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Abstract:
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"In times of resource scarcity, the management system should be able to cope by renewing the governing management system, thus enabling it to respond and reorganise it when changes in the ecosystem occur. Given the complexity of fish resources, a proper level of function is sustained when the management system is allowed to develop and renew itself. Thus, for successful resource management, ecological resilience must be combined with institutional resilience.
"The fishing of vendace (Coregonus albula ) in the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia provides a good example of this type of problem. The roe from the fish, known as bleak-roe, is of high commercial value and bleak- roe fishing is characterised by its multi-stakeholder quality. There are a number of different authorities involved in managing and regulating it; and both commercial and recreational fishers utilise the resource during the fishing season. Catches have decreased considerably since 1991 and both fishers and official authorities are worried that the fishery is now on a downward spiral. The resource system seems to have all the features that characterise a so- called 'common-pool resource dilemma.' Short-term individual rationality lead to an outcome that is not rational for the fishers as a group. In addition, the centralised management system seems unable to change even when ecological circumstances obviously call for this. The present situation is such that the ecological resource is on a 'downward spiral' while the management system is still acting as if there were plenty of fish to be caught. Without changing the management system (characterized by state regulation), there is an obvious risk that bleak-roe fishing is doomed.
"Our understanding of common pool resources (CPR) and the institutions that govern their use comes from a number of case studies of resource management. These show how institutional arrangements and the incentives they generate can be successful in the development of sustainable management practices for CPRs; people in these resource systems put their collective interests above their short-term individual interest. With reference to bleak-roe fishing in the Swedish County of Norrbotten, the paper discusses how these experiences correspond with concepts of resilience in management systems.
"The result of this analysis is that principles of institutional design correspond very well with resilience theory. In the paper is argued that in general a small and well-defined local management system, which avoid free-rider problems, is better able to receive and respond to signals from the ecosystem. With recourse to 'short' implementation structures, bottom-up processes for the construction of rules, and fishers own monitoring of the resource system, the incentive to follow rules will most likely be higher. If incentives to follow rules are high, it will also be easier to adjust rules when disturbances in the ecosystem occur, thus enhancing resilience in the management system. However, these may not be sufficient to solve the bleak-roe problem. To function effectively in a complex and large-scale society, the bleak-roe system must also have a wider institutional support. It is no longer enough for fishers simply to know how to operate a boat and catch fish. The fishers need to be actively involved in managing and conserving the resource. A possible way to implement such co-operation is through co-management, which is envisaged as a successful alternative to the centralised and bureaucratic governmental management that is driving the present bleak-roe fishery to extinction."
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