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PDF
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Type:
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Thesis or Dissertation |
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Author:
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Lund, Staffan |
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Date:
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2007 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3586
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Sector:
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Social Organization
Water Resource & Irrigation |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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institutions
property rights
natural resources
common pool resources
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Abstract:
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"The debate concerning how to manage common-property resources has for a long time been between state property and private property regimes. None of these has proven to be totally successful in managing common recourses. Studies regarding common-property regimes have started to focus more on the possibilities with communal property regimes. The expectation is that individuals that are directly concerned with the resource will have incentives to mange the resource in a sustainable way. To be able to superintend a resource in an effective way the rules that form the institutional arrangements are highly important. The rules must be adapted in a way that suits both the users' preferences and the resource ability to remain in a sustainable way.
"This essay presents a case study of a communal managed fishing lake. The conclusion of the study is that the rules first of all must be adapted in ways that make the users obey them. Secondly the rules must be analogous to the sustainability of the resource. Rules can be modified over time, but they are useless of no one obeys them.
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