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The Tragedy of the Commons

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dc.contributor.author Hardin, Garrett en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T15:15:06Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T15:15:06Z
dc.date.issued 1968 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-10-22 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-10-22 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4282
dc.description.abstract "Technology is not the answer to the population problem. Rather, what is needed is 'mutual coercion mutually agreed upon'--everyone voluntarily giving up the freedom to breed without limit. If we all have an equal right to many 'commons' provided by nature and by the activities of modern governments, then by breeding freely we behave as do herders sharing a common pasture. Each herder acts rationally by adding yet one more beast to his/her herd, because each gains all the profit from that addition, while bearing only a fraction of its costs in overgrazing, which are shared by all the users. The logic of the system compels all herders to increase their herds without limit, with the 'tragic,' i.e. 'inevitable,' 'inescapable' result: ruin the commons. Appealing to individual conscience to exercise restraint in the use of social-welfare or natural commons is likewise self-defeating: the conscientious will restrict use (reproduction), the heedless will continue using (reproducing), and gradually but inevitably the selfish will out-compete the responsible. Temperance can be best accomplished through administrative law, and a 'great challenge...is to invent the corrective feedbacks..to keep custodians honest.'" en_US
dc.subject common pool resources--theory en_US
dc.subject tragedy of the commons en_US
dc.subject core commons en_US
dc.title The Tragedy of the Commons en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.submitter.email efcastle@indiana.edu en_US


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