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Abstract:
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From Introduction:
"The starting point for this paper is a general observation of the replacement of common property by private property rights to resources. This seems to be valid both as a generalisation throughout history, as well as a description of processes taking place in many developing countries today. This conference will surely present a number of examples of successful management of resources held in common. My purpose is not to question these studies, indeed this paper should be complementary as it explores the forces that could lead to the weakening or disappearance of common property regimes.
"A general proposition on the emergence of private property rights (EPPR) raises a number of relevant research questions:
1.To what extent is this proposition universally valid?
2. What are the forces behind such a development?
3. What are the effects on particularly economic efficiency (growth) and equity?
4. How can governments influence this development, either to limit, redirect, or promote and facilitate it depending on the desirability of such a development?
"This paper will mainly address the second question, but touch upon the three others, particularly the forth one in relation to the case study. The first question relates to a more fundamental one: Is common property just a temporary stage in a more or less natural and optimizing evolution towards private property rights over natural resources? If yes, trying to preserve common property regimes may have negative consequences on both the productivity and the environment, as argued by Ault and Rutman (1979) in the context of land rights in Africa. While this paper does not pursue the question on the universal validity of the EPPR hypothesis, our tentative answer would be a conditional yes for resources where exclusion is possible (i.e., has relative low costs). For resources with high exclusion costs, it may not be the case."
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