Property Rights as a Cause of the Tragedy of the Commons: Institutional Change and the Pastoral Maasai in Kenya

Found at: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/7921
PDF
Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Blewett, Robert A.
Conference:	Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society
Location:	Austin, TX
Conf. Date:	April 8-10
Date:	1994
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10535/7921
Sector:	Grazing Theory
Region:	Africa
Subject(s):	grazing property rights common pool resources tragedy of the commons Maasai (African people)
Abstract:	"The pastoral commons of the Maasai offers a case in which common ownership proved superior to private property and where the creation of property rights was a cause of the tragedy of the commons. Property rights diminished sustainable use of the commons by disrupting the complex institutional structure of the Maasai used to control access to the commons and to provide insurance against environmental uncertainties. Analogous to a Coasian firm, Maasai institutions reduced the transactions costs of cooperation and coordination relative to market exchanges. This article explores pre-colonial institutions and the impact of colonial and post-colonial policies on the pastoral economy."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
Propertyrightsasacause.pdf	1.022Mb	PDF	View/Open

The following license files are associated with this item: