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Abstract:
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"Studies of cooperation typically find that enforcement is necessary when parties have an interest in defecting. That presents a serious problem for international relations because truly solving many international problems would require demanding agreements that are prone to defection. Yet the mechanisms for enforcing international agreements are typically weak. This article considers three topics in international environmental politics that are related to that problem. First, if enforcement mechanisms are poor, why does the record of compliance with international environmental agreements show that compliance is high? Second, in the few cases where compliance has not been perfect, what has been learned about the effectiveness of mechanisms for enforcement? Third, what does the historical experience with international environmental agreements imply for the creation of an effective regime to limit the effects of global warming? The discussion is based mainly on evidence developed in a large-scale research project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and a new project on global warming and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)."
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