Two-Agent Model for the Arcto-Norwegian Cod

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1595
PDF
Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
Conference:	Reinventing the Commons, the Fifth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location:	Bodoe, Norway
Conf. Date:	May 24-28, 1995
Date:	1995
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1595
Sector:	Fisheries
Region:	Europe
Subject(s):	IASC common pool resources fisheries fishing gear cod
Abstract:	"A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate a possible social loss from a non-unified management These two agents are identified as a trawl fishery versus a coastal fishery. When only the trawl or coastal fishery exploits the resource, the well-known sole-ownership regime results. On the other hand, when both fisheries harvest the cod, we are more likely to end up with a non-cooperative game. Standard economic theory predicts that, cet. par., the sole ownership regime should give the optimal solution whereas non-cooperative exploitation will generally entail inefficiencies. However, due to the differences in fishing gear and grounds, the question of which case gives the optimal solution is not obvious. Using a non-cooperative game framework, we show that SIN en current Norwegian prices and costs, the highest social benefit is achieved when only the trawl fishery exploits the resource. This conclusion is, however, rather sensitive to perturbations in costs and prices."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
A_Two-Agent_Model_for_the_Arcto-Norwegian_Cod.pdf	1.075Mb	PDF	View/Open