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Factor Rents, Sole Ownership, and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation

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Type: Journal Article
Author: Copes, Parzival
Journal: Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies
Volume: 40
Page(s):
Date: 1972
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/3234
Sector: Fisheries
Region:
Subject(s): fisheries
exploitation
Abstract: "In the literature of fisheries economics there is a noticeable preoccupation with the phenomenon of resource rent dissipation. The common property nature of most fishery resources-with the attendant free entry of labour and capital-gives rise to 'problems' of 'overfishing'. If at any given level of fishing effort the resource should yield a rent to the marginal operator, additional factor inputs of labour and capital will be attracted that will depress the catch per unit of effort and lower returns to all operators. This process will continue until the revenue per unit of fishing effort is reduced to the level of its marginal opportunity cost. Thus the rent attributable to the resource, that formerly accounted for the excess of revenue over marginal opportunity cost, is eliminated."

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