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Abstract:
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"As broad bodies of literature and empirical evidence have demonstrated,
management of common-pool resources implies an institutional construction that
would be able to take into account not only physical attributes of the resources, but
also attributes of the community facing the collective action problem. Among these
attributes, there are values of behavior generally accepted by the community as
vehicle of shared learning and foundation of social order, crucial variables of
relevance for the institutional analysis.
After a review of the related literature, it was analyzed how internal and shared
values can affect the level of cooperation and the institutional evolution in local
irrigation systems. The discussed hypothesis sustains that individual values in such
communities can interact during the course of time with the process of water
management, leading to an institutional evolution that translates individual demands
in changing rules in use. Such a topic has been addressed applying IAD Framework
and Ostroms design principles of long-enduring irrigation systems on small self-
organized farming communities in Northern Italy, having as support a qualitative
methodology of analysis based on in depth interviews.
As a result, it was notable that even if members of the community seem to
understand and to accept all such principles, without exception, these principles by
themselves have not led to a sustainable water management. This might be due to a lack of a well-supported common vision of the resource, besides by a level of trust
and of positive social capital not sufficiently widespread on the score of improper
leaderships experienced."
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