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Power and Incentives: From Behavioral to Institutional Analysis

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dc.contributor.author Landry, Rejean
dc.contributor.author Sabetti, Filippo
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-11T20:18:12Z
dc.date.available 2009-09-11T20:18:12Z
dc.date.issued 1987 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4853
dc.description.abstract "The growth of collective and public choice theory in more recent times has led to a shift from studies of power and influence to studies of the structure of decision-making arrangements that affect the way power and influence are mobilized and exercised. Without denying the potential for some to exercise power over others within particular constitutional arrangements, the growth of public choice theory has extended consideration to many contexts in which, to paraphrase Mary Parker Follett (1951: 188-189), some citizens and officials have power with, rather than power over, others. This shift in orientation has led to a renewed appreciation of another concept whose roots are deep in our intellectual tradition and whose importance in the design, creation and maintenance of organizational arrangements may well outrank that of power." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject power en_US
dc.subject incentives en_US
dc.subject institutional analysis en_US
dc.title Power and Incentives: From Behavioral to Institutional Analysis en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Advances in Comparative Institutional Analysis en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates Oct., 1987 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia en_US


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