Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4723
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Type:	Working Paper
Author:	Gardner, Roy
Date:	1987
Agency:
Series:	W87-19
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4723
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory voting social choice theory Workshop
Abstract:	"A voting game is a non-transferable utility (NTU) game with a simple game structure. When the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game is strictly positive, then the corresponding voting game has a strict NTU value. Moreover, the Shapley-Shubik index is the unique NTU value for a certain class of voting games. These results lead to a solution of the problem of a group choosing its leader."

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