| dc.contributor.author |
Magrath, William B. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-11-30T19:22:10Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-11-30T19:22:10Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1989 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5232 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper examines the forces that determine the allocation of resources which are not subject to completely private ownership, nonexclusive resources. The paper develops the distinction between common property, in which collective action controls resources use, and open access where individual decision making prevails. It is shown that open access regimes are inefficient, but that, although potentially unstable, common property regimes can generate satisfactory outcomes. Policy management of nonexclusive resources are reviewed from both theoretical and resources perspectives." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Environment Department Working Paper, no. 14 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
resource management |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Challenge of the Commons: The Allocation of Nonexclusive Resources |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |