| dc.contributor.author |
Ueda, Yoshifumi |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-09-27T20:32:19Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-09-27T20:32:19Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1999 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6416 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Possibility of cooperation for sustainable use of the commons is investigated in an analytical setting of evolution game with two-stage constituent game. Players are rational individualists, but classified into long-fun type and myopic type in terms of the length of time-horizon. As the long-run type grows, the more cooperative use becomes possible. The long-run type has a payoff advantage over the myopic type, but the latter has to pay adaptation cost for transformation to the former. Possibility of cooperation depends on the relative magnitude among adaptation cost, relative payoff advantage, and physical environment factors." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
SYS Discussion Paper Series SYS-DP-1999-A-1 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
cooperation |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
sustainability |
en_US |
| dc.title |
The Evolution of Voluntary Cooperation in Sustainable Use of the Commons |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Game Theory |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Society for Social System Science, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |