Sharing, Heterogeneity, and Status Considerations: Incentive Theory and Empirical Evidences

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/171
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Gaspart, Frédéric; Seki, Erika
Conference:	Constituting the Commons: Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium, the Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location:	Bloomington, Indiana, USA
Conf. Date:	May 31-June 4
Date:	2000
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/171
Sector:	Fisheries Social Organization
Region:	East Asia
Subject(s):	IASC common pool resources fisheries social organization competition income distribution incentives--theory heterogeneity CBRM
Abstract:	"We study whether a linear income sharing rule (pooling system) can achieve Pareto efficiency in a problem of joint exploitation of fishery resources. When agents are selfish, the homogeneity of individual outputs in equilibrium is a necessary condition for the efficient pooling system. When agents exhibit a preference for status (i.e. for being among the well-performing members of the group), the pooling system can be efficient even without this condition. This is because, on the one hand, relative status considerations enlarge the tolerable range of heterogeneity and, on the other hand, it generates an incentive structure that may homogenise individual output performances."

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