| dc.contributor.author |
Krutilla, Kerry |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Alexeev, Alexander |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2016-10-11T18:52:37Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2016-10-11T18:52:37Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2016 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/10139 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This article formulates a stylized model to measure the welfare costs of political conflict over environmental rights disputes. The parameters in the model represent the economic value of policy proposals, and structural characteristics of the political decision-making process, such as its noisiness and responsiveness to lobbying actions. Also included is a parameter for the degree to which environmental rents are visible to non-polluting stakeholders, and the main policy parameter – the share of environmental rents captured by the government sector. The welfare cost measures are used to demarcate a boundary for the economically efficient public governance of environmental resources." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
environmental policy |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Environmental Rights Conflicts and Institutional Choice: An Economic Evaluation of Environmental Policymaking |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
General & Multiple Resources |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Ostrom Symposium on Natural Resource Governance |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
October 7-8 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Ostrom Workshop, Indiana University |
en_US |