| dc.contributor.author |
Janssen, Marco A. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Lindahl, Therese |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Murphy, James J. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2016-10-04T15:24:10Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2016-10-04T15:24:10Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2015 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10133 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Experiments have made important contributions to our understanding of human behavior, including behavior relevant for understanding social-ecological systems. When there is a conflict between individual and group interests in social-ecological systems, social dilemmas occur. From the many types of social-dilemma formulations that are used to study collective action, common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas are most relevant for social-ecological systems. Experimental studies of both common-pool resource and public-good dilemmas have shown that many predictions based on the conventional theory of collective action, which assumes rational, self-interested behavior, do not hold. More cooperation occurs than predicted, 'cheap talk' increases cooperation, and participants are willing to invest in sanctioning free riders. Experiments have also demonstrated a diversity of motivations, which affect individual decisions about cooperation and sanctioning." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
experimental economics |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
social-ecological systems |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Advancing the Understanding of Behavior in Social-Ecological Systems: Results from Lab and Field Experiments |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Experimental |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Ecology and Society |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
20 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationnumber |
4 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationmonth |
December |
en_US |