dc.contributor.author | Ueda, Yoshifumi | |
dc.contributor.author | Wegener, Andraes | |
dc.contributor.author | Svendsen, Gert T. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-23T20:33:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-23T20:33:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6160 | |
dc.description.abstract | "With a view to applying to the problem of collective action for the global commons, we analyze a three-stage game model where public goods are provided by the costly leadership of a social entrepreneur for undertaking 'eco-goods' scheme. We derive (i) the conclusion that the social entrepreneur can finance more for the collective action under not-for-profit constraint than without the constraint, and (ii) the conditions under which he prefers the not-for-profit constraint on a rational basis. The main results are applied to some social experiments on the natural common-pools of a public-goods nature in the river-basins communities of Japan." | en_US |
dc.language | English | en_US |
dc.subject | commons | en_US |
dc.subject | collective action | en_US |
dc.subject | social behavior | en_US |
dc.subject | nonprofit sector | en_US |
dc.title | Private Financing of Public Goods by Means of 'Eco-Goods' Schemes: Social Entrepreneur and Not-For-Profit Enterprise | en_US |
dc.type | Working Paper | en_US |
dc.type.methodology | Case Study | en_US |
dc.subject.sector | Global Commons | en_US |
dc.subject.sector | Social Organization | en_US |
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Private Financi ... ns of Eco-Goods Scheme.pdf | 180.7Kb |
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