Cooperation Versus Free-Riding in International Environmental Affairs: Two Approaches

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5792
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Type:	Working Paper
Author:	Tulkens, Henry
Date:	1998
Agency:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium
Series:	CORE Reprint, no. 1339
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5792
Sector:	Global Commons Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	pollution free riding game theory coalitions cooperation international relations
Abstract:	"This chapter is about a controversy regarding the feasibility, and as a consequence the likelihood, of cooperation among countries on issues of transfrontier pollution. I want to contrast two theses, a pessimistic one and an optimistic one. Both of them are based on concepts rooted in economic analysis, and both of them claim additional support from game theory. Nevertheless they reach opposing conclusions. It is thus a challenging task to try to disentangle the arguments used on each side, in order to see whether the two theses can be reconciled or are intrinsically antagonistic."

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