|
Abstract:
|
"Since the work of Mancur Olson (1965) on collective action, the question remains on the conditions under which this is possible (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1988, Baland and Platteau 1996, Ruttan 1998, Ostrom et al. 2002, Agarwal 2002). Regarding the factors influencing group characteristics, group size and homogeneity of interest have been mentioned as important (see Agarwal 2002 but see also Becker and Ostrom 1995 and Ensminger 1992, Ensminger and Knight 1997). The case of the management of fish and wildlife in the Rufiji floodplain illustrates that as well as distance and locality in relation to markets chains, demand for cash and differences in demand for a specific CPR matter greatly regarding the way CPRs can be managed successfully through collective action. The comparison of CPR institutions in two different village settings in the Rufiji floodplain shows that these factors matter significantly. Studies have been done in two village settings by the author between 2002 and 2004 of which one was further away in the floodplain close to the Selous Game Reserve and to the wildlife trade routes, while the other village was close to the market centre Ikwiriri, located on the main road connecting Mozambique with the capital of Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam. In this location the demand for fish and timber is high. Both settings differ considerably in the management of the CPRs. While the village setting further away from the market centre is able to act collectively in order to manage floodplain- related lakes for a sustainable fishery by reintroducing traditional conservation methods and collective fishing institutions, the other village close to the market place fails to do so as the village is composed of various ethnic groups with varying interest in CPRs. But at the same time, successful collective action in the first village is not possible regarding wildlife management as the market for this resource has attracted more people to the business.
"Due to the economic and political constraints the state faces today, the management of the CPRs is mainly under the control of powerful individuals, who have manipulated and shaped the political system in favour of their personal interests. The customary laws, which promoted collective action, have been replaced by formal laws giving the external actors powers on resource management and extraction.
"The paper will explain these differences and link them to the institutional change in Tanzania since colonial and Ujamaa times. However, it is important to see how locality and access to markets are important factors influencing the development of sustainable CPR institutions and therefore, of successful collective action coping with the open access dilemma, which emerged by a de facto open access situation stemming from ineffective CPR management by the state."
|