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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Youhong, Chen |
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Conference:
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Workshop on the Workshop 4 |
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Location:
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Indiana University Bloomington |
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Conf. Date:
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June 3-6, 2009 |
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Date:
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2009 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1549
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Sector:
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Social Organization |
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Region:
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East Asia |
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Subject(s):
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self-governance
common pool resources
self-organization
collective action
ownership
housing
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Abstract:
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"Given the governance problem posed by CPR, and facing the challenge of institutional obstacles to self-organization, condominium owners chose to create innovations to the traditional pattern of governance. In this paper, in accordance with the theoretical method of Elinor Ostrom's principles of institutional design, two typical cases: Homeowner Representative Assembly System and Trusteeship of Property Management System are compared, analyzed and evaluated. The inquiry derives the institutional incentive conditions for collective action by the specified groups and the requirements of common interest ownership without outside authorities or coercive force. It is shown that homeowner groups can solve the problem of supplying new institutions in ways that go beyond the assumptions of traditional theories of the collective action problem."
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