| dc.contributor.author |
Whitmeyer, Joseph |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T14:57:50Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T14:57:50Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1997 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-03-17 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2008-03-17 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3152 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Under conditions holding in most experimental and simulation studies of exchange networks, the CORE as derived by game theory yields a solution set of exchange outcomes more appropriate than the equilibrium generated by general equilibrium analysis (see Yamaguchi 1996). This is because general equilibrium analysis assumes a large number of actors for each position in the exchange system--essentially that a network and its actors are afloat in a market of like networks and actors. I suggest a derivation of the core for isolated (i.e., not in a market) strong power networks alternative to that offered by Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992). Since the core for isolated networks is large, power distributions in such networks are necessarily the consequence of both network structure and actor strategies." |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
networks--models |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Applying General Equilibrium Analysis & Game Theory to Exchange Networks |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Current Research in Social Psychology |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
2 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationnumber |
2 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationmonth |
July |
en_US |
| dc.submitter.email |
rshivakoti@yahoo.com |
en_US |