Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action

dc.contributor.author	Ahn, Toh-Kyeong
dc.contributor.author	Ostrom, Elinor
dc.contributor.author	Walker, James M.
dc.date.accessioned	2009-09-01T15:45:56Z
dc.date.available	2009-09-01T15:45:56Z
dc.date.issued	2003	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4697
dc.description.abstract	"In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capture motivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine two models of heterogeneous utility—linear-altruism and inequity-aversion—in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data from experiments and surveys. We find that the model of inequity-aversion accounts for a substantial proportion of the preference types and behavior that are not explained by the standard model of self-interested preferences. In contrast, the altruism model does not provide a significant increase in explanatory power over the inequity aversion model."	en_US
dc.language	English	en_US
dc.subject	collective action	en_US
dc.subject	social dilemmas	en_US
dc.subject	game theory	en_US
dc.subject	motivation	en_US
dc.subject	heterogeneity	en_US
dc.subject	altruism	en_US
dc.subject	equity	en_US
dc.subject	cooperation	en_US
dc.subject	modeling	en_US
dc.subject	Workshop	en_US
dc.title	Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action	en_US
dc.type	Working Paper	en_US
dc.type.methodology	Case Study	en_US
dc.subject.sector	Theory	en_US

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