspects of "organizational" knowledge--how to put knowledge together and use it--is spaceless; combined together, the two become instrumental to technical and social innovation.[23]

Access to these new knowledges also leads to new forms and venues of authority, in that only those with access to them can act successfully. In some sense, the "management" function finds itself located at that level of social organization at which the appropriate combination of "local" and "global" knowledges come together, and this level is more likely to be local or regional than global. Or, as Richard Gordon puts it,

> Regions and networks...constitute interdependent poles within the new spatial mosaic of global innovation. Globalization in this context involves not the leavening impact of universal processes but, on the contrary, the calculated synthesis of cultural diversity in the form of differentiated regional innovation logics and capabilities.... The effectiveness of local resources and the ability to achieve genuine forms of cooperation with global networks must be developed from within the region itself....[24]

Such functionalist regionalization points back toward the political fragmentation discussed above: Lines must be drawn somewhere, whether by reference to Nature, power or innovation. From the perspective of political organization, these lines may be as "fictional" as those which currently separate one country, or one county, from another. Still, they are unlikely to be "illogical," inasmuch as they will probably map onto already-existing patterns of social and economic activity. Obviously, such a vision of the future raises serious questions about "who rules," "whose rules" and "which rules?" I will return to this point, below.

II. The Agency-Structure Question Redux

Where, in all of this emergent structure, is there a space for agency, for organized political action? At its core, the agenct-structure debate is more than just an obscure discussion among academics; it is really about the possibilities of political action in a world where, as John Agnew, a geographer, puts it: "[People] are located according to the demands of a spatially extensive division of labour, the global system of material production and distribution, and variable patterns of political authority and control."[25] This is not to say that people's lives are determined by those patterns; only that their choices must be made within the constraints imposed by those patterns (and the histories of the places where they are located). The image of the (usually) Great Man making history or, at least, making change, remains a potent one, yet it is the rare Great Man or Woman who is actually in a position to do so (short of pushing the button that would destroy both humanity and Nature). It is only in times of real, verifiable crisis that large-scale opportunities to engineer genuine ideational and material change make themselves felt. Even then, it is the courageous and, perhaps, foolhardy indivi-

dual who is willing to emply such opportunities. As Mikhail Gorbachev discovered, the best of intentions, sometimes, "cannot hold" the center together. And, sometimes, the "stickiness" of structures and the institutions that accompany these patterns can defy all efforts to change them, too.[26]

What and where, then, are the possibilities for action, if they are not to be found at the macrolevel? Historical structures help to put people in their place, but this does not mean that they are then left without choices. As John Walton says about this point,

> The constitution of local society...is far more than an imposition or small-scale reflection of the national state. On the contrary, it is the evolving product of multiple influences--the people, the economy, natural resource, intermediate levels of state authority, local accommodation to some broader designs, determined resistance to others and, perhaps above all, collective action founded on cultural meaning. Action takes place within social structures that forcibly shape experience, yet people live in local societies where particular customs, exigencies, and choices mediate structural constraints. On the ground people construct their lives in consciously meaningful ways that cannot be read from state-centered directives any more than they can be deduced from modes of economic production.[27]

Beyond this, I would argue, there are historical junctures at which the "menu of choices" expands, so to speak, offering alternative paths that might not, at other times, be available.[28] Agency is, thus, a matter of being aware of alternatives and helping to foster conditions under which meaningful choices can be made.

Crises occur, of course, at all different levels and spatial scales. The death throes of a formerly-stable community may hardly be noticed by those outside of it; indeed, a community's complete disappearance may hardly cause a ripple in the larger society. To those who are members of that community, however, the ripple is a tidal wave. But, to carry the metaphor a bit farther, such a wave washes away old mental constraints as well as old modes of production: What might have seemed anathema before is now a matter of necessity. Structures still matter, but less than they might have mattered at another time; choices about the future are now possible. As John Ruggie puts it, "Periods of fundamental political transition--of transformation--are characterized by a generalized loss of predictability and control among social actors. The reestablishment of an effective system of rule once again fixes parametric conditions."[29] Crises of one sort or another, at these scales, are not that uncommon; they are "deviations" from the structures of everyday life, as Braudel might have put it, had he been asked.

Environmental change often takes the form of such microlevel crises: When the trees or fish give out, when the air or water become unbearably polluted, when toxic wastes bubble up in back yards, the individuals living in a place, a community, are faced with the disruption of their accustomed way of life. To them, such a situation is a crisis; they must respond. The first--and sometimes the only--impulse is to attack those power-holders or institutions deemed responsible for the crisis; the second impulse is often to organize politically in order to seek redress or rectification; the third is to make sure the crisis does not happen again. Love Canal--whether it was a health hazard or not[30]--was notable not because it was a toxic waste dump but, rather, because it became the locus of political agency in the face of big and mostly immovable institutions and structures. Moreover, the lessons learned from Love Canal were transmitted, through a variety of means, to other individuals and communities facing similar circumstances. One local crisis crystallized a whole realm of innovative social and political action, a newly-emergent element of civil society.[31] This pattern has been, and is being, repeated in a myriad of places around the world, becoming globalized in the process.

Such agency should be distinguished from the form more common to contemporary or modernizing societies: Consumer preference, choice or autonomy--sometimes called "green consumerism" when it involves choosing "environmentally-friendly" products--which is not agency at all. Rather, it is a response to particular profit-seeking strategies pursued by capital. After all, the "green" consumer can only choose from what is offered on the supermarket shelf or in the catalogue printed on 40% "post-consumer" paper (but not, itself, recyclable), and many choices are, presumably, throttled in labs, boardrooms and accounting offices before they ever see the market. Beyond this, if a green product does not offer the desired rate of return, it is likely to be pulled from the shelf by its maker, thereby denying the consumer even that small choice. Choice then simply becomes a range of alternatives offered within a highly-structured set of constraints (the market).

Using the market, therefore, to influence or motivate behavior runs the risk of eliciting very different outcomes from those anticipated or hoped for; as was observed in the 1970s, when U.S. consumers chose to purchase more fuel-efficient automobiles as gasoline prices rose, they ended up driving farther than before, since the cost per mile of travel had dropped![32] It is not my intention to dismiss environmentally-driven consumer behavior as irrelevant; only to point out that it is subject to very real constraints imposed by others. And, although environmental protection mediated via markets can improve various types of environmental quality, these do not (and cannot) alter fundamental institutional structures and practices.[33] What, then, can do this?

III. Making Choices, Taking Action

History does count. Any social situation in which people, both individually and collectively, find themselves is a product of history, as Marx pointed out; to this, we might add, it is both the history of people and the history of places, made by people. To understand how one has arrived at a particular time and place, therefore, one has to know what has come before. In the language of economics, the present is a product of path dependency.[34] This history, in turn, says something about the menu of choices for the future available at any given time.[35] While such statements might seem self-evident, and perhaps even simplistic, they are neither: Most of our routine behaviors are the result of habit, of repetition, of unquestioned circumstances, of institutions and associated practices.[36] This is the environment within which we make ordinary choices; indeed, it is the realm of the rational actor, with exogenous preferences, so loved by microeconomists.[37] But, as I have suggested above, there are constraints on choices: Not all that might be imagined is necessarily possible.[38] As John Thompson has put it

> As constellations of social relations and reservoirs of natural resources, specific institutions form a relatively stable framework for action and interaction; they do not determine action but generate it, in the sense of establishing, loosely and tentatively, the parameters of permissible conduct.[39]

Sometimes, however, social constraints make what is a necessary choice very difficult, if not almost impossible. It is at this point that human agency becomes important, as the individual actor struggles to move away from habit-driven action, which simply reproduces the status quo.

Individual choice and action are not, however, sufficient to effect changes in the habit-driven behaviors characteristic of people in particular social and political contexts; as Norman Long points out:

> Effective agency...requires organizing capacities; it is not simply the result of possessing certain persuasive powers or forms of charisma.... [A]gency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors who become partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the "project" of some other person or persons.... It becomes essential, therefore, for social actors to win the struggles that take place over the attribution of specific social meanings to particular events, actions and ideas.[40]

These struggles over the "attribution of specific social meanings" are not about science or data or cost-benefit ratios or, indeed, about any of the things that are quantifiable; they are about ontologies and epistemologies of place, life and history, within which the methods and findings of science and economics are tools, or means, to an end.[41] Again, not all social meanings are available--the repertoire is limited by history, political economy and culture--but successful agency is possible when a context can be explained in terms of one or more of the meanings in the repertoire. What is central, therefore, to effective social action, is the ability to recognize the relationship between choices and meanings; indeed, such an ability is central to politics, inasmuch as the articulation of the relationship is essential for successfully "enrolling" people in a "project."[42]

It now becomes apparent how and why, at the international level, "projects" are so problematic. Consider the question of climate change, which is ordinarily described in terms of highly uncertain impacts that are difficult to quantify (e.g., a 2-3°C average rise in global temperature as a result of a doubling of CO_2 levels in the atmosphere). Implicit in these numbers is the notion that everyone will be affected to his or her detriment. Consequently, echoing Dr. Pangloss, the present--the status quo ante of the future--is the "best of possible worlds." The intended result of such an assumption is, as Deborah Stone points out, the creation of a "natural community"[43]--inhabitants of the Blue Planet, whether animal, vegetable or

mineral--with a shared interest. In this case, that interest is preventing or minimizing global environmental change (the actual result of global environmental change may be quite different from the implied outcome, of course, depending on who you are and where you live). This requires the construction of a shared, albeit artificial, history and culture around the process, which allows a group of actors to negotiate a "text" on which they can all agree. The text, in turn, tells a story with a specific social meaning.

Thus, for example, the parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, in the document's Preamble, "acknowledge that"

> [T]he global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions...[44]

As posed in the document, this is a story about a problem and the conditions deemed necessary, by the signatories, to its resolution. What is not told here--or, for that matter, anywhere in the convention itself--are the actual social meanings that the parties, and their societies, bring to the negotiations. These meanings can be read in the controversies that litter the growing literature and debates on the potential political, economic and social impacts of climage change.[45] Conversely, the collective social meaning embedded in the convention by the delegates may have little or no meaning to the members of the societies that must, ultimately, implement the terms of the document.[46] It is unlikely, therefore, that these individuals will "enroll" in this project. In other words, to be successfully implemented, the Framework Convention on Climate Change must have many different social meanings, each of which is context dependent, but each of which may be "essentially contested" by other parties to the convention.[47] Certainly, reports from the International Negotiating Committee meetings directed to prepare for the first Conference of the Parties in March, 1995 suggest that numerous different social meanings still stalk the meeting halls.[47]

To further illustrate this point, let us return to a question implied above: What is to be measured? If the numbers tell a story, which numbers tell which story? Who decides which numbers are "right?" And who is privileged to tell one story as opposed to another? This is, quite evidently, not just a matter of science or policy. Consider, for example, the problem of methane, which is a much more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide (by a factor of 21; CFCs are almost 6,000 times as potent as CO_2).[48] Methane concentrations in the atmosphere are increasing even more rapidly than carbon dioxide: Between 1965 and 1992, CO_2 concentrations grew by 11 percent, while methane concentrations increased by 25 percent.[49] Yet, if we look at the major sources of methane emissions--solid waste, coal mining, oil and gas production, wet rice agriculture, and livestock--we find that rice and cattle account for almost 60 percent. Moreover, as we might further expect, the bulk of methane emissions associated with rice production (93 percent) originates in Asia.[50] This raises the question of ranking one type of emissions source against another and, somehow, arriving at a shared valuation or metric of the different uses. But who is to say how wet rice cultivation is to be compared to oil and gas production? Is the metric to be expressed in dollars and cents? In caloric value? In terms of symbolic meanings?[51] My intention here is not to offer a way to parse this particular problem; indeed, I am not sure there is any way to quantitatively resolve the inherent conflicts in this all-too-real example. Rather, I mean to emphasize that the textual resolution will mostly depend on how the story is told, on whose social meaning is more compelling and able to garner more votes.[52]

In the midst of struggles over meaning, then, history counts not only in terms of explaining how one has arrived at a particular place, but also how convincing is the story to be told. This, in turn, has much to do with being able to make choices under constrained conditions, inasmuch as the ways in which a story is told will generate different projects and programs. Just to make this point entirely clear, consider the case of the Mattole River watershed, and the local efforts to re-establish the indigenous salmon run in that river.[53]

Several different stories could be told about this "bioregion." One has to do with the erosive effects of logging and ranching along the river's watershed, and the resulting obstructions to salmon seeking their spawning grounds.[54] A second has to do with depletion of the local fishery by sport and commercial fishers, who are engaged in what appears to be a Hardinesque "tragedy of the commons." Yet a third would suggest that the decline of the salmon is a result of a number of complex, interacting factors, and that responsibility cannot be placed on any one activity or group of actors but must, instead, be explained by Agnew's "spatially extensive division of

labour, the global system of material production and distribution, and variable patterns of political authority and control."[55] Each of these stories suggests different projects, with different outcomes, but the third, which is most inclusive, is also the most open-ended, inasmuch as it establishes no single blame and suggests a shared effort to address the causes.[56]

This, then, is the basis for the possibilities open to agency: The ability to place historically a given context--making strategic decisions about how that history is to be told--and understanding how the confluence of structures provides openings for different futures. Of course, no choices are final, although they can and do foreclose other choices, both in the present and in the future. And, I would argue, such choices may be best made at the most localized level at which they make practical and political sense, especially if we acknowledge that decisions made at the supra-local level cannot be very sensitive to local conditions and might, in fact, engender local resistance that undermines such decisions.[57] It is also clear from this argument that, somehow, localized agency becomes a necessary, abeit not a sufficient, element of environmental governance.[58] The key question, which I address in the following section, is whether it is possible to nurture a governance system that privileges local choice and, at the same time, takes into account global complexities, connections and justice.

IV. Who rules? Whose rules? From global environmental management to global environmental governance

In order to understand the relationship between locally-based civil society, knowledge and global governance, much can be learned by examining governance at the local level. In his study of the century-long struggle against Los Angeles by the residents of the Owens Valley in eastern California, John Walton argues that groups or social movements engaged in resistance to the state can, sometimes, find ways of allying with other parts of the state in the pursuit of certain goals. In the Owens Valley, an emergent environmental movement was able to draw on the expanding authority of the federal state, and the legitimation of various environmental strategies, to pressure the city to alter its patterns of water removal from the Valley.[59] To Walton, this suggests that the concept of the state--and, I would argue, governance--is too limited. The state is not restricted to discrete levels of governance, although administrative functions are; it is more than that. As Theda Skocpol points out:

> On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which official collectivities may pursue collective goals, realizing them more or less effectively given available state resources in relation to social settings. On the other hand, states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of organizations and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society.[60]

In other words, states and (in this instance) civil society interact dialectically, recreating and legitimating each other over and over. The state is engaged in government; civil society, in governance.[61]

What, then, do I mean by the term "governance?" According to James Rosenau

> Governance...is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview more ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants.... Governance is thus a system of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters.... [I]t is possible to conceive of governance without government--of regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority.[62]

Ernst-Otto Czempiel offers a somewhat more straightforward definition of governance as the "capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done."[63] Most of the contributors to the volume from which these quotes are taken hold the view that the state, and the state-system, are being eroded in a number of ways by the processes of globalization and the emergence of "powerful people." Their focus is, therefore, on the emergence of various transnational processes that have erosive effects on the power and authority of states (mostly powerful ones).

This particular focus overlooks, I suggest, the growth of institutions of governance at all levels of analysis, with concomittant implications for state and system.[64] Indeed, even though we recognize that there is no world government, as such, there is global governance. Subsumed within

this system of governance are both institutionalized regulatory arrangements--some of which we call "regimes"--and less formalized norms, rules and procedures that pattern behavior without the presence of written constitutions or material power.[65] This is not the state, as we commonly understand the term, but it is state-like, in Skocpol's second sense. Indeed, we can see emerging patterns of behavior in global politics very much like those described by Walton in the case of the Owens Valley: alliances between coalitions in global civil society and the international governance arrangements associated with the UN system.[66]

To further illuminate this argument, let us return, for a moment, to what scholars of international environmental policy and politics regard as the sine qua non of their research: The fact, as it is often put, that environmental degradation respects no borders. This feature automatically thrusts many environmental problems into the international realm where, we are reminded, there is no government and no way to regulate the activities of sovereign states. From this follows the need for international cooperation to internalize transboundary effects, a need that leads logically to the creation of international environmental regimes. Such regimes, it is often noted, are the creation of states, and scholars continue to argue about the conditions necessary for their establish and maintenance.[67] Whether they undermine the sovereignty of states or are, in themselves, a form of state-building is, as yet unclear[68]; what is less well-recognized or acknowledged is that some regimes are merely the "tip of the iceberg," so to speak, or they will be, if they reach fruition. Much of the implementation and regulation inherent in regimes such as the emerging one addressing climate change must, as I suggested above, take place at the regional and local levels, in the places where people live, not where their laws are made. If this climate regime is successful--whatever "success" means in such a context[69]--it will, for all practical purposes, function as a global institution of governance with elements at the local, regional, provincial, national, and international levels. It will, in effect, transfer some of the jurisdictional responsibilities of the state both upwards and downwards, enhancing political authority at the global as well as the local levels.

But the politics of this, and other, similar regimes, will make domestic politics simple, by comparison. Rather than two- or even three-level games,[70] what we see, and will see more of, are "n" level games, in which intermediate levels are squeezed or strong-armed by those above and below. This is commonly discussed in terms of coalitional strategies between grassroots social movement organizations and international institutions[71] but, in fact, these coalitions are much more complex, often link together multiple levels as well as multi-level actors and may also shift and change, as a situation demands.

Thus, for example, the campaign to "save the Amazon rainforest" includes indigenous groups, rubber tappers and, in some instances, garimpieros, regional research organizations, social movements in Brazilian cities, international environmental organizations based in the United States and Europe, industrialized country governments and international organizations. Arrayed somewhat in opposition to this coalition are the Brazilian government and military, organizations of ranchers and landowners, Brazilian state governments, other industrialized country governments and, in all likelihood, national and international corporate actors.[72] Each of these actors has, in one way or another, acquired a certain amount of "governance authority" within a poorly-specified political, economic and/or social realm. Each of these actors, at one time or another, finds it useful to ally with others, at other levels, so as to put pressure on yet other actors, at still other levels. The result might look more like a battlefield than a negotiation--and, indeed, violence is an all-too-real component of this particular campaign--but, while there is no definitive ruler, the process is not entirely without rules.

And what is the process, ultimately about? It involves negotiating over the terms of the story that will prove most compelling as a "project"--and whether than story is a local, regional, national or global one. Of course, such stories are never finalized; as Marianne Schmink and Charles Wood put it

> Ideological positions (and repositioning) such as these are not mere reflections of material interests. Nor are they static features of people/s consciousness. To the contrary, we treat ideologies as part of the arsenal of weapons the contestants actively forge and mobilize in the contest over boundaries and the content of accepted discourse. In the process, they alter the definitions of themselves and their understanding of the world around them. Social action therefore has a constitutive property. By this we mean that the preferences, interests, and ideas that define individuals--and that become the basis for collective action--are formed or constituted in the

> process of actions that engage participants in a dispute. From this perspective, people act not merely to meet preexisting ends but also to constitute themselves as persons and groups with particular and desired attributes. Because the interests that characterize different social groups are as much formed as they are revealed in the contests in which people are engaged, they are mutable and subject to continual redefinition.[73]

What, then, should we call such a process? Clearly, it is governance but not government (although it does contain elements of government); at the same time, it does not mark the end or disintegration of the state as an institutionalized form of politics (although it might, of course, mark the end of particular states).[74] And, while it does suggest the proliferation of all kinds of local political institutions, of varying power and authority, it does not mean that, inevitably, the world faces the "coming anarchy," as Robert Kaplan has put it. Governance is and will continue to be uneven, there will be both rule and rules, there will be "tame zones" and "wild zones," places where life is orderly and places where life is chaotic. In the latter, environmental governance will hardly be a priority; in the former, it will likely be important, if not central.[75] The role of "global civil society" in such situations is, therefore, the creation and legitimation of the institutions and practices of global and local environmental governance.

The role of global civil society in global environmental governance is best understood in comparison with that of civil society within states, especially democratic ones.[76] As I pointed out earlier, within many states, civil society and state are mutually constitutive. Each is necessary for the functioning of the other, and each serves to legitimate the other. At times, moreover, civil society fulfills a regulatory function in place of the state, as is the case with, for example, the medical and legal professional associations found within the United States as well as other countries.[77] These associations not only provide credentials to practitioners, through certification of practitioners' knowledge, they also provide a set of rules and norms that a practitioner must adhere to, at the risk of losing her or his license to practice. While these rules and norms have a moral quality to them--as, for example, in the Hippocratic Oath--there is clearly the element of self-interest about them, too. And this is true of most, if not all, of the associations of civil society. Not everyone observes all of the norms and rules to which they have subscribed all of the time, but the adherence rate is generally pretty good.[78] More to the point, the members of these associations internalize these rules and norms and follow them, whether the element of self-interest is evident or not.[79] Rules, in other words, take the place of explicit rule; governance replaces government; informal networks of coordination replace formal structures of command.

Such a system need not necessarily be a second-best one, either. There is reason to think that a governance system composed of collective actors at multiple levels, with overlapping authority, linked together through various kinds of networks, might be as functionally-efficient as a highly-centralized one.[80] Such a decentralized system of governance has a number of advantages over a real or imagined hierarchical counterpart. As Donald Chisholm points out

> [F]ormal systems often create a gap between the formal authority to make decisions and the capacity to make them, owing to a failure to recognize the necessity for a great deal of technical information for effective coordination. Ad hoc coordinating committees staffed by personnel with the requisite professional skills appear far more effective than permanent central coordinating committees run by professional coordinators.[81]

Chisholm goes on to argue that formal system work so long as appropriate information, necessary to the system's function and achievment of its goals, is available. The problem is that

> Strict reliance on formal channels compounds the problem [of trying to prevent public awareness of bureaucratic failure]: reliable information will not be supplied, and the failure will not be uncovered until it is too late to compensate for it. Informal channels, by their typically clandestine nature and foundation on reciprocity and mutual trust, provide appropriate means for surmounting problems associated with formal channels of communication.[82]

Compare this observation with Richard Gordon's discussion of the organizational logic of innovation:

> While strategic alliances involve agreements between autonomous firms, and are oriented towards strengthening the competitive

> position of the network and its members, inter-firm relations within the alliance itself tend to push beyond traditional market relations. Permanently contingent relationships mediated by strict organizational independence and market transactions--the arms-length exchange structure of traditional short-term linkages--are replaced by long-term relations intended to endure and which are mediated by highly personalized and detailed interaction.... Cooperative trust, shared norms and mutual advocacy overcome antagonistic independence and isolation.[83]

Relations such as those suggested in these two quotations develop when the costs of acquiring information through "normal" channels becomes too great; both bear a remarkable resemblance to transactions and economies oriented around kinship relations, in which "trust" and "membership" replace formal hierarchies and markets.[84] The phenomenon of "networking" also resembles the form of organization described above, a form that is characteristic of relations within global civil society. It is a form that best lends itself to cooperation without centralization, without "global management."

V. One Earth, Many Worlds

At the beginning of the Atomic Age, the World Federalists became notorious for arguing "One World or None." Forty years later, the Brundtland Commission observed, as though the question were not in doubt, "The Earth is one but the world is not."[85] From both perspectives, a world then divided among states--fewer than 80 in 1945; 165 in 1987 and, only ten years later, 185 and counting, as the energies of secession have been loosed--was doomed to endless squabbling, conflict, war and misery. The "one world" is no more forthcoming today than it was 50 years ago; it is not much more likely to have emerged 50 years hence, either. Indeed, a paradox--post-modern perhaps--emerges: One Earth, many worlds. Perhaps the problem is not that our political institutions are too small or not encompassing enough; perhaps they are too big. More than this, perhaps there is no logical or optimal size or number for them; rather, it all depends: It depends on the problem, it depends on culture, it depends on history and political economy, it depends on time and place. We cannot command that boundaries be drawn or redrawn on the basis of some sort of "objective" science or quantifiable indicators and expect it to be so: For human societies, even ecosystemic boundaries are no more "natural" than political ones. Indeed, if as growing numbers of observers suggest, human beings construct their landscapes, as well as Nature around them--and these are only some of the many social institutions that we inhabit--we can hardly say that there are any boundaries, or even limits to the numbers of possible "worlds," except, perhaps, those handed down to us or reconstructed by us. And even those boundaries, reified as they are, are constantly shifting, as we change our individual and collective identities, and as our identities are changed for us.

How, then, are we to proceed? I suspect that it is governance through social relations, rather than hierarchy or markets, in which shared norms, cooperation, trust and mutual obligation play central roles, that is most likely to protect Nature. Such governance seems increasingly characteristic of the emerging global political economy characterized by economic integration and political fragmentation. The fundamental units of governance are, in this system, defined by both function and social meanings, anchored to particular places, but linked globally through networks of knowledge-based relations. Coordination occurs because each unit plays a functional role where it is located, but also because the functional units share goals with other functional units. They also share a set of norms and epistemologies associated, in this instance, with what can be called "Ecology," a worldview that can be constrasted with the science of "ecology."[86] The localization of practice makes social difference acceptable; the globalization of knowledge makes shared goals practical; the boundaries are everywhere and the connections go everywhere.

In analytical as well as policy terms, this is not a very satisfying or parsimonious framework. It does not provide an entry for either easy explanation or manipulation. It relies on the possibly heroic assumption that people can and will help to create social choice mechanisms,[87] in their collective self-interest, that will also help to protect Nature. And, it is most decidedly not "international relations," as we conventionally understand them. Ultimately, the question "Who knows?" does not have a single answer; perhaps the best we can do is given by the following fragment from one of Ezra Pound's Cantos (LXXXI):

Learn of the green world what can be thy place.

Endnotes

1. Wade Sikorski, "Building Wilderness," pp. 24-43, in: Jane Bennett & William Chaloupka (eds.), In the Nature of Things--Language, Politics, and the Environment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 28.

2. The literature on this point is vast and growing, but see, for example, Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World--Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).

3. Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making--Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

4. The term "governance" is defined in detail later in this paper; suffice it here to say that it is about rule and rules.

5. Already, in a world of 185 states, the prospect of getting all to act together is problematic; how much more difficult will this be in a world of 200 or 500 states? See Bob Davis, "Global Paradox: Growth of Trade Binds Nations, but It Also can Spur Separatism," Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1994 (Western ed.), p. A1. Another report on the multiplication of nations is a report on the recent conference in the Hague of the "Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization; see Frank Viviano, "World's Wannabee Nations Sound Off," San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1995, p. A1.

6. A graphic, if sometimes inconsistent, description of such places can be found in Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76.

7. By this I mean that, in any one location, there are economic systems of local, regional, national, transnational and global extent. These are linked but not all of a single piece. Thus, for example, Silicon Valley is tightly integrated into the "global" economy, but some of its inhabitants are also participants in a service-based economy that, although coupled into global systems is largely directed toward meeting "local" demand. For further discussion of the notion of "multiple" economies, see Richard Gordon, "Internationalization, Multinationalization, Globalization: Contradictory World Economies and New Spatial Divisions of Labor," Santa Cruz, CA: Center for the Study of Global Transformations, Working Paper 94-10, August 1994. See also the quote from John Agnew, below.

8. See the letter, responding to a review in The New York Review of Books, Oct. 20, 1994, by Benjamin Friedman, of Paul Krugmann, Peddling Prosperity--Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York: Norton, 1994), which suggests that, like evolution, economic success may be highly contingent (Marshall E. Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel & Dan Rottenberg, "Technology's Lesson," New York Review of Books, Jan. 12, 1995, p. 53).

9. See, e.g., Heizi Noponen, Julie Graham & Ann R. Markusen, Trading Industries, Trading Regions--International Trade, American Industry, and Regional Economic Development (New York: Guilford, 1993).

10. The term for such historical contingency is "path dependency." See the discussion of this point in Krugman, Peddling Prosperity, ch. 9.

11. How intentional or fortuituous is, of course, the key question. Silicon Valley was hardly the product of chance; rather, it was the result of intentional mobilization of resources by the state in its pursuit of national security. The difficulty of maintaining such a development pole is illustrated by the relative collapse of the high tech center on Route 128 around Boston. Some of the difficulties facing policymakers who might like to replicate such mobilization are discussed in Beverly Crawford, "Hawks, Doves, But no Owls: International Economic Interdependence and the Construction of the New Security Dilemma," in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

12. Michael H. Shuman, "Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies," Foreign Policy 86 (Spring 1992):158-77; Michael Shuman, Towards a Global Village: International Community Development Initiatives (London & Boulder: Pluto Press, 1994).

Louis Trager, "All's fair in selling growth to cities," San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 22, 1995, p. C-1.

14. In California, for example, such antagonisms have led the Governor, Pete Wilson, to declare that "California is a proud and sovereign state, not a colony of the federal government." See Steven A. Capps, "Wilson sworn in with a blast at feds," San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 8, 1995, p. A-1.

15. Georgi M. Derlugian, "The Tale of Two Resorts--Abkhazia and Ajaria before and since the Soviet Collapse," Paper prepared for the project on "Redefining Global Security: Economic Integration and Liberalization, Eroding Sovereignty, and Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict," UC-Berkeley/UC-Santa Cruz, January 1995.

16. Clearly, individuals are deeply implicated in this process of "choosing paths." For a discussion of the agency-structure question relevant to this point, see below.

17. The point I am making here is not that "states" will disappear, but that power and legitimacy will become much more complex and problematic than they seem to have been for the past 50-100 years. Just to take an example from today's news (Feb. 2, 1995): The U.S. Federal Reserve Board has just raised its basic interest rate by 1/2 of a percentage point, in order to moderate domestic economic growth and thereby stifle incipient inflation. This move pleases investors and distresses producers. What are the impacts of this move on U.S. "power?" Or, as Bill Clinton is reputed to have said upon taking office, "you mean to tell me that the success of my [economic] program and my re-election hinges on the Federal Research and bunch of [expletive] bond traders?" Quoted in

Tom Hayden, "Orange County Could Use Some Role Models," San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1994, p. A23.

18. The best-known discussion of the "new mediaevalism" is to be found in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society--A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Pres, 1977), pp. 254-55, 264-76, 285-86, 291-94. The notion of "heteronomy" is found, among other places, in John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," World Politics 35, #2 (Jan. 1983), p. 274, n. 30. The term "heterarchy" comes from C. Bartlett & S. Ghoshal, "Managing Innovation in the Transnational Corporation," pp. 215-55, in: C.Y. Doz & G. Hedlund (eds.), Managing the Global Firm (London: Routledge, 1990), quoted in Gordon, "Internationalization...," p. 27.

19. Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in: Lipschutz, On Security, n. 61.

20. John G. Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," pp. 21-35, In: Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989). p. 28.

21. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1964).

22. The following paragraphs are based on Gordon, "Internationalization...." Gordon argues for the existence of three "logics" of world-economic organization: internationalization; multi-/transnationalization; and globalization. The last is "heterarchical" and non-market and, as he puts it, involves "valorization of localized techno-economic capabilities and socio-institutional frameworks... [with] mutual reciprocity between regional innovation systems and global networks" ("Concurrent Processes of World-Economic Integration: A Preliminary Typology," handout in colloquium, Nov. 30, 1994, UC-Santa Cruz). Gordon is, essentially, making arguments about the organization and flows of knowledges, and his typology maps rather neatly (I think) onto my descriptions of the global networks of civil society. In a way, I anticipated some of this in an earlier ISA paper that was never published, and which has not been incorporated into Learn of the Green World: "From Here to Eternity: Environmental Time Frames & National Decisionmaking." Paper prepared for a Panel on "De-nationalizing" the State: The Transformation of Political Space, Social Time, and National Sovereignty, Conference of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, BC, 19-23 March, 1991.

Judith Mayer has almost convinced me that organizational knowledge is also mostly contextual, inasmuch as successful organization aimed at solving a localized functional problem must be based on a solid understanding of local social relations. Personal communication, Jan. 26, 1995.

24. Gordon, "Internationalization...," pp. 46, 53.

25. John Agnew, "Representing Space--Space, scale and culture in social science," pp. 251-71, in: James Duncan & David Ley (eds.), Place/Culture/Representation (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 262.

26. James N. Rosenau, "Before cooperation: hegemons, regimes, and habit-driven actors in world politics," International Organization 40, #4 (Autumn 1986):849-94.

27. John Walton, Western Times and Water Wars--State, Culture, and Rebellion in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

28. "Path dependency," in other words, proceeds from specifiable choice points; the trick is to recognize such points when they present themselves. For a discussion of path dependency, see, Krugmann, Peddling Prosperity, ch. 9. This should not be confused with the chaos theory equivalent of the "butterfly's wings" creating hurricanes. This notion of a "menu of choices" is akin to the bricolage of Levi-Strauss, a concept only recently brought to my attention.

29. John Ruggie, "Structure and Transformation," p. 28.

30. See Charles T. Rubin, The Green Crusade--Rethinking the Roots of Environmentalism (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 219; and the discussion in Sherry Cable & Charles Cable, Environmental Problems Grassroots Solution--The Politics of Grassroots Environmental Conflict (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), pp. 75-84.

31. Andrew Szasz, Ecopopulism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

32. This point is briefly alluded to in Hans H. Landsberg (chairman), Energy--The Next Twenty Years (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), p. 133. It was certainly my experience: my 1971 Toyota Corolla got a now-picayune 30 miles to the gallon, but it only cost $15 to drive from Texas to New York. Even after gasoline prices doubled or tripled, dividing the cost of gasoline for the trip, divided three ways, was still not much more than $10.

33. See, e.g., Peter Passell, "For Utilities, New Clean-Air Plan," New York Times, Nov. 18, 1994 (nat'l ed.), p. C1, which describes a swap of carbon dioxide credits for sulfur dioxide allowances.

34. Krugman, Peddling Prosperity, ch. 9.

35. Such a menu is best-illustrated in a 1994 paper written by Maria Todarova for a project on ethnic conflict and global security directed by Beverly Crawford and me. In the paper, "Identity (Trans)Formation among Bulgarian Muslims," Todarova shows how the collapse of the communist regime in Bulgaria left an underdetermined situation in which these Muslims (not Turkish, but Bulgarian) have been presented with a choice of "identities," ranging from demands for economic improvement within Bulgaria to fusion with Turkey to conversion to Christianity to American patronage. Which will ultimately be chosen depends on the extent to which the agents of each choice are able to mobilize these people. The paper by Derlugian, cited above, makes similar points with respect to Abkhazia and Ajaria.

36. Rosenau, "Before cooperation," see also the discussion of institutions in Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Judith Mayer, "Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Property Rights, Constitutive Rules, and the Renegotiation of Resource Management Regimes, pp. 246-73, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca (eds.), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), which is based, in part, on Oran Young, Resource Regimes--Natural Resources and Social Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

37. For an illuminating critique of rational choice epistemologies, see Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988).

38. Norman Long, "From paradigm lost to paradigm regained? The case for an actor-oriented sociology of development," pp. 16-43, in: Norman Long & Ann Long (eds.), Battlefields of Knowledge--The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 24-25.

39. John Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 135. Emphasis in original.

40. Long, "From paradigm lost," pp. 23-24. My emphasis.

41. This point is elaborated in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Learn of the Green World, ch. 7, as well as in "Who are we? Why are we here? Political identity, ecological politics, and global change," Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 28-April 1, 1994, as well as chapter 7 of the book.

42. On this point, albeit in a different framing, see Stone, Policy Paradox, "Conclusion," esp. p. 309. It is also discussed with respect to the Presidency in Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power--An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 33-39.

43. Policy Paradox, p. 135.

44. International Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Geneva: UNEP/WMO Information Unit on Climate Change, n.d.), p. 2.

45. Compare, for example, Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy--New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991); Stephen H. Schneider, "The Changing Climate," pp. 25-36, in: Scientific American, Managing Planet Earth (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1990); Jeremy Leggett (ed.), Global Warming--The Greenpeace Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Ann Hawkins, "Contested Ground: International Environmentalism and Global Climate Change," pp. 221-45, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca (eds.), The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution (London: Zed/Third World Network, 1991); Joni Seager, Earth Follies: Coming to Feminist Terms with the Global Environmental Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1993).

Or, as T.H. Marshall once put it, "[W]e find that legislation, instead of being the decisive step that puts policy into immediate effect, acquires more and more the character of a declaration of policy that it is hoped to put into effect some day." Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 59.

47. A short, but unpublished, description of one such meeting can be found in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Is It Warm in Here or Is It Just Me? A Report on Global Climate Negotiations," available on request from the author.

48. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992-93 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 207.

49. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-95 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 366.

50. World Resources 1994-95, p. 364.

51. Lest these questions seem ridiculous, one major point of controversy in the climate negotiations has to do with the accounting for carbon emissions from marine bunker fuels: Who gets the debit? A similar dispute has arisen over joint implementation. Readers might also recall the dispute over the ranking of greenhouse gas producers published by the World Resources Institute in World Resources 1992-93, p. 208.

52. It is for this reason that recorded votes are rarely held in such negotiations; the ideal is consensus, which means that the contestation over social meaning occurs mostly in small, informal groups that meet in the hallways or over coffee. An American perspective on the entire voting process in such fora can be found in Michael Lind, "One Nation One Vote? That's Not Fair," New York Times, Nov. 23, 1994, (nat'l. ed.), p. A15.

53. This story is told in Learn of the Green World, ch. 4; see also California Executive Council on Biological Diversity, "Imperiled Salmon Inspire Citizens to Restore Mattole River Watershed," California Biodiversity News 1, #5 (Summer 1994):1, 4-5, 8.

54. See, e.g., William K. Stevens, "Dwindling Salmon Spur West to Save Rivers," New York Times, Nov. 15, 1994 (nat'l ed.), p. B7; Glen Martin, "Salmon Lose Struggle for Shasta River," San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 22, 1994, p. A1.

55. "Representing Space," p. 262.

56. Actually, this case is a subset of a larger one having to do with the overall condition of the watershed. One could also tell stories about various chemicals leaching into the water supply, clear-cutting, overgrazing, or zealous environmentalists. These, however, would largely foreclose more inclusive choices.

57. See Learn of the Green World, ch. 2, 7, and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Bioregional Politics and Local Organization in Policy Responses to Global Climate Change." In: David L. Feldman (ed.), Global Climate Change and Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1994).

58. This is, at the moment, the core of an argument against the revival of "states' rights." More to the point, just as there was great resistance in the American South to the implementation of civil rights for blacks during the 1960s, there is no reason to think that local governance will, by its very nature, necessarily be "environmentally-friendly." Pursuing this parallel further, however, it is difficult to imagine governments sending national troops into communities in order to enforce the letter of environmental law.

59. Western Times and Water Wars

60. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," pp. 3-37, in: Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol (eds.) , Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 20.

61. This is, essentially, that same view as that offered by Antonio Gramsci; see the discussion of this point below.

62. James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics," pp. 1-29, in: James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 4-5.

63. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Governance and Democratization," pp. 250-71, in: Rosenau & Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government, p. 250.

64. For one perspective on this phenomenon, see Janie Leatherman, Ron Pagnucco & Jackie Smith, "International Institutions and Transnational Social Movement Organizations: Transforming Sovereignty, Anarchy, and Global Governance," Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, August 1994, Working Paper 5:WP:3, esp. pp. 23-28.

65. This point is a heavily disputed one: To wit, is the international system so undersocialized as to make institutions only weakly-constraining on behavior, as Stephen Krasner might argue, or are the fetters of institutionalized practices sufficiently strong to modify behavior away from chaos and even anarchy, as Nicholas Onuf might put it? See: Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in: Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Onuf, World of Our Making.

66. A good illustration of this process can be found in Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics (Newbury Park: Sage, 1993).

67. Two of the best-known works addressing regimes and the conditions of creation and maintenance are: Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). More recent works on environmental regimes include: Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane & Marc A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth--Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko (eds.), Polar Politics--Creating International Environmental Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Oran R. Young, International Governance--Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses--Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

68. On this point, see Daniel Deudney, "Global Environmental Rescue and the Emergence of World Domestic Politics," pp. 280-305, in: Lipschutz & Conca, The State and Social Power, pp. 286-89; and Janice E. Thompson, "Explaining the regulation of transnational practices: a state-building approach," pp. 195-218, in: Rosenau & Czempiel, Governance Without Government.

69. For some thoughts on this matter, see Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Governance Systems," pp. 140-60, in: Young, International Governance; also Peter Sand, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

70. The notion of "two-level games" was originally developed by Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics--The Logic of Two Level Games," International Organization 42, #3 (Summer 1988):427-60; see also Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy--International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). A brief discussion of "three-level" games can be found in Leatherman, et. al., "International Institutions."

71. See Leatherman, et. al., "International Institutions."

72. Susanna B. Hecht & Alexander Cockburn, The Fate of the Forest--Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the Amazon (New York, HarperPerennial, 1990); Schmink & Wood, Contested Fronties; João Pacheco de Oliveira Filho, "Frontier Security and the New Indigenism: Nature and Origins of the Calha Norte Project," pp. 155-78, in: David Goodman & Anthony Hall (eds.), The Future of Amazonia--Destruction or Sustainable Development? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); David Cleary, "After the frontier: problems with political economy in the modern Brazilian Amazon," Journal of Latin American Studies 25, #2 (May, 1993):331-50; Susanna B. Hecht, "The logic of livestock and deforestation in Amazonia," BioScience 43, #10 (Nov. 1993): 687-96.

73. Schmink & Wood, Contested Frontiers, pp. 17-18. Or, as Charles Lipson says, in a somewhat different context, the outcomes of social negotiations "do not have fixed meanings or decontextualized significance. Rather, they are continually reproduced and redefined in the dispute process as the actors use or resist existing standardsCharles Lipson, Standing Guard--Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 32.

74. I have in mind here the notion that the negotiation of such stories--or the failure to renegotiate them--is, in a sense, behind the collapse of states such as Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the civil wars in places such as Rwanda and Chechnya. A detailed discussion of such stories and "story-telling" can be found in Derlugian, "The Tale of Two Resorts."

75. Actually, this raises an interesting question. If a system of global governance can tolerate the presence of non-territorialized political institutions not modelled on or subordinate to the state--for example, "tribes" and clans, as opposed to cities and counties--there is no reason why tribes and clans could not also be involved in environmental governance, as is already partly the case in many projects underway throughout the world. See also David D. Haddock, " Foreseeing Confiscation by the Sovereign: Lessons From the American West," pp. 129-46, in: Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill (eds.), The Political Economy of the American West (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).

76. As Brian Ford puts it, if we look at the "functional system of governance associated with the particular level of civil society in question, whether it be on a global or regional level...[it is important to recognize that] this system of govenance is a political formation that not only transcends both geographical borders and state jurisdictions, but as a matter of practice includes elements of the institutional machinery of various states." ("Trade, Transnational Civil Society and the Formation of Ethical Content in World and Regional Systems: Transcending the Posted Borders of the Modern System," Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, New York, 1-4 Sept., 1994, p. 1.

77. Personal communication from Robert Meister.

78. Which is why we are so shocked when the rules of such professions are violated in a major way. Such associations provide a setting in which social constraints operate more strongly than in society at large. To violate the rules is to violate a trust and this could lead to one being thrown out into the cold, cruel world.

79. Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 120-121, 137-40, 146.

80. Much of the following discussion is based on Donald Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy--Informal Structures in Multiorganizational Systems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

81. Coordination Without Hierarchy, p. 11.

82. Coordination Without Hierarchy, p. 32. My emphasis.

83. Gordon, "Internationalization...," pp. 30-31. First emphasis in original; second emphasis mine.

84. Another example of this phenomenon is the wholesale diamond trade in New York, Antwerp and Israel, which historically has been based on trust in one's ethnic or religious "kin." See, e.g., Mats Alvesson & Lars Lindkvist, "Transaction Costs, Clans and Corporate Culture," Journal of Management Studies 30, #3 (May 1993):427-52; William G. Ouchi, "Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans," Administrative Science Quarterly 25 (March 1980):129-41.

85. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 28.

86. See Wolfgant Sachs, "Environment," pp. 26-37, in: Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Directory (London: Zed Books, 1992), and Learn of the Green World, ch. 3.

87. The term comes from John S. Dryzek, Rational Ecology--Environment and Political Economy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).