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PDF
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Type:
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Book Chapter |
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Author:
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Ostrom, Elinor; Kaufmann, F. X.; Majone, G.; Ostrom, Vincent |
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Book Title:
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Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector |
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Publisher:
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Walter de Gruyter |
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Location:
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New York |
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Page(s):
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495-510 |
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Date:
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1986 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/82
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Sector:
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Social Organization |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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Workshop
institutional analysis
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Abstract:
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"Two linked action situations are examined in this chapter using the method of Institutional analysis previously described in Chapter 22. The first arena is the one in which public officials are elected. The most influential model of this arena was developed by Anthony Downs. The second arena is the one in which elected officials bargain with the heads of administrative agencies (sponsors) over the amount of the budget to be allocated and the amount and type of goods or services to be produced. William Niskanen developed an important model of this process. The central question addressed in this chapter is how multiple organizations, competing according to sets of rules, tend to enhance the responsiveness of public officials and bureau chiefs to the preferences of the citizens they serve in both of these arenas. Empirical evidence supporting the proposition that competition among potential producers of a public good will enhance performance is presented related to the provision of solid waste removal services in American cities."
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