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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
Author:
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Gibson, Clark C. |
Date:
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1994 |
Agency:
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Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
Series:
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Workshop Working Paper Series W94-17 |
URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3891
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Sector:
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Wildlife |
Region:
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Africa |
Subject(s):
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wildlife conservation institutions public administration Workshop
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Abstract:
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"In this paper, I examine Zambia's wildlife policy from 1983-1991 by focusing on the construction of ADMADE and LIRDP. I argue that the institutions of both programs can be explained by exploring the strategic choices of the program's designers, who confronted a set of political constraints and opportunities generated by the one-party state. Such an approach challenges those who view bureaucracies as apolitical institutions designed to produce collective goods. Rather than regard public agencies as solutions to collective action problems, I conceptualize bureaucracies as means by which political winners can impose their favored distributive outcomes on the rest of society. The design of public agencies cannot be separated out from politics; on the contrary, structural choices are central to explanations of government policy."
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