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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Starr, Harvey; McGinnis, Michael D. |
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Conference:
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Colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis |
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Location:
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Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana |
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Conf. Date:
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September 14 |
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Date:
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1992 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5883
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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game theory
conflict
behavior--models
Workshop
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Abstract:
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"We focus on the decision problem of a government (or regime) facing
external and domestic threats to it s security. For simplicity, we treat this governmental actor as a unitary rational actor. We also assume that this government (which we denote as actor i) faces threats from a set of other unitary actors, comprised of other governments j-1,2,...,J and domestic organizations or groups k-1,2,...K. Since government i must fin d some way to balance the threats posed by these various actors, and since dealing with tradeoffs between desired ends is the very essence of rationality, a rational choice approach seems particularly appropriate for modeling a government's efforts to manage two-level security problems. We assume that government i is fundamentally concerned with minimizing the probability that it will lose a war with any government j or that it will be overthrown after a revolution instigated by domestic groups k."
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