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Evolutionary Stability in Common Pool Resources

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Atzenhoffer, Jean-Philippe
Date: 2008
Agency:
Series: Document de Travail, no. 21
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/3980
Sector: Theory
Region:
Subject(s): common pool resources
evolution
game theory
Abstract: "The 'Tragedy of the Commons' refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is over-exploited. However, some empirical studies show that the over-utilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium."

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