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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Meinhardt, Holger; Ostmann, Axel |
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Date:
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1999 |
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Agency:
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Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany |
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Series:
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Game Theory and Experimental Economics, no. 10 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5369
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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game theory
common pool resources--theory
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Abstract:
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Subsequently published as "Towards an Analysis of Cooperation and Fairness that Includes Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory". In A. Biel et al. (eds.): "New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas", ch. 14, p.230-251. New York: Springer, 2008.
-- "Usually common pool games are analysed without taking into account the cooperative features of the game even when communication and (non-binding) agreements are involved. Using the fact that the corresponding cooperative TU-common pool games are clear and convex, negotiators may agree on attractive solutions in the grand coalition. In symmetric situations the solution is trivial. Assuming asymmetry, especially the (in this case) single valued kernel has the appealing property to balance the losses/gains among the players. For an experimental test the data set reported by Hackett, Schlager and
Walker 1994 is reanalysed from a cooperative point of view. In order to represent to what extend the subjects obey efficiency and fairness we present the patterns of the corresponding excess vectors. Moreover it is analysed up to what degree intermediate coalitions can be content with the agreements realised."
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