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Abstract:
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"In this paper, I argue that there are also intrinsic reasons to value the distribution
of power involved in a common property regime. That is, I claim that when
users govern a resource themselves, and do so on terms of equality, this is not just
valuable because it leads to good outcomes. The value of this distribution of power
is also intrinsic, meaning that it is partially independent of the outcomes it generates.
To make this claim, I will draw on political philosophical debates on the value
of democracy. Philosophers debate whether we can account for that value instrumentally
or whether the equal distribution of power in a democracy is intrinsically
valuable as well. This paper will take a stance on that debate, and argue that any
distribution of power needs to be judged on both its intrinsic and its instrumental
merits. This is also the case, then, for common property regimes."
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