| dc.contributor.author |
Kollmann, Andrea |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Schneider, Friedrich |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-01-24T21:19:57Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-01-24T21:19:57Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2010 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6878 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been
implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
public choice |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
sustainability |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
environmental policy |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
governance and politics |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
interest groups |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Journal Article |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationjournal |
Sustainability |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationvolume |
2 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationpages |
3710-3734 |
en_US |