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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Sengupta, Nirmal |
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Conference:
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Designing Sustainability on the Commons, the First Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property |
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Location:
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Durham, NC |
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Conf. Date:
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September 27-30, 1990 |
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Date:
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1990 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/1721
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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game theory
sustainability--models
IASC
prisoner's dilemma
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Abstract:
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"Current investigations in the Prisoner's Dilemma kind of choice situations show that very often co-operation emerges as the rational decision of individuals if the pay-offs are iterative (supergame). Sustainability of resource use can be represented by iterative formulation of pay-offs. By such a formulation it can be shown that sustainable resource use is closely related with participation and co-operation of beneficiaries. Such a notion, though exists at present, is based on ethical or politico-economic justification. The advantage of the Game formulation is that a detailed analysis of why and how co-operation occurs may be investigated and may be related to designs and policies. It may help in containing the idealist view that peoples' participation is the remedy of all evils. Examples will be drawn from the case of water resources."
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