| dc.description.abstract |
"My purpose with this paper is to show a historical case study of management of commons and their surviving and transformation through the Liberal Revolution (18th- 19th centuries).
"The paper will be divided in three parts. First, I will characterize the commons of the region and their management from 15th to 18th centuries. I will try to fit in with the set of questions published by De Moor, Shaw- Taylor & Warde (The management of common land in north west Europe, c.1500-1850, Turnhout, 2002: 23-30): outline of the resources (topography, environments and agrarian economy of the region), identity and rights of users (commoners), and finally institutions that connected both resources and users. Secondly, I will describe the push for the dissolution of the commons in this region in the 19th century. This episode, part of a wider movement covering Europe and America (Vid. M.D.Demelas & N.Vivier, eds.: Les proprietas collectives face aux attaques liberals, 1750-1914, Rennes, 2003), had some regional peculiarities. It began with the collapse of the Hispanic State in 1808, and it was generalized by the Desamortizacion Law in 1855. Thirdly, I will examine some distinctive features that are out of place with the known scheme of the triumph of the complete and perfect concept of (private) property. I will argue that these features are not residual and irrelevant. On the contrary, I will defend that these 'anomalies' express the complex nature of the social change that happened between 1790 and 1900. Moreover, I will defend that these facts reveal the adaptability of community bonds despite their supposed decline.
"In short, we have here an example of the strength of common property and the adaptability of community bonds to changing circumstances. This was possible because the agents (users, owners, State, residents, etc) changed (or tried to do it) the institutions and rules when the historical circumstances resulted in new contexts, where their relative positions were altered. Commons have survived because some agents have found utility in them and could defend it, changing the rules if it was necessary." |
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