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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Sikor, Thomas; Dorondel, Stefan |
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Conference:
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Workshop on the Workshop 4 |
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Location:
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Indiana University Bloomington |
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Conf. Date:
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June 3-6, 2009 |
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Date:
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2009 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1128
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Sector:
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Forestry |
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Region:
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Europe |
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Subject(s):
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forest dwellers
forestry
state and local governance
political economy
game theory
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Abstract:
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"This chapter examines the reasons for new forest owners' frustrations in Dragomiresti and Dragova. How were Rudari able to exploit forests in Dragomiresti even though villagers held titles to the forest, and although there were forest guards and policemen in place to protect private ownership? What allowed the logging firm to take advantage of new owners in Dragova even though the mayor and Forest Inspectorate had the mandate to enforce regulations on its operations? Searching for answers to these questions we come to look at the predatory practices of policemen, forest guards and mayors, as they targeted new owners as easy prey. We also examine their efforts to develop relations of patronage with owners and other villagers. Our account thereby uses insights from earlier research on patron-client relationships. The concept may have dropped out of favor in the more recent literature, but we find certain insights from the literature on patron-client relationships very useful for making sense of forest dynamics in Dragomiresti and Dragova. The insights include the observation that relationships between patrons and clients develop on the basis of unequal power relations. They tend to involve exchanges of economic and political resources, generating benefits for all involved parties even if only nominal in some cases. Moreover, patronage relations are intimately interwoven with the role of the state. Our interest in forest property thus makes us connect with another debate about the nature of the Romanian state, in particular the notion that powerful actors 'capture' the local state.
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