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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Bhattacharya, Sudeepto |
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Date:
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2004 |
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Agency:
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Collaborative Research Center (CRC) of IFRI SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, Maharashtra, India |
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Series:
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Working Paper, no. 6-04 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5610
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Sector:
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Forestry
Social Organization
Theory |
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Region:
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Middle East & South Asia |
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
forest management
monitoring and sanctioning
village organization
cooperation--theory
heterogeneity
game theory
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Abstract:
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"The foregoing discussion interprets the community action to cooperate for conservation and management of CPR at Saigata, which they have now come to identify as 'my forest', as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, thereby reflecting individual choices in public goods interactions. It illustrates how cooperation among the members of the resource community can emerge in a population dominated by non-cooperators. Cooperation, however, fails to get a foothold if an individual or a scattered aggregate of cooperators attempts an interaction with the defectors. It can emerge and become established through interactions between a cluster of cooperating individuals using a nice strategy like the TFT and the unconditional defectors, provided these individuals have approximately 5% of their interactions with each other. Such an interaction results in an invasion of the entire environment by the cooperators, making cooperation to conserve CPR thrive at Saigata."
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