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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Bates, Robert; Brady, David |
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Conference:
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Conference on the Theory of Democratic Institutions |
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Location:
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Taipei, Taiwan |
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Conf. Date:
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January 4-7 |
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Date:
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1992 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5687
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Sector:
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Agriculture
Social Organization |
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Region:
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East Asia |
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Subject(s):
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agriculture
democracy
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Abstract:
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"This paper examines the relationship between interest groups and
electoral/party systems. We argue that interest group behavior is sophisticated in that they shape their strategies in response to the political strategies of the politicians they seek to influence. In short, contrary to the dominant interpretation of interest group behavior, we argue that their behavior is endogenous. We analyze electoral reform in Japan and party reform in Korea to demonstrate the endogeneity of interest groups' strategy. The creation of a new party in Korea after the Democratic Justice Party's loss of the 13th National Assembly Election was, we show, in part, the result of the Chaebol's lobbying to create a stable one party dominant system. The proposed electoral reforms in Japan were defeated by agricultural interests in order to preserve their present status and the status quo in agricultural policy."
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