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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Schott, Stephan |
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Conference:
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Property Rights, Institutions, and Management of Environmental and Natural Resources, the Fourth Toulouse Conference on Environment and Resource Economics |
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Location:
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Toulouse, France |
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Conf. Date:
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May 3-4 |
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Date:
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2001 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5367
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
game theory
cooperation
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Abstract:
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"This paper introduces a management regime that would maintain common property rights by allowing resource users to harvest on their own but to share their extraction outcome with a given number of other resource users. The developed partnership approach makes use of the shirking
incentives in output sharing partnerships to counterbalance the incentive to supply excessive effort that prevails in noncooperative common property extraction. A first-best solution is derived and the
socially optimal partnership size and number of partnerships for a fixed number of harvesters is determined for different conjectural variations. The results provide a new interpretation of conjectural
variations in the supply of harvesting effort as it establishes some links to community boundaries, social capital and resource characteristics. The implication of community boundaries and authority systems as well as resource boundaries on proper sharing arrangements is explored in various applications of the partnership solution that can consist of randomly assigning resource users to teams after every
harvesting round, having the same team members for several rounds or joining community members in partnerships."
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