The Tragicomedy of the Commons: Why Communities Rationally Choose 'Inefficient' Allocations of Shared Resources

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5665
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Type:	Working Paper
Author:	Roberts, Russell D.
Date:	1990
Agency:	School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO
Series:	Political Economy Working Papers, no. 140
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5665
Sector:	Theory Water Resource & Irrigation
Region:
Subject(s):	common pool resources--models community water management
Abstract:	"Open access to a shared resource, or 'commons,' leads to usage beyond the efficient level. There are essentially two ways for a community to manage a commons to avoid overusage: • Charge an entry fee that is sufficiently high to restrict usage to the efficient level • Distribute an efficient number of entry rights entitling owners to use the commons. Either of these methods increases wealth. How will this wealth be distributed? If the first method is used, the community must decide how to distribute the revenue from the entry fee. If the second method is used, the community must decide how to distribute the entry rights."

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