| dc.contributor.author |
Koczy, László Á. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2011-01-28T20:09:21Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2011-01-28T20:09:21Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2002 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6939 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can
be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Discussion Paper, no. 02.17 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
tragedy of the commons--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
simulations |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--models |
en_US |
| dc.title |
A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Centre for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |