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Formal Sanctions in CPRs: Why so Often, but so Low? Combining Logics of Rational Choice using IAD-framework

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dc.contributor.author Autto, H.
dc.date.accessioned 2011-11-09T20:26:19Z
dc.date.available 2011-11-09T20:26:19Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/7682
dc.description.abstract "Many successful regimes managing common-pool resources have crafted formal rules, but the level of formal sanctions is usually low. These observations seem to constitute a contradiction of a sort. On the one hand, formal sanctions seem to be helpful. On the other hand, their deterrence effect is used only to a small extent. These observations are explained by studying interaction effects between formal sanctions and other institutions that can sustain cooperation in a collective action game. We distinguish two positive mechanisms (direct mechanism, belief mechanism) between deterrence and collective action by combining logics of PD and coordination games in the IAD-framework using the concept of conformism. Despite conformism, deterrence is expected to contribute positively to the collective action, but exact effects depend on the distribution of conformism in the population. However, formal sanctions also interact with informal controls depending on the system characteristics. These effects may very well undermine or outweigh the potential for deterrence. Therefore, a formal agency does not face a simple optimization problem. Agencies prefer low sanctions as they rather complement informal controls than take a risk of supplanting them." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject rational choice theory en_US
dc.subject institutional analysis--IAD framework en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.title Formal Sanctions in CPRs: Why so Often, but so Low? Combining Logics of Rational Choice using IAD-framework en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Shared Resources in a Rapidly Changing World, European Regional Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates September 14-17 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Agricultural University, Plovdiv, Bulgaria en_US


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