Norm Impacts on States-Building: A Hierarchical-Coalition Game Model of the State-Building of Japan

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8029
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Ueda, Yoshifumi
Conference:	2006 Conference of JPCS
Location:	Kyoto University, Japan
Conf. Date:	July 1-2
Date:	2006
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/8029
Sector:	Social Organization Theory
Region:	East Asia
Subject(s):	norms game theory common pool resources public goods and bads coalitions hierarchy--models
Abstract:	"This paper shows (1) that both Shinto and Bushido have rational bases for having prevailed in Japan, (2) that the norms of Shinto and of Bushido promoted the society or state-building process f the chiefdom, kingdom, and feudalism of Japan, and (3) that those societies can be formulated by a hierarchical-coalition game, and (4) that they can be classified by differences in how to share leaderships for commons' preservation, agricultural production, and enforcement services, the 'increasing returns to scale' effect of which are crucial factors for determining how or by whom those leaderships are shared."

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