|
|
|
PDF
|
|
Type:
|
Working Paper |
|
Author:
|
Winer, Stanley L.; Hettich, Walter |
|
Date:
|
1993 |
|
Agency:
|
School of Public Administration, Ottawa, Canada |
|
Series:
|
Working Paper Series |
|
URI:
|
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5762
|
|
Sector:
|
Social Organization |
|
Region:
|
|
|
Subject(s):
|
taxation--theory
|
|
Abstract:
|
"The paper formulates a normative theory of taxation that incorporates both economic structure and political institutions as essential elements. Such a theory has interesting parallels to optimal taxation,
including large information requirements. We discuss solutions to the information problem in a competitive political economy. The answer appears to lie in a decentralized information gathering and policy process rather than in the development of simplified guidelines for central planners. The paper proposes a framework to examine the effects of decentralized decision making, imperfect political competition and political institutions on tax policy outcomes."
|