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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy |
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Conference:
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Association of Environmental and Resource Economists' Session of the Annual Meetings of the Allied Social Science Association |
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Location:
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New York |
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Conf. Date:
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December 1989 |
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Date:
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1991 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/655
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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Workshop
common pool resources
game theory
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Abstract:
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Subsequently Published as:
Walker, James, and Roy Gardner 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence." Economic Journal 102(414):1149-1161.
"This paper uses a game theoretic model of a common pool resources to investigate whether the possibility of destroying the resource significantly affects choice behavior in the laboratory.
"When subgame perfection involves a significant probability of destruction, the common pool resource is in every case destroyed and in most cases, rather quickly. Even when there is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is completely safe and yields near optimal rents, subjects do not stabilize at this equilibrium. The consequence of this destruction is in every case a significant loss in efficiency."
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